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Abstract
This thesis addresses questions regarding the effect of income taxation on labor market
outcomes.
Chapter 1 asks “Do income taxes create accumulating effects over time on pre-tax
hourly wages by distorting on-the-job human capital accumulation?” This chapter presents
micro evidence by exploiting Danish administrative data and a tax reform. After non-
parametrically controlling for pre-reform income and covariates, I provide graphical ev-
idence and difference-in-differences estimates regarding the accumulating effects. I find
suggestive evidence that learning-by-doing is the underlying channel. However, I do not
find significant effects of taxes on participation in on-the-job training courses. To un-
derstand welfare implications, this chapter next constructs a labor supply model with
endogenous wage dynamics as a conceptual framework. Guided by the model, the elastic-
ity estimates imply that the wage response has a larger impact on welfare than the hour
response and that both responses create accumulating effects on welfare.
In Chapter 2, we study the impact of labor income taxation on workers’ job search
behavior and the implications it has for the equilibrium allocation of heterogenous workers
across heterogenous firms. The analysis is conducted within a complete markets equilib-
rium on-the-job search model with two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous job search effort
and hiring intensity, equilibrium wage formation, and firm entry and exit. By appropri-
ating part of the gain from finding a better paid job, income taxation reduces the return
to job search effort, and distorts workers’ job search effort, which, in turn, distorts the
equilibrium allocation of labor. The model is estimated on Danish matched employer-
employee data, and is used to evaluate a series of tax reforms in Denmark in the 1990s
and 2000s, to provide new insights into the elasticity of taxable labor income, and to
identify a Pareto-optimal income tax reform.
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Chapter 1
Accumulating Effects of Income
Taxes on Wages: Micro Evidence
from Denmark
1.1 Introduction
Economists have paid a large amount of attention to distortionary effects of income taxes
on individual behavior. The early empirical literature exclusively focuses on a labor supply
response and reaches its consensus that taxes have an impact almost only on labor force
participation by females.1 However, observing that taxes distort not only labor supply
but also behavior in other dimensions (e.g., work effort or tax avoidance), Feldstein (1995,
1999) argues that an elasticity of taxable income (ETI hereafter) with respect to marginal
tax rates is more appropriate for welfare analysis because it works as a sufficient statistic
capturing all the behavioral responses. Following this contribution, the recent literature
shifts its interest from the elasticity of labor supply to the ETI as a relevant parameter.2
Recent estimates of the ETI using US data are around 0.4 (Saez et al. (2012b)), but
heterogeneity in two aspects is worth mentioning. The first is along the income distribu-
tion. Gruber and Saez (2002) find larger ETIs for high-income individuals than for the
rest. The second is that ETIs for self-employed workers are larger than for wage earners as
found by Kleven and Schultz (2014a) using Danish data. The literature attributes these
1See Blundell and Macurdy (1999) and Blundell, MaCurdy, and Meghir (2007) for surveys on theoret-
ical and empirical frameworks. Keane (2011) and Meghir and Phillips (2010) give overviews of recent
empirical evidence.
2See Chetty (2009a,b), Hendren (2016), and Kleven (2018) for the “sufficient statistic” approach, and
see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012b) for a survey on the ETIs. Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) formulate
the idea that the ETI is not an immutable structural parameter but a choice variable shaped by features
of the tax system, e.g., opportunities for tax avoidance or evasion.
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results to tax avoidance and evasion.3 In other words, ETIs are small for the majority of
employed workers, who consist of more than half of the entire labor force in most countries
(e.g., Kleven (2014)). Slemrod (1992, 1995) argues that real behavior is far less responsive
to taxes than avoidance or timing behavior. His argument implies that small ETIs for em-
ployed workers reflect real behavioral responses such as labor supply, which are crucial for
economic performance and growth.4 To better understand distortionary effects of taxes,
one would need to move beyond the ETI because its aggregate notion might miss some
important micro responses.
This paper empirically investigates a new channel through which taxes distort real
behavior among employed workers. More specifically, the hypothesis is that taxes have
an impact on pre-tax hourly wages. Despite the fact that wages are an important labor
market variable along with labor supply variables, their responsiveness to taxes has not
been studied in detail. Related research is done by Blomquist and Selin (2010), and I
compare my estimation results to theirs in Section 1.5.5
Taxes can have an impact on wages through several behavioral responses. The empiri-
cal literature has analyzed the effect of taxes on job search (Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri
(2011b) and Gentry and Hubbard (2004b)) or bargaining (Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva
(2014)). Although they do not look at pre-tax hourly wages as an outcome, both responses
arguably have an impact on wages. This paper contributes to the literature by presenting
empirical evidence on another behavioral response to taxes: human capital accumulation
on the job. This channel has been studied mainly by structurally estimating Ben-Porath
models (Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014), Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, 1999),
and Taber (2002)) or learning-by-doing models (Keane (2015, 2016) and Keane and Wasi
(2016)). Rather than taking a structural approach, this paper estimates reduced-form pa-
rameters, which will provide a basis for structural estimation. Since on-the-job human cap-
ital accumulation can be through on-the-job training (e.g., Simonsen and Skipper (2008))
or learning-by-doing (e.g., Stinebrickner, Stinebrickner, and Sullivan (2017)), I distinguish
these two by using information on participation in on-the-job training courses and hours
worked as proxies.6
3For example, Goolsbee (2000) and Gorry, Hassett, Hubbard, and Mathur (2017) find that large ETIs
among executives come from the exercise of stock options as a way to shift income intertemporally, although
Hall and Liebman (2000) find only a modest impact of stock options. Kreiner, Leth-Petersen, and Skov
(2016) also identify large intertemporal income shifting driven by a tax reform among high-income em-
ployees.
4See Mertens and Olea (2018) for recent time-series evidence regarding impacts of taxes on GDP and
unemployment.
5Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Lockwood, Slok, and Tranaes (2000) are early examples using
aggregate data. Although their focus is not on individual income taxes, Saez, Schoefer, and Seim (2017)
find zero effects of an employer payroll tax cut on net-of-tax wages while Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch (2018)
and Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar (2016) estimate the incidence of corporate taxes on wages.
6Education choice (i.e., human capital investment off the job) is also an important behavioral response
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This paper also makes a contribution by considering accumulating effects of taxes
on wages. As an worker invests in human capital subject to taxes for multiple periods,
distortion will accumulate over time and appear gradually in her wage dynamics. One thus
has to analyze not only a one-shot impact but also a long-lasting impact of taxes for an
appropriate policy evaluation. However, broadly speaking, the empirical micro literature
estimates short-run static elasticities, while the macro calibration literature compares
two long-run steady-states.7 The current paper therefore fills the gap between these two
strands of the literature.
To find micro evidence, this paper exploits rich Danish administrative data covering the
whole population with detailed individual income and demographics. Exogenous variation
in tax rates comes from a large tax reform that pushes some taxpayers to other tax
brackets. Comparing taxpayers pushed to another bracket with those staying in the same
bracket constitutes a difference-in-differences (DID hereafter) empirical strategy of this
paper. To deal with endogeneity caused by correlation between treatment assignment
and pre-reform income, I focus on a specific tax bracket where treatment and control
groups have almost identical distributions of pre-reform income, leading to non-parametric
controlling for it. In addition, to make the treatment group similar to the control group
in terms of pre-reform covariates, I apply a covariate balancing method akin to propensity
score matching methods.
I first provide graphical evidence that demonstrates parallel wage dynamics between
the treatment and control groups before the reform but diverging wage dynamics after
the reform. Moving on to regression analysis, DID estimates show that an intertemporal
elasticity of wages with respect to net-of-marginal tax rates (i.e., one minus marginal tax
rates) is statistically significant and 0.05 one year after the reform but reaches as high
as 0.1 five years after the reform. Several threats to identification such as composition
changes in employed workers over time are discussed and tested to verify my estimation
results. Further, I find suggestive evidence that learning-by-doing is the underlying chan-
nel. Namely, an intertemporal elasticity of hours worked with respect to net-of-marginal
tax rates is increasing over time. The increasing patterns of both wage and hour elastici-
ties over time are consistent with the notion of learning-by-doing. However, I do not find
significant effects of taxes on the incidence of on-the-job training.
Since the literature typically analyzes a welfare consequence of income taxes under a
static labor supply model with exogenous wages, this paper next studies how the accu-
mulating effects of taxes on wages change our understanding on welfare. Although the
but identification will be extremely difficult.
7A few exceptions in the ETI literature estimating long-run elasticities are Holmlund and Soderstrom
(2011), who adopt a dynamic panel model, and Giertz (2010) and Heim (2009), who consider time-lagged
responses.
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ETI is a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis and one thus does not have to identify each
underlying response (such as wage and hour responses), decomposing welfare into its roots
(i.e., “the anatomy of behavioral response”) opens up the black box and has important
normative implications (Chetty et al. (2011b), Saez (2003), and Slemrod (1996, 1998)).
As a conceptual framework, I construct a labor supply model in which a worker chooses
continuous hours to work and invests in on-the-job training subject to taxes every period.
Wages increase through learning-by-doing or on-the-job training. I then derive a for-
mula for marginal excess burden of taxation, which is decomposed into wage and hour
elasticities. Guided by this model, the elasticity estimates imply that the wage response
has a larger impact on welfare than the hour response and that both responses create
accumulating effects on welfare. In relation to “the anatomy of behavioral response”,
these results indicate that when evaluating tax policies aimed at encouraging labor supply
such as Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), researchers should look at responses not only
in labor supply but also in wages and their interactions over time. Further normative
implications will be negative impacts on labor supply and welfare created by phase-out
(positive) tax rates of EITC could be mitigated by other tax policies encouraging human
capital accumulation on the job.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 describes a tax system and reform in
Denmark. Section 1.3 explains data. Section 1.4 explains empirical strategies. Section 1.5
presents DID estimation results. Section 1.6 analyzes welfare. Section 1.7 concludes. All
the tables and figures are placed at the end of the paper.
1.2 Danish tax system and reform in 1987
Like other Scandinavian countries, Denmark is characterized by relatively high tax bur-
dens. According to Kleven (2014), the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is 48 percent in 2012.
This is higher than other countries such as Germany (36 percent), the United Kingdom (35
percent), and the United States (25 percent). Denmark collects about half of its revenue
from individual income taxes, and here their impact on individual behavior is studied by
using a tax reform as a natural experiment.
The Danish tax system has experienced several reforms since the 1980s, and major
reforms took places in 1987, 1994, 1999, and 2004. I focus on the 1987 reform because
it creates larger variation in tax rates, tax bases, and tax bracket cutoffs. In addition,
compared to other reforms, the tax system is stable before and after the 1987 reform. This
reform is therefore not gradual changes phased in over an extended period of time but a
one-shot large change taking place in 1987, which is suitable for estimating accumulating
effects of taxes on wages.
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Before the 1987 reform, individual income taxation in Denmark was based on a single
measure of taxable income. Table 1.1 explains the components of taxable income and their
main items.8 Taxable income (TI) is composed of personal income (PI), capital income
(CI), and net of deductions (– D). Personal income is further decomposed into labor income
(LI) and other personal income (OPI). Labor income is the largest component of taxable
income as confirmed by descriptive statistics in Section 1.3, and the interest of this paper
lies on marginal tax rates on labor income.
The left panel of Table 1.2 describes the individual tax system before the 1987 reform.
First of all, one can see that the tax base is simply taxable income (TI) in all brackets.
Taxes in Denmark are divided into regional and national taxes. Although their variations
are small, regional tax rates vary by municipality and county.9 National taxes have a
progressive structure with three brackets. These tax rates are cumulative such that, for
example, an individual in the middle bracket faces a 28.0 + 19.9 + 14.4 = 62.3 percent
marginal tax rate. Finally, while taxation is based on individual filing for married couples,
some exemptions can be transferred across spouses. As I explain in Section 1.4, these
details of the tax system are taken into account in simulating tax liabilities and effective
marginal tax rates for individuals.
Given that the reform changed the tax system in a slightly complicated way, it will
be worthwhile to get its big picture. Figure 1.1 plots marginal tax rates on labor income
(LI) as a function of LI before and after the 1987 reform. The tax rates and cutoffs are
from Table 1.2 while assuming other personal income (OPI), capital income (CI), and
deductions (D) are all zero. By assuming OPI = CI = D = 0, marginal tax rates are a
deterministic function of only LI, which simplifies a complex structure of the tax system
and thus is helpful for a overview of the reform. All the details are explained below but it
is clear from the figure that, for example, the reform makes the tax system less progressive.
Before moving on to details of the reform, it is also useful to mention its background.
In an international context, the Danish tax system prior to the reform was characterized
by high marginal tax rates and narrow tax bases. As the left panel of Table 1.2 shows,
the top marginal tax rate was as high as 73 percent. Regarding narrow tax bases, first
note that capital income is negative for the majority of Danish taxpayers as a result of
interest payments on debt such as mortgage and other loans. Therefore, negative capital
income was subtracted from the tax base of every bracket, leading to narrow tax bases
and creating incentives to getting into debt. Given these backgrounds, the purpose of the
reform was, among others, to lower marginal tax rates and encourage private savings. The
reform was passed in parliament in March 1986 and came into effect from January 1987.
8Description about institutional settings is partly based on Kleven and Schultz (2014a), who exploit a
series of tax reforms in Denmark including the 1987 one.
9In 1986, for example, the 10th percentile of regional tax rates is 26.1 while the 90th percentile is 29.8.
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The right panel of Table 1.2 describes the individual tax system after the 1987 reform.
As one can see, the reform is characterized by (i) a differential change in progressive tax
rates across brackets, (ii) a change in tax bases from a single measure of taxable income
(TI) to its components (PI, CI, D) for the middle and top brackets, and (iii) an increase
in bracket cutoffs in national taxes. Regarding the third point, the cutoffs increased
by around 15 percent for the bottom and middle brackets and by 7.5 percent for the
top bracket. Note that the inflation rate in 1986 was 3.7 percent, and thus the bracket
cutoffs increased by larger amounts than inflation indexation. Given the second and third
points that the tax bases and cutoffs have changed by the reform, some taxpayers were
pushed upward to the higher bracket while others with the same taxable income (TI) were
pushed downward to the lower bracket depending on the composition of TI. This bracket
movement gives me a DID identification strategy that compares workers staying in the
same bracket with those pushed to another bracket. I explain the details of this empirical
strategy in Section 1.4.
As is also emphasized by Kleven and Schultz (2014a), it is important to note that
the reform changed the tax structure along all income groups. If the reform changed
the tax structure only among top-bracket taxpayers, comparing them with middle-bracket
taxpayers (as a control group) over time would be conflated by non-tax factors that create
heterogenous wage trends such as skill-biased technological changes. This reform, however,
affected every taxpayer in a heterogenous way depending on the composition of pre-reform
taxable income. Therefore, one can find two groups of taxpayers with similar pre-reform
income levels but with different tax-bracket movements. As I show in Section 1.4, this
feature of the reform enables me to find treatment and control groups whose pre-reform
income distributions are almost identical to each other.
Additional comments are in order about the reform. First, regional taxes changed
only marginally throughout the reform. The variation thus comes almost exclusively from
national taxes. Second, as is consistent with its background, the reform broadened the
tax bases of the middle and top brackets because negative capital income and deductions
cannot be subtracted from these tax bases under the new tax system.
1.3 Data
The empirical analysis of this paper exploits an administrative data set based on several
registers such as the tax register and IDA covering the whole Danish population since
1980.10 They are constructed and maintained by Statistics Denmark for research pur-
10IDA is an acronym for “Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning” (Integrated Database for
Labor Market Research).
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poses. The data set contains a wide range of information including worker identifiers,
socioeconomic backgrounds, job characteristics, and individual income necessary to sim-
ulate tax liabilities and effective marginal tax rates. Individual income is observed yearly
and aggregated into labor income (LI), other personal income (OPI), capital income (CI),
and deductions (D) as listed in Table 1.1.
For socioeconomic backgrounds, I use yearly variables on age, gender, marital status,
the number of children (younger than 17 years old), education levels (low, middle, and
high)11, and household assets. Let me clarify a few points regarding household assets.
First, they include financial assets, non-financial assets, and (net of) debts at their market
prices. Second, they are summation of an individual’s and his or her spouse’s assets. This
wide range of demographic information allows me to control for factors related to wage
trends and will be one of the advantages of my data set given that tax return data in US
usually does not have such information as pointed out by Weber (2014).
For an outcome variable, I first use hourly wages as a main focus of this paper. We
observe in the data whether workers are employed or not on the 28th of November each
year. The definition of employment in this paper is hence being employed on this particular
day. Then, only for employed workers, the data contains hourly wages for the jobs held on
the 28th of November. For simplicity, a job held on the 28th of November is referred to as a
“November job” in the following. Hourly wages are computed by dividing yearly earnings
from November jobs (precisely recorded by the tax authorities) by yearly hours worked
for November jobs.12 Hours worked are estimates based on yearly pension contribution
records (called “ATP”) by exploiting the fact that accumulated pensions depend only on
hours in a certain way. The details of this estimation are documented thoroughly by
Lund and Vejlin (2016), who find that the estimates are precise especially for full-time
workers by comparing their wage estimates to wages obtained from another data source.
I next use daily hours worked as an outcome. Given the estimates of yearly hours
worked for November jobs, daily hours worked are computed by dividing yearly hours
worked by yearly days worked for November jobs. The latter information comes from
job spell data that contains start and end dates of the November jobs. Since the job
spell data starts in 1985, daily hours worked are available only from 1985. Although they
are estimates, availability of both wages and hours together with the tax return data is
novel and allows one to analyze responses to taxes in both dimensions. Finally, I also use
information on participation in on-the-job training courses as an outcome but explain its
11Low education is defined by completion of primary education. Middle education is defined by comple-
tion of high school or vocational education. High education is defined by holding of bachelor, master, or
PhD degrees.
12Labor income (LI) in Table 1.1 includes earnings from a November job and jobs held outside of the
28th of November. That is, LI is the yearly total amount of earnings.
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details in the corresponding analysis of Section 1.5.
A window of analysis is between 1983 and 1993 because there were minor tax reforms
in 1982 and 1983, and also because the next tax reform (after the 1987 one) took place
in 1994. I select males employed (on the 28th of November) in all of the pre-reform years
from 1983 to 1986. This criteria picks up male workers who are strongly attached to
the labor market and are thus presumably in full-time jobs, which is desirable for the
following reasons: First, as Lund and Vejlin (2016) find it, the wage estimates of full-
time workers are more precise than those of part-time workers. Second, since I test the
hypothesis that taxes distort individual behavior on the job, it is necessary to select core
labor market participants. As Chetty et al. (2011b) find it, (married) female workers
form bunching around bracket cutoffs in Denmark. Their behavior might be described
by avoidance or timing responses in addition to real behavioral responses such as human
capital accumulation. It thus will be difficult to estimate accumulating effects of taxes on
wages with females. I come back to the issue of bunching in Section 1.5.
This sample selection also ensures wage observations for all of the pre-reform years
and therefore is useful for looking at pre-reform wage trends. Notice that the restriction
is imposed only on the pre-reform period because, after the reform, a decision on taking
a job will be endogenous in relation to the reform. This point is related to composition
changes in employed workers over time, which I discuss in Section 1.5.
In the end, my data set consists of male workers employed in the pre-reform years
and follows them after the reform with small attrition due to, e.g., death or emigration
(around 3 percent attrition in the final year of the sample period). Table 1.3 displays
cross-sectional descriptive statistics of these workers in 1986. Mean values as of 1986 are
listed, and 1 Danish Krone (DKK) in 1986 is approximately equal to 0.3 US Dollar (USD)
in 2016. A few points are worth mentioning about the components of taxable income.
First, labor income is by far the largest component, suggesting that it is important to
control for it in the analysis to come. Second, as I touched upon in Section 1.2, capital
income is, on average, negative mainly as a result of interest payments on debt such as
mortgage and other loans.13
1.4 Empirical strategy
This paper adopts a DID framework by using the tax reform and administrative data
described in Sections 1.2 and 1.3. The basic idea of DID estimation is comparing outcomes
of treated and control units over time where treated units get some treatment after an
exogenous event, which is the tax reform in this paper. The key identification assumption
13As the data includes only males, I use masculine pronouns for a worker below.
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is a parallel-trend assumption, which requires that treated units have the same trend in
outcomes as control units in the absence of the treatment. Although this assumption is
not directly testable, one could conduct a (placebo) test to see whether the pre-treatment
trends are identical between the two units.
In the following, I explain (i) how to form treated and control units while exploiting
the reform, (ii) how to deal with endogeneity caused by correlation between treatment
assignment and pre-reform income, and (iii) a covariate balancing method that will be
useful for the parallel-trend assumption.
1.4.1 Treated and control units
As I mentioned in Section 1.2, this paper exploits the variation in tax bases and bracket
cutoffs induced by the reform that pushes some taxpayers to other tax brackets. For
this purpose, it’s necessary to identify in which brackets taxpayers are located but the
tax register does not contain such information. I hence calculate yearly tax liabilities
for individuals using a tax simulator based on the one developed by Kleven and Schultz
(2014a)14. This simulator requires, as inputs, individual income listed in Table 1.1 (i.e.,
LI, OPI, CI, and D) and individual characteristics such as marital status (to calculate
exemption transfers across spouses). The simulator takes into account the details of the
Danish tax system and pins down in which brackets taxpayers are located.
Tax-liable individuals are located in one of the three brackets as shown in Table 1.2.
Let B86(zi86) denote that a worker i is in the bottom bracket under the 1986 tax system
with his 1986 income and characteristics zi86 = {LIi86,OPIi86,CIi86,Di86, xi86}, where xi86
includes, for example, marital status. Similarly, one can define M86(zi86) and T
86(zi86) as
a worker i in the middle or top brackets under the 1986 tax system with his 1986 income
and characteristics zi86.
Let us next construct a measure of bracket movements created by the 1987 reform.
This measure should be mechanical in the sense that it captures exogenous variation
induced by the reform. To this end, it is useful to consider the following counterfactual
bracket location: B˜
87
(zi86) denotes that a worker i is in the bottom bracket with his
1986 income and characteristics zi86 if the tax system were the inflation-adjusted 1987 tax
system. By the inflation-adjusted 1987 tax system, I mean the 1987 tax system where all
the monetary values such as bracket cutoffs are deflated at the 1986 price level.15 Note
that his behavior and income are fixed at the 1986 level zi86. M˜
87
(zi86) and T˜
87
(zi86) are
analogously defined.
By combining the actual and counterfactual bracket locations, I hence construct a
14I modified their codes available on the website of American Economic Association.
15I use CPI downloaded from the website of Denmark Statistics as a deflator.
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measure of bracket movements, that is, mechanical changes in brackets as follows:
B86(zi86)B˜
87
(zi86) : i stays in the bottom bracket (BB)
B86(zi86)M˜
87
(zi86) : i moves from the bottom to middle brackets (BM)
M86(zi86)B˜
87
(zi86) : i moves from the middle to bottom brackets (MB)
...
T86(zi86)T˜
87
(zi86) : i stays in the top bracket (TT).
To ease the notations, let BM denote B86(zi86)M˜
87
(zi86) with the same rule applied to other
cases. For example, BM means that, when fixing his behavior and income at the 1986
level zi86, he is in the bottom bracket under the 1986 tax system but in the middle bracket
under the 1987 tax system. Therefore, BM is a movement from the bottom bracket to the
middle bracket mechanically created by the reform. Rich and heterogenous variation in
tax bases and bracket cutoffs induced by the reform generates all the movements of (BB,
BM, MB, MM, MT, TM, TT).
Using the mechanical changes in brackets, the following four groups each with treated
and control units are formed:
BM group = {Treated: BM, Control: BB}
MB group = {Treated: MB, Control: MM}
MT group = {Treated: MT, Control: MM}
TM group = {Treated: TM, Control: TT}.
Treated units are pushed upward or downward to other brackets while control units stay
in the same bracket. Comparing wage dynamics of treated units to those of control units
before and after the reform constitutes the DID empirical strategy of this paper, as is
similarly done by Saez (2003) and Singleton (2011), who also exploit bracket movements to
estimate ETIs. I exclusively focus on the MB group for the identification reason discussed
in Section 1.4.2 and test my hypothesis that the treated units have higher wage growth
than the control units in the MB group.
1.4.2 Endogeneity by pre-reform income
As is clear from the discussion in Section 1.4.1, treatment assignment is a deterministic
function of pre-reform income and characteristics zi86 = {LIi86,OPIi86,CIi86,Di86, xi86},
where xi86 includes, for example, marital status. While it is straightforward to control for
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xi86 such as marital status, the ETI literature finds that estimates are very sensitive to
specifications of pre-reform income controls. Since similar concerns will also apply to the
relationship between taxes and wages, I here explain how to deal with endogeneity caused
by correlation between treatment assignment and pre-reform income. My identification
strategy is, in a nutshell, to control for labor income LIi86 carefully but leave the other
components {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} uncontrolled and use them for variation.
Regarding pre-reform labor income LIi86, it is easy to understand the endogeneity
issue by starting from Figure 1.2, which plots kernel density estimates of the logarithm of
LIi86 (log LIi86) by treatment status for the BM, MB, MT, and TM groups. One can see
that treatment assignment is correlated with LIi86 in an expected way: that is, in the BM
and MT groups, the treated units have higher LIi86 (i.e., located at the right end of the
brackets), while in the MB and TM groups, they have lower LIi86 (i.e., located at the left
end of the brackets). This causes endogeneity because LIi86 is arguably also correlated
with wage dynamics due to, e.g., skill-biased technological changes.
One needs to control for pre-reform income to deal with the endogeneity but the
literature finds that regression results are very sensitive to specifications of controls.16
This is easily understood from Figure 1.2. Let us consider the TM group for illustration.
Since the support of log LIi86 does not sufficiently overlap with each other between the
treated and control units, linear regression with pre-reform income controls heavily relies
on extrapolation.17 However, the MB group does not suffer from lack of the common
support. Rather, as Figure 1.2 clearly shows, the distributions of the treated and control
units are almost identical to each other, which will ensure estimation results robust to
specifications of LIi86 controls. I hence exclusively focus on the MB group in the following
analysis.
Let us move on to the other components of pre-reform income {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86}.
Since treatment assignment is a deterministic function of pre-reform income, controlling
for {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} in addition to LIi86 will destroy identification. Given that labor
income is the dominant component of taxable income (Table 1.3) and that the wide range
of demographic information is available for controls, I do not control for the other com-
ponents of pre-reform income to maintain the variation in treatment assignment. The
identification assumption imposed here is therefore that once controlling for LIi86 and
demographics (age, marital status, the number of children, education levels, and house-
hold assets), {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} do not affect wage dynamics. Borrowing terminology
from the instrumental variable estimation literature, I call this assumption as an exclusion
16See Saez et al. (2012b) for extensive discussions, and see Burns and Ziliak (2017) and Weber (2014)
for recent developments.
17Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) and Imbens (2015) clarify this point in the context of the
advantage of synthetic control and matching methods over regression.
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restriction:
wage dynamics ⊥ {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} | {LIi86, demographics}, (1.1)
which is tested and verified later in Section 1.5. As I explained in Section 1.2, the reform
changed tax bases as well as bracket cutoffs and thus creates the variation in treatment
assignment among those who have same LIi86 but different {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86}.
1.4.3 Covariate balancing
In the DID framework, similarity between the treated and control units is crucial for
the parallel-trend assumption. If they are different in terms of observable covatiates, one
cannot expect that their outcomes follow the same trends in the absence of the treatment.
I thus apply a covariate balancing method to pre-treatment covariates of the MB group.
The idea of covariate balancing methods is to construct weights to achieve balance in
covariates between the treated and control units. The covariates considered here are (i)
demographics in 1986 (age, age square, marital status, the number of children, education
levels, and household assets), (ii) real wage changes between 1985 and 1986 (∆ logw =
logwi86 − logwi85), and (iii) logarithms of labor income in 1986 (log LI) and its square.
These are listed in Table 1.4, and I clarify a few points about the second and third
covariates.18
The motivation to control for ∆ logw is to deal with mean reversion. Recall that work-
ers are employed in both of 1985 and 1986 by sample selection and located in the middle
bracket in 1986 by construction of the MB group. Those hit by high transitory shocks
in wages and labor income in 1986 are more likely to be located at the right end of the
bracket and therefore be in the control units. This is shown by ∆ logw and log LI in Table
1.4. Due to mean reversion, their wages will drop on average for the following periods
even without any tax reforms, causing overestimation of treatment effects. “Ashenfelter’s
dip” found by Ashenfelter (1978) is an early example related to mean reversion in the DID
framework, and the recent ETI literature proposes several solutions. Auten and Carroll
(1999) control for log pre-reform income while Gruber and Saez (2002) propose more flex-
ible specifications by using ten-piece splines in log pre-reform income. Kopczuk (2005)
controls for log pre-reform income in levels and changes. My specification is similar to
Kopczuk (2005) in the sense that I control for pre-reform income (log LI) and pre-reform
wage changes (∆ logw). Although these specifications are widely accepted in the ETI
literature, Weber (2014) points out that their validity depends on assumptions regarding
18I use household assets not in logarithms but in levels because some households have negative assets
due to debts.
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serial correlation in error terms. If, for example, the error process is serially correlated,
she shows that endogeneity remains unresolved. Therefore, it will be useful to test serial
correlation to further examine this concern.
Regarding log LI, I experiment with the following two specifications: (i) I do not include
any LI controls in the covariates and (ii) I include log LI and its square. Since the MB
group has the almost identical pre-reform LI distributions between the treated and control
units, these two specifications should produce similar estimation results. Therefore, it will
be interesting to compare results with and without LI controls.
Returning to a covariate balancing method, I use entropy balancing developed by
Hainmueller (2012). The popular alternative will be matching methods based on propen-
sity scores, which are known to be sensitive to model miss-specifications. Entropy balanc-
ing however directly calculates weights of control units for pre-specified covariates and is
thus non-parametric because there is no need to use parametric propensity scores.19
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.4 display raw mean values of the covariates by treatment
status. The two units are different in several dimensions. In particular, the treated
units have a much higher marriage rate. This is partly because some rules applied to
the middle tax bracket about exemption transfers across spouses have changed after the
reform. On the other hand, as expected, log LI is almost same between the two units
with respect to the first and second moments. Column 3 displays mean values of the
control units weighted by entropy balancing when I do not include any LI controls in the
covariates. The results clearly show that entropy balancing works well to achieve high
balance, which ensures that the pre-treatment covarites are non-parametrically controlled
for. Column 4 displays the results when I include log LI and its square. Although I
include only the first and second moments of log LI, the third and forth moments are
also found to be balanced.20 Balancing log LI and its square is hence sufficient. In
the following analysis, the control units are weighted (or balanced) ones unless explicitly
stated otherwise. Combination of the DID design with the covariate balancing method
will be useful to deliver causal effects, as is done in the literature based on matching on
propensity scores (Abadie (2005), Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen (2004),
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and Smith and Todd (2005)).
19See Hainmueller and Xu (2013) for implementation in Stata, Zhao and Percival (2017) for theoretical
properties related to doubly robustness, and Marcus (2013) and Marcus and Siedler (2015) for economic
applications.
20Mean of (log LI)3 is 1709 for the both units. Mean of (log LI)4 is 20445 also for the both.
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1.5 Difference-in-differences estimation
With all the ingredients necessary for DID estimation having been explained in the pre-
vious sections, we are now in a position to look at accumulating effects of taxes on wages.
I first present graphical evidence followed by a discussion on threats to identification. I
next, one by one, present regression results with wages, participation in training courses
on the job, and daily hours worked as outcomes.
1.5.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 1.3 plots mean log wages of the treated and control units for the MB group. Mean
log wages are relative to 1986 (the final year of the old tax system), that is, logwit−logwi86
is plotted for t = 83, ..., 93, where wit is real hourly wages for jobs held on the 28th of
November in a year t. The control units are weighted by entropy balancing. The top
panel of Figure 1.3 does not include any LI controls in the covariates to balance, which
corresponds to Column 3 of Table 1.4. On the other hand, the bottom panel includes log
LI and its square, which corresponds to Column 4 of Table 1.4.
First of all, the two panels of Figure 1.3 show quite similar wage dynamics of the control
units.21 The ETI literature finds estimates very sensitive to specifications of pre-reform
income controls. For example, Saez et al. (2012b) find that, using the tax reform targeted
at the top income group, some signs of ETIs are flipped once controlling for pre-reform
income. This is partly because one has to compare the top (e.g., 1%) income group with
the next (e.g., 9%) income group and thus heavily rely on extrapolation in regression to
control for different income levels. My results show the advantage of controlling for pre-
reform income non-parametrically, i.e., exclusively focusing on the MB group where the
treated and control units have the almost identical pre-reform labor income distributions
(Figure 1.2). This strategy makes results robust to inclusion of pre-reform income in the
covariates. At the same time, however, my results also show that including log LI and
its square is useful especially for the parallel pre-reform wage trends. Thus, I choose
the bottom panel of Figure 1.3 as a main specification and present results based on this
specification (i.e., Column 4 of Table 1.4) in the following analysis.
Before moving on to details of the main specification, I here demonstrate the advantage
of focusing on the MB group again but I do so this time by comparing its wage dynamics
with those of the other three groups, i.e., the BM, MT, and TM groups. Figure 1.4
shows wage dynamics of all the groups. Control units are weighted by entropy balancing
as before, but in this figure only, I removed age square, household assets, and log LI
21As the difference is only in weights for the control units between the two panels, wage dynamics of the
treated units are same in the two panels.
22
square from the covariates to balance. This is because for the other three groups, entropy
balancing fails to find unique weights and thus one cannot balance covariates when these
three variables are included. This failure typically happens when treated units are too
different from control units.22 As Figure 1.2 clearly shows, the distributions and supports
of log LI differ by a large amount between treated and control units for the BM, MT, and
TM groups. This fact indicates that treated units might not be comparable to control
units in these three groups even after entropy balancing. The left panel of Figure 1.4 does
not include any LI control in the covariates to balance, while the right panel includes log
LI. One can find the following clear pattern: treatment effects of the BM, MT, and TM
groups are unstable and even flipped once controlling for pre-reform labor income. For
example, the difference in wage dynamics between the treated and control units of the
BM group almost disappears in the right panel. For the TM group, the treated units
show higher wage growth in the left panel, while the control units do in the right panel.
On the other hand, the MB group again shows robust wage dynamics. Finally, note that
the wage dynamics of Figure 1.3 is different from those of Figure 1.4 for the MB group
because the latter does not include age square, household assets, and log LI square in
the covariates to balance, implying that results of the MB group are robust not only to
pre-reform labor income controls but also to other characteristics. This exercise indicates
that I can identify the treatment effect for the MB group but not necessary for the other
three groups.
Let me now come back to the main specification of this paper, i.e., the bottom panel
of Figure 1.3, which corresponds to Column 4 of Table 1.4. The bottom panel of Figure
1.3 is non-parametric graphical evidence combined with covariate balancing and shows
a clear pattern of wage dynamics. First, the pre-reform trends are identical between
the two units, which is, for the years 1985 and 1986, a direct consequence of balancing
the pre-reform wage changes (∆ logw).23 The treated units of the MB group, who are
pushed downward from the middle to bottom brackets, display higher wage growth after
the reform. In addition, one can find accumulating effects as the difference between the
two units spreads out over time.
I here clarify the meaning and interpretation of accumulating effects of taxes on wages
by using Figure 1.5. The figure plots fractions of workers located in the middle bracket
(the top panel) and the bottom bracket (the bottom panel).24 Let us focus on the top
panel. Both treated and control units are in the middle bracket in 1986 by construction.
22For example, if treated units are only males and control units are only females, one cannot construct
weights to balance gender ratios.
23One can find a similar idea in a synthetic control method where researches match pre-treatment
outcomes in levels for sufficiently long pre-treatment periods. (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010); Abadie et al. (2015))
24Due to data issues, I cannot pin down individual bracket locations in 1983.
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Although the treated units are pushed downward to the bottom bracket by the reform,
this bracket movement is only mechanical or counterfactual, i.e., they are by definition
M86(zi86)B˜
87
(zi86) using the notation in Section 1.4. Notice that their behavior and income
are fixed at the 1986 level zi86. Their actual brackets in 1987 can be thus different from
the bottom bracket because of behavioral changes. For this reason, the fraction of workers
in the middle bracket in 1987 is not equal to zero for the treated units. This is also the
case for the control units. That is, since they stay in the middle bracket only in the
mechanical or counterfactual sense (M86(zi86)M˜
87
(zi86)), their actual brackets in 1987 are
not necessary the middle bracket.
However, the two panels of Figure 1.5 show that, after the 1987 reform, the treated
units are more likely to be in the bottom bracket on average while the control units are
more likely to be in the middle bracket. In addition, their bracket locations are almost
identical between the two units before the reform. This observation gives the following
interpretation about accumulating effects: before the reform the two units face same
tax rates and thus have same incentives for, e.g., on-the-job human capital accumulation,
which contributes to the parallel pre-reform wage trends. They respond differently to taxes
during 1987 due to the mechanical changes in brackets created by the reform, leading to the
small initial difference in wages found in Figure 1.3. Regarding the actual bracket locations
at the end of 1987, Figure 1.5 shows that the fraction of workers in the bottom bracket
is still significantly higher for the treated units, which generates larger incentives for on-
the-job human capital accumulation once again and leads to the widening gap of wages
in 1988. This process continues over the years, and hence taxes create the accumulating
effects on wages.
1.5.2 Threats to identification
Before moving on to regression analysis, it is worthwhile to consider potential threats to
identification. As far as I am aware, strategic behavior to control income and composition
changes in employed workers over time will be the main issues to be examined.
Strategic behavior. Since the identification strategy exploits bracket movements, one
concern is strategic behavior that will lead to bunching around bracket cutoffs as found by
Chetty et al. (2011b) and le Maire and Schjerning (2013) in Denmark. When close to a
bracket cutoff, workers may try to control their income strategically to avoid crossing the
bracket by, e.g., adjusting labor supply or shifting income. If this manipulation behavior is
dominant, it will be misleading to interpret the accumulating effects of taxes on wages as
a phenomenon resulting from real behavioral responses such as on-the-job human capital
accumulation.
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To look at this concern, I start from the popular observation that a degree of strategic
income-control should be revealed by bunching around the bracket cutoff.25 Figure 1.6
plots fractions of workers by income for the middle bracket over the three years after the
reform. Income is measured in difference from the bracket cutoff and grouped into 1,000-
DKK bins.26 In 1987, for example, income for the middle bracket is PI + [CI>0] (i.e.,
the tax base), and the cutoff for the middle bracket is 130,000 DKK as listed in Table
1.2. The figure confirms that both treated and control units display smooth densities and
no spikes around the bracket cutoff. Given that the samples are male wage-earners, this
finding is consistent with Chetty et al. (2011b) and le Maire and Schjerning (2013), who
find evident bunching formed by female or self-employed workers. I hence conclude that
strategic behavior to control income is not a serious threat to identication.
Composition change. Although Figure 1.3 presents the wage response to taxes, one
has to bear in mind that, after the reform, workers can be non-employed and also can
drop from the samples due to attrition caused by, e.g., death or emigration. Obviously,
we cannot observe wages for non-employed or missing workers. Note that workers are
employed in all of the pre-reform years (1983 - 1986) by sample selection. Figure 1.7 plots
an attrition-adjusted employment rate in a year t, which is computed as the number of
employed workers in a year t divided by the number of workers in 1986. This employment
rate adjusts attrition because it is relative to workers observed in 1986, who are not subject
to attrition and thus constitute the population of the samples. The figure shows that the
employment rates of the treated and control units are almost same over time even after
taking attrition into consideration.
Although the quantity of employed (i.e., the employment rate) is found to be same
over time between the two units, there is still a concern that the quality of employed (i.e.,
the composition) changes disproportionately. Covariate balancing makes the two units
similar in terms of the pre-reform 1986 covarites. However, if the reform affects incentives
to become non-employed (e.g., self-employed) disproportionately for the two units, then
the composition of employed workers will change through selection after the reform. This
composition changes over time make it problematic to compare the two units because
the parallel trend assumption in the DID design will be violated. Table 1.5 lists the pre-
reform 1986 covarites of those who are employed in 1993, which is informative to see who
remains employed after the reform in terms of the pre-reform covariates. One can confirm
that the compositions of the two units are still balanced seven years after the reform. To
put it more precisely, although the compositions of the two units do change over time
25The literature exploits bunching to identify an ETI. See Kleven (2016) for a survey.
26The bins are [-20000,-19000), ..., [-1000,0), (0,1000], ..., (19000,20000]. If income is exactly equal to
the bracket cutoff (i.e, the difference is zero), its observation is included in [-1000,0).
25
as is clear from comparing Table 1.4 with 1.5, they change in the same way between the
two units. Then, wage dynamics resulting from the composition changes will be washed
away by differencing out in the DID framework, implying that the composition changes
in employed workers are not a threat to identification. In addition, the regression analysis
of Section 1.5.3 controls for the pre-reform covariates in a parametric way.
1.5.3 Regression analysis
Specification. To further look into accumulating effects, I move on to regression analysis
and adopt the following DID specification for an individual i and a year t = 86, ..., 93:
logwit = α0 + α11{i ∈ T}+ α871{t = 87}+ ...+ α931{t = 93}
+ βw871{i ∈ T}1{t = 87}+ ...+ βw931{i ∈ T}1{t = 93}+X ′i86γ + uit, (1.2)
where T is a treatment group indicator and uit is an error term. t = 86 is a reference
year, and the parameters of interest are βw87, ..., and β
w
93, i.e., the treatment effects one
year, ..., and seven years after the reform. Standard errors are clustered by individual
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)).
The control units are weighted by entropy balancing. Xi86 is a vector of the pre-reform
covariates and exactly same as the set of variables included in covariate balancing, i.e., the
variables listed in Table 1.4. This control adjusts the tiny difference in the compositions
between the two units after the reform, which we detected in Table 1.5. Note that con-
trolling for post-reform covariates is “bad control” because they are in general endogenous
to the reform and therefrom cause selection biases (Angrist and Pischke (2009)).
Intertemporal Elasticity. To put estimation results into perspective, it is necessary
to transform βw86, ..., and β
w
93 into elasticities of wages with respect to tax rates. Following
the literature, I consider a net-of-marginal tax rate 1 − τ t, where τ t is a marginal tax
rate on labor income under a year-t tax system. In order to incorporate the details of
the Danish tax system, one should focus on effective (rather than statutory) marginal tax
rates on labor income. Since effective tax rates are not available in the data set, I use the
tax simulator and compute them by the following formula:
τ t(LIit, yit) =
Taxt(LIit + 100, yit)− Taxt(LIit, yit)
100
,
where Taxt(LIit, yit) is a tax liability under a year-t tax system. LIit is labor income, and
yit includes the other income components and individual characteristics such as marital
status, i.e., yit = {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86, xi86} using the notation in Section 1.4.
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As the treated and control units are defined by the mechanical changes in brackets
between 1986 and 1987, mechanical changes in net-of-marginal tax rates are analogously
defined by
log(1− τ˜87(LIi86, yi86))− log(1− τ86(LIi86, yi86)),
where τ˜87(LIi86, yi86) is a counterfactual marginal tax rate under the inflation-adjusted
1987 tax system. Note that individual behavior and income are fixed at the 1986 level
(LIi86, yi86). Then, by running the following first-stage regression, I estimate differential
mechanical changes in net-of-marginal tax rates between the treated and control units:
log(1− τ˜87(LIi86, yi86))− log(1− τ86(LIi86, yi86)) = δ0 + δ11{i ∈ T}+ ui. (1.3)
Given that δ0 is an average for the control units and that δ0+δ1 is an average for the treated
units, δ1 captures the differential changes and thus is a proper measure for variation in
tax rates.
Finally, one can compute intertemporal elasticities of wages with respect to net-of-
marginal tax rates by dividing estimates of βw87, ..., and β
w
93 by an estimate of δ1 respec-
tively, i.e., ̂wt := β̂
w
t /δ̂1 for t = 87, ..., 93. Standard errors are adjusted by the delta method
treating δ̂1 as a constant variable. The elasticity ̂
w
t is intertemporal in the sense that it
measures the response in wages several years after the reform while the variation in tax
rates takes place only at the reform. As it turns out in Section 1.6, this elasticity concept
connects the reduced-form parameters to a welfare formula.
Placebo. To check pre-reform wage trends, I also conduct a placebo test using the
pre-reform period (t = 83, ..., 86) as follows:
logwit = α0 + α11{i ∈ T}+ α831{t = 83}+ ...+ α851{t = 85}
+ βw831{i ∈ T}1{t = 83}+ ...+ βw851{i ∈ T}1{t = 85}+ uit. (1.4)
Same as in the main specification, t = 86 is a reference year. The placebo treatment
effects (β̂w83, ..., β̂
w
85) must not be statistically different from zero to be confident that the
wage trends are identical between the treated and control units in the absence of the
treatment.27 I also transform the DID estimates into wage elasticities by ̂wt := β̂
w
t /δ̂1 for
27Although I use the words “reform” and “treatment” interchangeably throughout the paper, one needs
to be careful with the distinction here. Notice that both of the treated and control are affected by the
reform. In other wards, the treatment given to the treated units is not the reform but the mechanical
movement from the middle to bottom brackets. Thus, the parallel trend assumption in this DID design
is that the treated units have the same wage trends as the control units when the former hypothetically
stays in the middle bracket in the mechanical sense.
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t = 83, ..., 85.
Notice that, as opposed to the main specification given by Equation (1.2), I do not
include the pre-reform covariates Xi86 in Equation (1.4). Covariate balancing makes the
treated and control units similar in terms of the pre-reform covarites. Further, workers
are employed in all of the pre-reform years by sample selection. These points mean that
there is no composition changes, and thus the two units are directly comparable before
the reform. For this reason, one does not need to include the pre-reform covariates Xi86
in Equation (1.4).
Result. Figure 1.8 plots point estimates of the wage elasticities with their 95% confi-
dence intervals based on the main specification by Equation (1.2) and also based on the
placebo test by Equation (1.4). One can see that the regression results are in line with
graphical evidence given by Figure 1.3.
First of all, none of the placebo estimates (̂w83, ..., ̂
w
85) are statistically different from
zero. Given that, to deal with mean reversion, I include the wage changes between 1985
and 1986 (∆ logw = logwi86 − logwi85) in the covariates to balance (Table 1.4), ̂w85
is constrained to zero almost by construction. However, the fact that the other non-
constrained placebo estimates (̂w83 and ̂
w
84) are not statistically different from zero gives
me some confidence that wage trends would be parallel in the absence of the treatment.
Next, the treatment effects (̂w87, ..., ̂
w
93) are all statistically different from zero. That
is, workers respond to taxes through wages. In addition, although the confidence intervals
overlap, the point estimates tend to get large over time, which indicates accumulating
effects. More specifically, the elasticity is around 0.05 one year after the reform but
reaches around 0.1 five years after the reform. If distortion by taxes had only a static
impact, these estimates would be same over time.
In relation to the literature, Blomquist and Selin (2010) also estimate the elasticity
of hourly wages with respect to net-of-tax rates using Swedish survey data and register
data. They consider a static specification, rather than the dynamic one considered here,
while exploiting variation in tax rates over ten years. Their static elasticity estimates are
in the range of 0.14 - 0.16 for males and thus of the same magnitude as my intertemporal
elasticity estimates. One of the differences between Blomquist and Selin (2010) and the
current paper is an identification strategy. In a regression framework widely adopted in
the ETI literature, they attribute wage dynamics over ten years to time series variation in
tax rates over ten years. On the other hand, my identification strategy exploits the specific
tax reform and explicitly compares the treated to control units in the DID framework.
Thanks to this strategy, I can follow the same workers over time and thus estimate the
accumulating effects of taxes on wages, which are novel in the literature.
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Exclusion restriction. Having presented the main result regarding taxes on wages,
I come back to and address validity of an exclusion restriction, i.e., the identification
assumption given by Equation (1.1). To test whether or not the other components of
pre-reform income {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} affect wage dynamics conditional on LIi86 and
demographics, I consider the following regression by treatment status for a year t =
86, ..., 93:
log(wit) = α0 + α871{t = 87}+ ...+ α931{t = 93}+X ′i86γ + uit. (1.5)
Under this specification, which is very similar to Equation (1.2), wage dynamics are cap-
tured by α87, ..., and α93. I then run the following three specifications with different
controls for pre-reform income:
1. Xi86 includes all the variables listed in Table 1.4 (the baseline control).
2. Xi86 includes the baseline control and {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86}.28
3. Xi86 excludes LIi86 controls (i.e, log LI and its square) from the baseline control.
If {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} do not affect wage dynamics, Specifications 1 and 2 must give
statistically same estimates (α̂87, ..., α̂93). I also test the importance of controlling for
LIi86 by comparting estimates of Specification 1 to those of Specification 3.
Note that if one conducts the same exercise using Equation (1.2) rather than Equation
(1.5), estimates between Specifications 1 and 2 will be different for the two indistinguish-
able reasons: First, {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} affect wage dynamics. Second, identification is
destroyed because there is no variation in treatment assignment. To isolate the first reason
from the second, I estimate Equation (1.5) separately for the treated and control units.
Finally, since this exercise does not compare the two units, the control units are raw and
not weighted by entropy balancing.
Figure 1.9 plots point estimates of the wage-dynamics coefficients (α̂87, ..., α̂93) with
their 95% confidence intervals based on Equation (1.5). Same patterns appear for both
treated and control units. One can find that the point estimates and confidence intervals
are almost identical between Specification 1 (blue in the figure) and Specification 2 (red),
which implies that exclusion restriction is verified. On the other hand, Specification 3
(green) gives the significantly different estimates from the other two specifications, mean-
ing that labor income does affect wage dynamics. In conclusion, the figure justifies my
identification strategy, which controls for labor income but does not control for the other
income components for variation in treatment assignment.
28Since {OPIi86,CIi86,Di86} can be zero or negative, I use them in levels not in logs.
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1.5.4 On-the-job training
What is the underlying channel for the response to taxes though wages? There will be
multiple answers, but this paper investigates a hypothesis that on-the-job human capital
accumulation is one channel. Although workers can accumulate human capital in vari-
ous ways, I exclusively look at on-the-job training and learning-by-doing because proper
outcome variables are available for them. This section presents results about on-the-job
training while Section 1.5.5 focuses on learning-by-doing.
For the measure of on-the-job training, I use information on whether or not a worker
attends training courses co-sponsored by the government. In 1986, for example, 5.0 percent
of the treated units and 7.6 percent of the (unweighted) control units attend courses. The
courses consist of language classes, vocational training, and college-level higher education
among others. Simonsen and Skipper (2008) and Sørensen and Vejlin (2014) point out
that a large fraction of training is indeed co-sponsored by the government in Denmark.
Given the binary dependent variable, I estimate the following linear probability model
in the DID framework:
1{OJTit} = α0 + α11{i ∈ T}+ α871{t = 87}+ ...+ α931{t = 93}
+ βOJT87 1{i ∈ T}1{t = 87}+ ...+ βOJT93 1{i ∈ T}1{t = 93}+X ′i86γ + uit, (1.6)
where 1{OJTit} equals to one if an individual i attends training courses co-sponsored
by the government in a year t and to zero otherwise.29 The estimation procedure and
specification of controls are same as the DID wage regression of Equation (1.2) except for
the outcome variable. I also conduct a placebo test and transform all the DID estimates
into OJT elasticities by ̂OJTt := β̂
OJT
t /δ̂1.
Figure 1.10 plots point estimates of the OJT elasticities with their 95% confidence
intervals. First, all the placebo estimates are not statistically different from zero. Next, all
the treatment effects are positive but not statistically different from zero. Some placebo
estimates almost entirely overlap with some treatment effects. Hence, there seems no
significant effects of taxes on participation in training courses on the job. This is probably
because a decision on taking courses will be made not solely by a worker but jointly with
his employer. If he cannot freely choose whether to take courses, income taxes will not
have impacts on the incidence of on-the-job training.
29Lechner (2010) shows that a non-linear model (e.g., a probit model) leads to an inconsistent estimator
in a DID framework. This is intuitively because, as opposed to a linear model, the differences are not
washed away by subtraction.
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1.5.5 Learning-by-doing
Let us next move on to learning-by-doing as another channel of the wage response to taxes.
Since it is difficult to directly observe learning-by-doing in the data, I look at a response
in hours worked. The idea is that if an employee works longer, he is more likely to acquire
skills and knowledge, which should lead to higher wages. As I explain in Section 1.3, the
data set includes daily hours worked from 1985.
Using hour worked as an outcome variable, I adopt the same DID specification as
Equation (1.2) with a different pre-reform covariate vector Yi86:
log hit = α0 + α11{i ∈ T}+ α871{t = 87}+ ...+ α931{t = 93}
+ βh871{i ∈ T}1{t = 87}+ ...+ βh931{i ∈ T}1{t = 93}+ Y ′i86γ + uit. (1.7)
Given that the relationship considered here is taxes on hours worked, I choose the pre-
reform covariate vector Yi86 by following the labor supply literature, which emphasizes
controlling for wages and assets in an intertemporal setting (Keane (2011)). Yi86 thus in-
cludes demographics in 1986 (same demographics included in Xi86), hour changes between
1985 and 1986 (∆ log h = log hi86 − log hi85), and logw in 1986.30 Now that I introduce
a new set of covariates, I redo covariate balancing and present results in Table 1.6, which
again shows that entropy balancing works well to achieve high balance. In this section
only, entropy balancing is based on not Xi86 but Yi86.
Same as before, I conduct a placebo test and transform all the DID estimates into
hour elasticities by ̂ht := β̂
h
t /δ̂1. Figure 1.11 plots point estimates of the hour elasticities
with their 95% confidence intervals. The result is consistent with findings of the labor
supply literature: that is, the intertemporal elasticities of males are small and sometimes
insignificant (Meghir and Phillips (2010)). However, interestingly, Figure 1.11 shows an
increasing pattern of the hour elasticities as we found it for the wage elasticities in Figure
1.8. Starting from around zero, the hour elasticity reaches around 0.15 seven years after
the reform.
What is an interpretation of the increasing patterns of the wage and hour elasticities?
One can think of the following feedback effect between wages and hours through learning-
by-doing as one of the interpretations: initially, a worker responds to tax changes by, e.g.,
undertaking more on-the-job training or putting more unobservable work effort, leading to
higher wages. This appears as the wage elasticity one year after the reform in Figure 1.8.
Given higher wages, he has an incentive to work longer, which appears as the increasing
hour elasticity after the reform in Figure 1.11. Then, through learning-by-doing, his
30The motivation of controlling for ∆ log h is again to deal with mean reversion.
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wages become even higher (Figure 1.8), which in turn creates an incentive to work even
longer (Figure 1.11). Therefore, the increasing patterns of the wage and hour elasticities
are consistent to each other if one has learning-by-doing in mind as a potential channel.
This interpretation implies the wage response is not independent of the hour response;
rather, they are interdependent through learning-by-doing. To further look into this joint
relationship, it will be useful to see, for example, whether taxes have an impact on a joint
probability of earning higher wages and working longer hours.
In relation to the literature, Keane (2015, 2016) structurally estimates life-cycle labor
supply models with human capital accumulation via learning-by-doing. He also investi-
gates an effect of taxes on male hours worked as well as wages and finds increasing wage
and hour responses over time by simulation exercises. The underlying mechanism is same
as my feedback effect between wages and hours explained in the previous paragraph. The
current paper is different from Keane (2015, 2016) in terms of empirical approaches. While
I exploit the tax reform as a natural experiment to estimate the reduced-form parameters,
he constructs and estimates the models structurally. Although his structural estimates are
much larger than my reduced-form estimates, these two estimates give the qualitatively
same findings and come to the similar conclusions.31 My reduced-form estimates are the
first and direct empirical evidence in the literature that suggests that learning-by-doing is
one of the underlying channels, and thus will be a basis or justification for exploring this
channel using structural models as is done by Keane (2015, 2016). Hence, one can think
of his papers and mine as complements to each other.
1.6 Welfare analysis
The literature of labor supply and an ETI typically considers a welfare consequence of
income taxes under a static labor supply model with exogenous wages. However, the pre-
vious section finds the empirical evidence of accumulating effects of taxes on wages, which
could change our understanding on welfare. Therefore, this section shifts an attention to
welfare by constructing a simple model as a conceptual framework. Rather than specify-
ing and estimating the fully parametric model, I use the model as a guide that links the
elasticity estimates to welfare implications.
31One potential reason for his large estimates is that his samples are from NLSY79 and thus young
American workers. It is widely reported that young workers have higher wage growth, which implies that
they may respond more to tax changes through wages.
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1.6.1 Model
To compare a welfare impact of wage responses with that of labor supply responses, I
extend a canonical labor supply model to include choice on human capital accumulation on
the job in a dynamic setting. Although the models by Chetty (2009a) and Feldstein (1999)
feature sheltering behavior (i.e., tax avoidance or evasion) in addition to real behavior (i.e.,
labor supply), I omit it here because there is almost no opportunity for sheltering left for
the majority of employed workers in Denmark (Kleven (2014)).
The economy consists of a unit measure of workers. Time is discrete, finite, and in years
(t = 87, ..., 93, ..., T ). t = 87 corresponds to the first year after the reform, while t = 93
corresponds to the final year of the empirical analysis. One can regard T as a deterministic
retirement period. A homogenous worker has initial and exogenous human capital k86 at
the beginning of 87. It is straightforward to relax the assumptions on homogeneous and
single-dimension human capital, which gives the same welfare implication. He then chooses
continuous h87 hours to work, namely labor supply along the intensive margin. Given the
samples include only males strongly attached to the labor market, I do not model decisions
on labor market participation, i.e., labor supply along the extensive margin. Let ψ(h87)
be an increasing and convex cost function of labor supply. He also invests i87 amounts
of money in on-the-job training with an increasing and convex cost function c(i87). On-
the-job training should be broadly interpreted and includes not only training courses
co-sponsored by the government but also informal training at workplaces.
Human capital accumulation takes place through either learning-by-doing or on-the-
job training as follows: during the year (t = 87), human capital k86 is upgraded to
k87 following a low of motion k87 = F (h87, i87, k86), where F (·, ·, ·) is a human capital
production function with every argument increasing and concave. Hourly wages are given
by w87 = w(k87), which is increasing and concave in k87. The model is partial equilibrium
in the sense that firm behavior and thus wage determination are exogenous. By assuming a
constant (flat) marginal tax rate τ , his net income at the end of 87 is given by (1−τ)w87h87.
He repeats the action (ht, it) over the period (t = 87, ..., 93, ..., T ). I assume a zero
discount rate and quasi-linear utility, which implies that there is no incentive for private
savings. Let V (k86) denote a worker’s value at the beginning of 87 with his initial human
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capital k86. Then, his problem is written as
V (k86) = max
{ht,it}Tt=87
(1− τ)w87h87 − ψ(h87)− c(i87)
+ · · ·+
{
(1− τ)w93h93 − ψ(h93)− c(i93)
}
+ · · ·+
{
(1− τ)wThT − ψ(hT )− c(iT )
}
,
subject to
wt = w(kt)
kt = F (ht, it, kt−1).
On the other hand, tax revenue from him over the period is given by
R(k86) = τw87h87 + · · ·+ τw93h93 + · · ·+ τwThT
As is standard in the literature, the government is assumed to distribute its revenue as a
lump-sum transfer among taxpayers. Therefore, given the quasi-linear utility, the (money-
metric) social welfare is defined as
W = V (k86) +R(k86).
The interest lies on marginal excess burden of taxation when the government perma-
nently changes the tax rate at the beginning of 87, i.e., dWdτ
∣∣
87
. By exploiting the envelope
theorem, this welfare measure is reduced to
dW
dτ
∣∣∣∣
87
=
dV (k86)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
87
+
dR(k86)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
87
= −w87h87 − · · · − wThT
+
(
w87h87 + τ
dw87h87
dτ
∣∣∣∣
87
)
+ · · ·+
(
wThT + τ
dwThT
dτ
∣∣∣∣
87
)
= w87h87(
w
87 + 
h
87) + · · ·+ w93h93(w93 + h93) + · · ·+ wThT (wT + hT ), (1.8)
where wt :=
dwt/wt
dτ/τ
∣∣
87
and ht :=
dht/ht
dτ/τ
∣∣
87
for t = 87, ..., 93, ..., T . This welfare formula is
a straightforward extension of famous Feldstein’s one to the dynamic setting and conveys
the same insight: a small subset of estimable parameters forms sufficient statistics for
welfare analysis. In particular, the intertemporal wage and labor supply elasticities (wt
and ht ) capture behavioral responses and play central roles in the formula. Thus, the
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model laid out here works as a guide for welfare analysis and gives me a mapping from
the elasticity estimates to welfare implications.32
1.6.2 Clarification
Since the welfare analysis of this section is closely related to the one of the ETI literature,
it is worthwhile to clarify some points. First of all, by definition, labor income is given
by LIt = wtht, which immediately implies that 
LI
t = 
w
t + 
h
t . Thus, in order to apply the
welfare formula of Equation (1.8), LIt is sufficient. For this reason, a large amount of the
literature estimates an ETI or an elasticity of labor income. They typically find large ETIs
for top-income or self-employed workers and consider tax avoidance or evasion as potential
behavioral responses (Kleven (2014) and Saez et al. (2012b)). The policy implications are
that the government should fix the tax system by, e.g., removing loopholes. On the other
hand, ETIs are small for the majority of employed workers, which implies that they may
respond to taxes through real behavior (such as labor supply) rather than tax avoidance
or evasion.
As Slemrod (1992, 1995, 1996, 1998) points out, real behavior is least responsive to
taxes compared to avoidance or evasion but the most crucial factor for economic per-
formance and growth. In addition, the anatomy of behavioral responses helps to better
understand optimal policies because normative implications are different depending on be-
havioral responses. However, just looking at the aggregate response LIt does not tell us its
underlying channel. In other words, one needs to decompose the aggregate response into
its micro responses to gain further welfare implications. In this paper, the decomposition
is into the wage and hour responses (wt and 
h
t ).
Although wages increase through learning-by-doing or on-the-job training in the model,
one does not have to distinguish each response. Rather, what matters is only the wage
response. As I decompose the labor income response into the wage and labor supply
responses, further decomposition of the wage response into its roots is an important future
work.
32The welfare formula of Equation (1.8) is valid when a reform is small. For a large reform like the
87 one, Kleven (2018) shows that the elasticity remains the sufficient statistics under quasi-linear and
iso-elastic utility.
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1.6.3 Welfare implications
Figure 1.12 stacks point estimates of the wage and hour elasticities (̂wt and ̂
h
t ) estimated
in Section 1.5 for t = 87, ..., 93.3334 Two points are worth mentioning. First, the wage
responses have larger impacts on welfare than the labor supply responses for most of the
years. Second, as summation of the two responses increases over time, the accumulating
effects are evident. Given that the standard tool for analyzing tax incidence or optimal
taxation is a static labor supply model with exogenous wages, the current results indi-
cate that researchers should incorporate wage responses and dynamic aspects into their
frameworks.
One can also gain further implications regarding tax policies aimed at encouraging
labor supply. One such example is Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) being implemented
in US. EITC has a flat pyramid structure with phase-in (negative), flat (zero), and phase-
out (positive) marginal tax rates. Clearly, phase-out tax rates create disincentives for labor
supply. According to Figure 1.12, however, this negative impacts on labor supply and
welfare could be mitigated by other tax policies encouraging human capital accumulation
on the job. One can think of expanding deductions for on-the-job training costs as an
example. This is because such policies will bring high wages and thus create incentives
for labor supply. Although this is a simple example illustrating the benefit of looking at
the micro responses (wt and 
h
t ), one will not be able to gain the same implications just
by looking at the aggregate response LIt .
Note that LIt = 
w
t + 
h
t , and 
LI
t has been estimated by Chetty et al. (2011b) and
Kleven and Schultz (2014a) with Danish administrative data. In particular, Kleven and Schultz
(2014a) use the same tax reform as the current paper and estimate LI89 taking the three-year
difference (86 - 89). Although their elasticity concept is static rather than intertempo-
ral, their estimate still gives me a useful benchmark. Their static elasticity estimate ̂LI89
is around 0.2 (reported as “DD elasticity” in their Panels A and B of Figure 4), which
is slightly larger than my intertemporal elasticity estimate ̂w89 + ̂
h
89 ≈ 0.13. This is
partly because their samples include self-employed workers and top-income earners, who
have larger elasticities as confirmed in their Table 4.35 Given that my micro elasticity
estimates (̂w89 + ̂
h
89) are largely consistent with the aggregate elasticity estimate ̂
LI
89 of
33Notice that the elasticity estimates in Section 1.5 are defined with respect to net-of-marginal tax
rates while the elasticities in Equation (1.8) are defined with respect to marginal tax rates. However, one
can easily transform the latter into the former by multiplying −τ/(1 − τ), which ensures that this small
difference in definitions does not matter.
34Since the point estimate of ̂h87 is negative, its absolute value is stacked in the figure, which does not
change any messages of this exercise.
35Another reason is that labor income in the data is observed as an yearly total amount of earnings while
hourly wages and daily hours worked are observed only for workers holding jobs on the 28th of November.
Therefore, LIt = 
w
t + 
h
t holds only approximately.
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Kleven and Schultz (2014a), it is worthwhile to clarify the difference between these two
papers here: They estimate the aggregate elasticity (̂LI89), while I decompose it into or
estimate the micro elasticities (̂w89, ̂
h
89). By estimating the micro elasticities, I can build
the bridge between the labor supply and ETI literature. In particular, my findings imply
that the response in (taxable) labor income (̂LI89) is explained not by the labor supply
response (̂h89) alone but jointly by the labor supply and wage responses (̂
w
89, ̂
h
89), which
also has important welfare implications as shown in Figure 1.12.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper presents the micro evidence on accumulating effects of taxes on wages by
exploiting the administrative data and tax reform in Denmark. Here, I mention a few
robustness checks that I am currently working on.
First, I am looking at a concern that the wage response to taxes is due to shifting
income from labor income to capital income rather than due to real behavior. One can
think of stock options as a way to get salary in the form of capital income. Note that the
reform changed the tax base for the middle bracket (Table 1.2). Taxpayers in the middle
bracket with negative capital income have a large incentive to shift income from labor
income to capital income after the reform because capital income is not included in the
tax base for the middle bracket as long as it is negative. This income shifting creates lower
wage growth for the control units and thus a upward bias in treatment effects. Although
I conjecture that stock options are not common among non-executive workers in 1980’s,
this will be a valid concern.
Second, I am looking at another concern that the hour response to taxes is through
job changes as found by Altonji and Paxson (1992) and Blundell, Brewer, and Francesconi
(2008). Note that, in many cases, job changes are associated with wage increases as docu-
mented by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and Topel and Ward (1992). Then, it
is misleading to interpret the hour response as evidence of learning-by-doing because one
cannot distinguish between learning-by-doing and job changes regarding potential chan-
nels of the wage response. However, at the same time, it will be interesting to find some
evidence that the wage response is through job changes.
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Table 1.1: Income concept in the Danish tax system
Income concept Acronym Main items included
Taxable income TI PI + CI – D
Personal income PI LI + OPI
Labor income LI Salary, wages, bonuses, fringe benefits
Other personal income OPI Transfers – pension contributions
Capital income CI Interest income – interest on debt
Deductions D Commuting, union fees, UI contributions
Notes: Capital income is negative for the majority of Danish taxpayers as a result of interest
payments on debt such as mortgage and other loans.
Table 1.2: Danish tax system before and after the 1987 reform
1986 1987
Tax type Base Rate Cutoff Base Rate Cutoff
Regional taxes TI 28.0 20,700 TI 29.0 21,200
National taxes
Bottom bracket TI 19.9 23,200 TI 22.0 27,100
Middle bracket TI 14.4 113,400 PI + [CI>0] 6.0 130,000
Top bracket TI 10.8 186,100 PI 12.0 200,000
Notes: All the monetary values are in Danish Krone (DKK). DKK 1 in 1986 ≈ USD 0.3
in 2016. Regional taxes include municipal, county, and church taxes. Church taxes are paid
only by members of the church (Folkekirken). The regional tax rates are averages across
municipalities. The bottom tax rate in 1986 includes social security contributions.
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics in 1986
Demographics: Taxable income:
Age 38.8 Labor income 186,042
Married (%) 59.0 Other personal income 4,740
Number of children 0.73 Capital income -27,996
Low education (%) 31.3 Deductions 10,680
Middle education (%) 52.7
High education (%) 16.0 Tax brackets:
Household assets 226,318 Bottom bracket (%) 25.6
Middle bracket (%) 54.5
Number of obs. 886,924 Top bracket (%) 19.3
Notes: Selected samples are male workers employed in all of the pre-reform years
(1983 - 1986). Mean values as of 1986 are listed, and DKK 1 in 1986 ≈ USD 0.3 in
2016. Since taxable income of some workers is less than the bottom bracket cutoff,
the three tax-bracket percentages do not add up to 100.
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Table 1.4: Pre-treatment covarites (MB group in 1986)
Column 1 2 3 4
Treated Control
Variable Raw Balanced Balanced
Age 46.2 36.9 46.2 46.2
Age (square) 2259 1489 2259 2259
Married (%) 94.7 42.3 94.7 94.7
Number of children 0.83 0.60 0.83 0.83
Low education (%) 45.0 32.2 45.0 45.0
Middle education (%) 50.0 57.6 50.0 50.0
High education (%) 5.0 10.2 5.0 5.0
Household assets 256,318 154,532 256,270 256,262
∆ logw 0.008 0.037 0.008 0.008
log LI 11.95 12.03 11.95
log LI (square) 142.9 144.6 142.9
Number of obs. 107,985 281,727
Notes: Pre-treatment covarites of the MB group in 1986 are listed, where
∆ logw = logwi86 − logwi85. Columns 1 and 2 display raw mean values by
treatment status. Columns 3 and 4 display mean values of the control units
weighted by entropy balancing.
Table 1.5: Pre-reform 1986 covarites (employed in 1993)
Variable Treated Control
Age 41.4 41.3
Age (square) 1,804 1,794
Married (%) 93.8 94.3
Number of children 1.13 1.12
Low education (%) 39.1 39.3
Middle education (%) 54.8 54.4
High education (%) 6.1 6.3
Household assets 222,318 213,482
∆ logw 0.013 0.012
log LI 11.97 11.98
log LI (square) 143.4 143.6
Notes: Pre-reform 1986 covarites of those employed
in 1993 are listed. Control units are weighted by en-
tropy balancing.
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Table 1.6: Pre-treatment covarites (MB group in 1986)
Column 1 2 3
Treated Control
Variable Raw Balanced
Age 46.2 36.9 46.2
Age (square) 2259 1489 2259
Married (%) 94.7 42.3 94.7
Number of children 0.83 0.60 0.83
Low education (%) 45.0 32.2 45.0
Middle education (%) 50.0 57.6 50.0
High education (%) 5.0 10.2 5.0
Household assets 256,318 154,532 256,268
∆ log h 0.008 0.017 0.008
logw 4.52 4.57 4.52
Number of obs. 107,985 281,727
Notes: Pre-treatment covarites of the MB group in 1986 are listed,
where ∆ log h = log hi86 − log hi85. Columns 1 and 2 display raw
mean values by treatment status. Columns 3 displays mean values
of the control units weighted by entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the 1987 tax reform
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Notes: The figure plots marginal tax rates on labor income (LI) as a function of LI before and after the
1987 reform. The tax rates and cutoffs are from Table 1.2 while assuming other personal income (OPI),
capital income (CI), and deductions (D) are all zero.
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Figure 1.2: Correlation between treatment assignment and log LIi86
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Notes: The figure plots kernel density estimates of log LIi86 by treatment status for the BM, MB, MT,
and TM groups. The estimation is based on ksdensity function in MATLAB with default settings.
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Figure 1.3: Graphical evidence
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Notes: The figure plots logwit−logwi86 for t = 83, ..., 93. Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
The top panel does not include any LI controls in the covariates to balance (corresponding to Column 3
of Table 1.4) while the bottom panel includes log LI and its square (corresponding to Column 4 of Table
1.4).
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Figure 1.4: Robustness of MB group
84 86 88 90 92
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
84 86 88 90 92
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
84 86 88 90 92
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
84 86 88 90 92
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
84 86 88 90 92
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
84 86 88 90 92
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
84 86 88 90 92
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
84 86 88 90 92
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Notes: The figure plots logwit−logwi86 for t = 83, ..., 93. Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
The left panel does not include any LI control in the covariates to balance while the right panel includes
log LI.
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Figure 1.5: Actual tax brackets of MB group
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Notes: The figure plots fractions of workers located in the middle bracket (the top panel) and the bottom
bracket (the bottom panel). Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.6: Density around the middle bracket cutoff
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Notes: The figure plots fractions of workers by income for the middle bracket. Income is measured in
difference from the bracket cutoff and grouped into 1,000-DKK bins. In 1987, for example, income for the
middle bracket is PI + [CI>0] (i.e., the tax base), and the cutoff for the middle bracket is 130,000 DKK.
Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.7: Composition change in employed workers
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Notes: The figure plots an attrition-adjusted employment rate in a year t, which is computed as the number
of employed workers in a year t divided by the number of workers in 1986. Control units are weighted by
entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.8: Wage response
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Notes: The figure plots point estimates of wage elasticities with their 95% confidence intervals. Wage
elasticities are computed as ̂wt := β̂
w
t /δ̂1, where δ̂1 is from the first-stage regression specified by Equation
(1.3). β̂wt is from the second-stage regression, where “Treatment effect” (blue) is based on Equation (1.2)
while “Placebo test” (red) is based on Equation (1.4). Standard errors in the second stage are clustered
by individual. Standard errors for ̂wt are adjusted by the delta method treating δ̂1 as a constant variable.
Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.9: Exclusion restriction test
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Notes: The figure plots point estimates of wage-dynamics coefficients with their 95% confidence intervals.
Wage-dynamics coefficients α̂t are from the regression specified by Equation (1.5). Standard errors are
clustered by individual. Control units are raw and not weighted by entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.10: On-the-job training response
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Notes: The figure plots point estimates of OJT elasticities with their 95% confidence intervals. OJT
elasticities are computed as ̂OJTt := β̂
OJT
t /δ̂1, where δ̂1 is from the firs-stage regression specified by
Equation (1.3). β̂OJTt is from the second-stage regression, where “Treatment effect” (blue) is based on
Equation (1.6) while “Placebo test” (red) is analogous to Equation (1.4) with 1{OJTit} as the dependent
variable. Standard errors in the second stage are clustered by individual. Standard errors for ̂OJTt are
adjusted by the delta method treating δ̂1 as a constant variable. Control units are weighted by entropy
balancing.
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Figure 1.11: Hour response
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Notes: The figure plots point estimates of hour elasticities with their 95% confidence intervals. Hour
elasticities are computed as ̂ht := β̂
h
t /δ̂1, where δ̂1 is from the firs-stage regression specified by Equation
(1.3). β̂ht is from the second-stage regression, where “Treatment effect” (blue) is based on Equation (1.7)
while “Placebo test” (red) is analogous to Equation (1.4) with log hit as the dependent variable. Standard
errors in the second stage are clustered by individual. Standard errors for ̂ht are adjusted by the delta
method treating δ̂1 as a constant variable. Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
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Figure 1.12: Welfare implication of wage and hour responses
Notes: The figure stacks point estimates of wage and hour elasticities. Wage elasticities are computed
as ̂wt := β̂
w
t /δ̂1, where δ̂1 is from the first-stage regression specified by Equation (1.3). β̂
w
t is from the
second-stage regression based on Equation (1.2). Hour elasticities are computed as ̂ht := β̂
h
t /δ̂1. β̂
h
t is from
the second-stage regression based on Equation (1.7). Control units are weighted by entropy balancing.
Since the point estimate of ̂h87 is negative, its absolute value is stacked in the figure.
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Chapter 2
Income Taxation and the
Equilibrium Allocation of Labor
2.1 Introduction
Labor income taxation is a key vehicle by which governments redistribute income, alleviate
risk and finance public goods and services. Indeed, developed economies raise 35%-50% of
national income in taxes, with labor income taxation being the primary source of revenue,
accounting for roughly 75% of the total tax burden (Piketty and Saez, 2013). However,
at the same time, taxation distorts incentives, leaves gains from trade unexploited, and
hampers economic efficiency and growth. The design of optimal income tax schedules that
achieve redistributive goals with minimum distortionary effects requires detailed knowl-
edge of how economic agents’ respond to taxation. As a result, a large and diverse empirical
literature studying behavioral responses to income taxation has emerged.1 We contribute
to this literature by studying the impact of labor income taxation on workers’ job search
behavior and the implications it has for the equilibrium allocation of heterogenous workers
across heterogenous firms.
Our analysis is based on a rich equilibrium on-the-job search model with two-sided
heterogeneity, endogenous job search effort on the worker-side, as in Burdett (1978),
Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Werwatz (2005), and Bagger and Lentz (2015),
endogenous hiring intensity on the firm-side, wage determination as in Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (2000), and firm entry and exit as in
Melitz (2003). Curvature in the utility of consumption implies that workers’ optimal
search effort choices feature both substitution and income effects, and introduces a desire
1See e.g. the Mirrlees Review (Adam, Besley, Blundell, Bond, Chote, Johnson, Myles, and Poterba,
2011; Mirrlees, Adam, Besley, Blundell, Bond, Chote, Johnson, Myles, and Poterba, 2011) for a recent
and comprehensive collection of studies of issues related to taxation, including labor income taxation.
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for consumption smoothing in the face of labor income risk stemming from job finding and
job destruction events. We assume the presence of a complete system of insurance markets
in which workers may trade securities to alleviate this consumption risk, and solve for the
complete markets equilibrium using a large household formulation of the model in the
mould of Merz (1995). In a nutshell, the model stipulates that income taxation reduces
the return to job search effort, thus distorting workers’ job search effort, and therefore the
equilibrium allocation of heterogenous workers across heterogenous firms.
The empirical analysis makes use of a comprehensive population-wide Danish matched-
employer employee panel covering 1990-2005. The data includes detailed information on
workers individual tax liabilities, which allow us to obtain precise estimates of the changing
Danish tax system during the observation period. We structurally estimate the equilibrium
model by way of Indirect Inference using data pertaining to 1999-2003. The estimated
model is used for three exercises that illustrate and quantify the impact of labor income
taxation on the equilibrium allocation of labor. First, we evaluate how three Danish income
tax reforms during 1990-2005 affected the steady state unemployment rate and taxable
labor income. Second, we provide new estimates of a mobility-based long-run elasticity
of taxable labor income, including a novel structural decomposition of the elasticity of
taxable labor income. Third, we characterize a Pareto optimal income tax reform, which
increases government revenue while leaving all workers (weakly) better off vis-a-vis the
baseline 1999-2003 income tax regime in terms of steady state expected utility.
We find that the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Danish income tax reforms improved the equilib-
rium allocation of labor, reducing the steady state unemployment rate by about 6 percent,
and increasing steady state labor income by about 2 percent, with workers of low ability
gaining the most in terms of lower unemployment rates and higher labor incomes. Cur-
rently, our estimation procedure and subsequent quantitative analysis does not balance
the government budget, and overall, the tax reforms during 1990-2005, lead to a 2 percent
drop in government revenue. Accounting for equilibrium adjustments is quantitatively
important when evaluating the three income tax reforms.
The estimated model implies that the full equilibrium mobility-based elasticity of tax-
able labor income is 0.12. The corresponding compensated elasticity of taxable labor
income, where any income effects have been eliminated, is larger, at 0.17. Moreover, we
find that workers of lower ability have higher taxable labor income elasticities. A struc-
tural decomposition reveal that 46 percent of the measured elasticity of taxable income
come from extensive margin allocative adjustments (i.e. changes in the steady state unem-
ployment rate), 12 percent come from intensive margin allocative adjustments (reflecting
changes in the steady state distribution of employed workers across firms), and 42 percent
come from firms’ wage policy adjustments. When we apply the decomposition across the
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ability distribution, we see that extensive margin adjustments drives the bulk of the mea-
sured taxable labor income elasticity at the bottom of the ability distribution, whereas
intensive margin adjustments and adjustment to wage policies drive the taxable labor
income elasticity estimates towards the top of the ability distribution.
Finally, we identify a Pareto optimal income tax reform, see Werning (2007), Blundell and Shephard
(2012) and Hosseini and Shourideh (2017), which increases government revenue by 0.68
percent while leaving no workers worse off compared to the baseline 1999-2003 income tax
schedule. The Pareto optimal income tax schedule reduces the marginal tax rate at low
wage levels, and increases it slightly at all higher wage levels. At the same time, the aver-
age tax rate is increased at low wages, and reduced at higher wage levels. Interestingly, the
Pareto optimal tax schedule shares some features of the actual tax reforms implemented
in Denmark during the 1990-2005 period.
There are only a few other papers providing empirical evidence on the effect of income
taxation on job search effort, labor mobility and labor allocation. Gentry and Hubbard
(2004a) presents a reduced form regression analysis of the impact of income taxation on
workers’ labor market mobility. Using time- and state-variation in income taxation in the
US as a source of identification, Gentry and Hubbard (2004a) find that a 5 percentage
point reduction in the marginal tax rate increases the probability that a worker (in their
study, a head of household) is in better job within a year by 0.79 percentage points, and
that a reduction in income tax progressivity increases the probability that a worker moves
to better job. In a paper closely related to ours, Kreiner, Munch, and Whitta-Jacobsen
(2015) estimate a partial equilibrium on-the-job search model on Danish data in order
to compute a mobility-based elasticity of taxable labor income. Kreiner et al. (2015)
finds a taxable labor income elasticity of 0.30, but their analysis does not account for
income effects in job search behavior, does not explicitly account for both worker and
firm heterogeneity, and does not allow equilibrium adjustments to changes in the income
tax system. Shephard (2017) develops an equilibrium search model where firm’s differ in
productivity, and workers differ in the value of non-market time. The model, which also
features both part- and full-time jobs, is estimated using UK data, including a detailed
accounting for income taxation, and is then used to conduct an equilibrium evaluation of
the labor supply responses to a reform of the Working Families Tax Credit, a UK in-work
benefit scheme. Shephard (2017) does not have endogenous search on the worker side and
focus instead on the labor supply responses at the part-time and full-time margin, and does
not use matched employer-employee data in the estimation. Breda, Haywood, and Wang
(2017) develops an equilibrium search model to analyze labor market effects of taxation
and minimum wage policies in France, but do not endogenize on-the-job search intensity,
and thus primarily focus on workers’ incentive to leave unemployment.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model and characterizes the
equilibrium, section 2.3 describes the data we use, section 2.4 provides a detailed de-
scription of the Danish income tax system during the relevant 1990-2005 period and also
describes how we estimate the tax function used in the estimation. Section 2.5 details the
estimation procedure, including a discussion of the estimated model’s fit to data, and a
presentation of the estimated structural parameters, section 2.6 contains the equilibrium
evaluation of the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Danish income tax reforms, section 2.7 contains
our analysis of the elasticity of taxable income, and section 2.8 presents a Pareto optimal
income tax reform based on the estimated model. Finally, section 2.9 concludes, and a
number of appendicies contain technical details and supplementary results.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 The environment
The model is set in continuous time and the future is discounted at rate ρ. We assume
throughout that the labor market is in steady state.
Two-sided heterogeneity. One side of the labor market is populated by a unit measure
of infinitely lived individuals of heterogenous scalar ability a ∈ [0, 1]. Let H(·) be the CDF
of ability in the worker population. We take H(·) to be continuously differentiable with
PDF h(·). On the other side of the market, there is a measure M0 firms of heterogenous
productivity p ∈ [p0, 1]. Productivity p is distributed with CDF Γ0(·) across firms. M0,
p0 and Γ0(·) are endogenous objects.
Match output. A match between an ability-a worker and a productivity-p firm yields
output y(a, p). The match production function y(a, p) is assumed twice continuously
differentiable with y′a(a, p) > 0 and y′p(a, p) > 0 for all (a, p)-combinations. All other
derivatives of the match output function are left unrestricted. The total output of a firm
is the sum of the output from the matches it participates in. That is, the production
function at the firm-level exhibits constant returns to scale in matches.
Match formation and dissolution. We assume labor markets are segregated by
worker-ability a. Search frictions require workers and firms to exert effort to form pro-
ductive matches, and workers may search both off- and on-the-job. A type-a worker who
exerts job search effort s receives job offers from hiring firms at rate λ(a)s, where λ(a) is
the job finding rate per unit of search effort for type-a workers, which is an equilibrium
object that depends on the tightness of the market for type-a labor.
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A job offer is a draw of a gross wage w from the ability-conditional wage offer dis-
tribution F (w|a) with support [w(a), w(a)]. When a worker accepts a job offer, a match
is formed, and the worker starts working for the new employer immediately. Matches
are dissolved in one of three ways. First, workers are laid off at rate δ(a) upon which
they transition into unemployment. Second, workers quit for higher paying job found
through on-the-job search. This event occurs at rate λ(a)sF (w|a), where s is the worker’s
endogenous search effort, and where F (w|a) ≡ 1 − F (w|a). Third, workers are exoge-
nously reallocated to new matches at rate λ(a)µ, with a wage drawn from F (w|a). The
worker can reject a reallocation and instead transition to unemployment. Descriptively,
the reallocation shocks generates transitions from high to low paying jobs, events that are
empirically prevalent, but that the model would otherwise be unable to generate.2 To
simplify the model solution, unemployed workers are also subject to reallocation shocks.
Taxation and the government’s budget. A worker’s net wage resulting from a gross
wage of w is w−T (w), where T (·) is the income tax function. Taxes are paid continuously,
and we assume that T (w) < w, that T (·) is twice differentiable, and that 0 ≤ T ′(w) < 1.
Firm profit is taxed at rate τ . An unmatched worker receives gross unemployment benefit
b, and the net flow income of an unemployed worker is b−T (b). If the government’s steady
state revenue from levying income and profit taxes is R, the government budget is the
identity
B = R− n0b− b ≡ 0, (2.1)
where, anticipating some notation to be introduced below, n0 is the aggregate steady state
unemployment rate, and b is a per-capita lump-sum transfer that balance the government
budget.3
Worker preferences. Workers have preferences over consumption of a composite pri-
vate good c and job search effort s, an economic bad that yields disutility. The preferences
are represented by the additively separable felicity function ψ : [0,∞)× [s,∞) 7→ R, with
ψ(c, s) = u(c)− ζ(s− s), (2.2)
where u : [0,∞) 7→ R is a continuously differentiable function with u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0,
and ζ : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) is a continuously differentiable function with ζ ′(·) > 0 and
2In terms of interpretation, transitions from high to low paying jobs may reflect advanced layoff notices,
strong duration dependence in the unemployment-to-job hazard, or simply considerations that fall outside
the scope of the model, e.g. amenities.
3As will become clear as we present the model, imposing a balanced budget is not a trivial exercise and
it involves some numerical complications that we have yet to solve in a satisfactory way. For this reason,
our current estimation procedure and analysis is done with b = 0.
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ζ ′′(·) > 0. This parameterization bounds search effort from below by s > 0, reflecting that
low levels of search effort, up until s = s, involves no disutility. We refer to s as “free
search”. Free search turns out not to be quantitatively important, but rules out degenerate
equilibrium wage offer distributions (Diamond, 1971). As we shall see, the convexity of
ζ(·) determines the substitution effect in the job search response to income tax reforms.
The income effect is pinned down by the concavity of u(·). Insofar as the job search
literature has endogenized search effort, it typically imposes quasi-linear preferences that
rules out income effects in job search behavior.4 With quasi-linear preferences, a reduction
in the marginal income tax rate invariably result in increased worker search effort. In the
more general case of (2.2), search effort may be reduced if the income effect dominates
the substitution effect.
Large households and the complete markets allocation. Curvature in the utility
of consumption, u(·), also introduces a desire for consumption smoothing in the face of
labor income risk stemming from job finding and job destruction events. We deal with
this issue within the complete markets paradigm, and follow Merz (1995) in characterizing
the resulting allocation (of consumption and search effort) by introducing a set of large
households in the economy. Specifically, each worker in the economy belong to large house-
hold that is able to dictate the job search effort of its members. Members of a household
pool their income to provide perfect consumption insurance against labor income fluctua-
tions. A household consists of a unit measure of workers of identical ability. We refer to a
household of ability-a workers as a type-a household. There are h(a) type-a households,
coinciding with the measure of ability-a workers, and the economy thus contains a unit
measure of households,
∫ 1
0 h(a)da = 1.
Even though our analysis is strictly positive—measuring and analyzing the conse-
quences of the actual tax schedule in place and side-stepping any normative consideration
regarding the shape of this tax schedule—we note here that the complete markets assump-
tion eliminates the need for government-provided social insurance through progressive
taxation. However, as our model features ex-ante heterogeneous workers, a progressive
income tax schedule may nonetheless be warranted out of concerns for redistribution.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) provide a thorough analysis of the factors
that shape the optimal degree of income tax progressivity. Michau (2017) analyze optimal
provision of social insurance in an on-the-job search model of ex-ante homogenous workers.
4Indeed, existing empirical work on the effect of income taxation on job search and job mobility either
takes no account of income effects (see Kreiner et al., 2015), or does not separate income and substitution
effects (Gentry and Hubbard, 2004a). This is in sharp contrast to the empirical labor supply literature,
see e.g. Heckman (1993) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
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Wage determination. The ability-conditional wage offer distribution F (w|a) is deter-
mined in a wage posting equilibrium as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps et al.
(2000). The wage setting game restricts admissible wage policies in three dimensions.
First, firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers and credibly commit to future wage payments.
Second, the wage must remain constant throughout the duration of the match. Third,
contracts are anonymous, implying that a firm must offer the same contract to all workers
of the same ability. A firm’s wage policy maximizes its steady state profit by trading off
profit per worker and worker turnover, and is a best response to all other firms’ wage and
recruitment policies and workers’ optimal search effort choices. The equilibrium outcome
is a set of non-degenerate ability-specific wage offer distributions, where more productive
firms offer higher wages.
Alternative wage setting arrangements are available. Coles (2001) characterize a wage
posting equilibrium where firms may renege on promised wage payments. Stevens (2004),
and Burdett and Coles (2003) and Burdett and Coles (2010) relax the assumption that the
offered wage remain constant throughout the match and characterize the set of (privately)
optimal wage-tenure contracts. The contracts derived in Stevens (2004) has little empiri-
cal content. Burdett and Coles (2003) and Burdett and Coles (2010) consider risk-averse
workers who inhabit an incomplete markets economy where there is value to firms smooth-
ing workers consumption paths through the wage contract. While the resulting wage con-
tracts are empirically plausible, with complete markets, there is no need for firms to pro-
vide such insurance. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin
(2006) relax the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it offers through the introduction of se-
quential auctions and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job search.5 Lentz (2010) and
Bagger and Lentz (2015) extend the Cahuc et al. (2006) framework to allow for endoge-
nous job search effort. However, with income and profit taxation, wages are no longer pure
transfers in the bargaining game, rendering the Cahuc et al. (2006) framework unattrac-
tive for our purposes.6 Finally, Lentz (2015) studies equilibrium wage formation in an
incomplete markets economy where on-the-job search effort is subject to moral hazard.
5From a theoretical point of view, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004) consider whether firms should match
outside offers and reach the (tentative) conclusion that more productive firms may benefit from an offer-
matching strategy, whereas firms with lower productivity may be better off committing not to match
outside offers. From an empirical point of view, using survey data, Hall and Krueger (2012) find that
about 1/3 of the workers in their survey have wages set through take-it-or-leave-it offers, whereas another
1/3 were able to bargain.
6Breda et al. (2017) uses a sequential bargaining model in the mould of Cahuc et al. (2006) to analyze
the effect of payroll taxes on labor allocation, but does not provide a solution to the wage bargaining game,
instead imposing a reduced form sharing rule.
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2.2.2 Household behavior
Consider a type-a household. Let n0t (a) be the measure of unemployed household members
at time t, and let n1t (w|a) be the measure of household members employed with a gross
wage w at time t. Define
Nt(a) ≡ n0t (a) +
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
n1t (w|a)dw (2.3)
as the time-t measure of the household population.
The distribution of workers across unemployment and employment, and within em-
ployment, across wage levels depend on household members’ labor market behavior. The
household is able to dictate, and enforce, the search effort and acceptance decisions of
its members. Let s0t (a) be the dictated time-t search intensity for an unemployed type-a
worker, and let s1t (w|a) be the dictated time-t search intensity for a type-a worker with
gross wage w. In regard to the dictated acceptance decision of job offers, we confirm below
that the household will employ a reservation wage strategy. Let φ(a) be the reservation
wage dictated to unemployed workers in a type-a household. The reservation wage of
members employed with wage w is, obviously, w.
Members of the household pool their net-of-tax labor income and perfectly insure each
other against consumption fluctuations due to individual job finding and job destruction
shocks. Hence, time-t consumption of a type-a household member is independent of
current individual labor market status and labor income, and is given by
ct(a) =
1
Nt(a)
(
[b− T (b)]n0t (a) +
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[w − T (w)]n1t (w|a)dw
)
+ b, (2.4)
the average type-a household net-of-tax income at time t. Recall that b is a government
lump-sum transfer that balances the government budget.
Turning to the labor market behavior, a type-a household set unemployed search effort
profile s0t (a), an employed search effort profile s
1
t (w|a) for every w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], as well as
a reservation wage φ(a), in order to maximize the present value household lifetime utility,
Ψ(a), given as
Ψ(a) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
ψ(ct(a), s
0
t (a))n
0
t (a) +
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
ψ(ct(a), s
1
t (w|a))n1t (w|a)dw
]
dt, (2.5)
where ψ(c, s) is the felicity function given by (2.2), and ct(a) is the household consumption
level given by (2.4). The optimization is subject to the law of motions for n0t (a) and
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n1t (w|a). The law of motion for n0t (a) is given by
n˙0t (a) = δ(a)Nt(a)− [δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s0t (a)]n0t (a), (2.6)
The “dot”-notation indicates derivatives with respect to time t. The law of motion for
n1t (w|a) is slightly more involved and is given by
n˙1t (w|a) =
[
λ(a)µNt(a) + λ(a)s
0
t (a)n
0
t (a) +
∫ w
φ(a)
λ(a)s1t (x|a)n1t (x|a)dx
]
f(w|a)
−
[
δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s1t (w|a)F (w|a)
]
n1t (w|a), (2.7)
for every w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)]. The derivation of both (2.6) and (2.7) are based on gross
worker flow accounting and are detailed in Appendix A.1.1.
Conditional on φ(a) < w(a), the household problem is an optimal control problem with
the controls s0t (a) and s
1
t (w|a) for every w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], and states n0t (a) and n1t (w|a)
for every w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)]. Define ξ0t (a) as the multiplier on the law of motion for n0t (a)
in the household’s problem, and let ξ1t (w|a) be the multiplier on the law of motion for
n1t (w|a). ξ0t (a) and ξ1t (w|a) are referred to as the costate variables, and we denominate
them in present (t = 0) values. The costates can be interpreted as shadow values, and
are central to the analysis to come. Indeed, ξ0t (a) is the increase in the present value
household lifetime utility Ψ(a), see (2.5), from adding an additional unemployed worker
to the household at time t. Likewise, ξ1t (w|a) is the increase in Ψ(a) from adding an extra
worker with wage w to the household at time t.
Our analysis focuses on an economy in steady state, where controls, states and the
current value costates, given by eρtξ0t (a) and e
ρtξ1t (w|a), are time-invariant, and the present
value costates, ξ0t (a) and ξ
1
t (w|a), varies with t only because of discounting. That is, steady
state behavior is captured by ξ00(a) and ξ
1
0(w|a) with the following set of steady state
identities applying: ξ00(a) = e
ρtξ0t (a) and ξ
1
0(w|a) = eρtξ1t (w|a) for every w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)].7
Steady state values of s0t (a) and s
1
t (w|a) are denoted by s0(a) and s1(w|a), respectively.
Suppose an unemployed household member has received an offer of a job paying a
wage w. In order to maximize Ψ(a), the household dictates a rejection if the value of the
worker remaining unemployed, ξ00(a), exceeds the value of having the worker employed
in a job paying w, ξ10(w|a). The household dictates acceptance if the opposite inequality
between ξ00(a) and ξ
1
0(w|a) holds. We confirm below that ξ10(w|a) is strictly increasing in
w. Hence, the household employs a reservation wage strategy, and the current reservation
7ξ00(a) and ξ
1
0(w|a) are the added value to Ψ(a) from immediately admitting an additional unemployed
worker, respectively employed worker with wage w, to the household when the economy is in steady state.
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wage φ(a) solves
ξ10(φ(a)|a) = ξ00(a). (2.8)
The household’s optimal control problem can be solved by constructing the associated
Hamiltonian and applying a version of the Maximum Principle (Acemoglu, 2009, section
7.5, p. 253). We state just the main results here, with details on the derivations relegated
to Appendix A.1.3. Optimal steady state search effort for employed workers earning a
wage w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)] satisfies
ζ ′(s1(w|a)− s) = λ(a)
∫ w(a)
w
[ξ10(x|a)− ξ10(w|a)]dF (x|a) = λ(a)
∫ w(a)
w
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx,
(2.9)
where the last equality follows from integrating by parts. The interpretation of (2.9) is
straightforward. Suppose the household perturb its steady state search policy by dictating
marginally higher search intensity at wage-rung w, specifically from s1(w|a) to s1(w|a)+∆.
This pertubation involves an additional disutility-flow ζ ′(s1(w|a)−s)∆ per rung-w worker,
see (2.2). However, it also increases the rate at which rung-w workers obtain job offers by
λ(a)∆. The additional offers are distributed according to F (·|a), but only a share F (w|a)
are acceptable. Reallocating a worker from rung w to rung x > w yields a household
utility gain of ξ10(x|a) − ξ10(w|a). Hence, the expected per-worker marginal value gain of
the search policy perturbation is λ(a)∆
∫ w(a)
w [ξ
1
0(x|a)− ξ10(w|a)]dF (x|a). Condition (2.9)
therefore balances the added marginal disutility from search with the expected marginal
gains from search. An analogous condition characterizes optimal unemployed search.8
A recursive expression for the steady state value to the household of a worker employed
at wage w, ξ10(w|a), can be derived as
ρξ10(w|a) = ψ(c(a), s1(w|a)) + u′(c(a))[w − T (w)− c(a)]
+ δ(a)[ξ00(a)− ξ10(w|a)] + λ(a)µ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx
+ λ(a)s1(w|a)
∫ w(a)
w
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx, (2.10)
where ψ(·, ·) is the felicity function given by (2.2), and where c(a) is the steady state
version of household consumption, see (2.4). A worker employed with wage w is an
asset to the household. The left-hand side of (2.10) is the permanent utility flow from
this asset. This flow comprises the household payoff flow, and the expected returns to
job destruction, job reallocation, and job finding. The marginal wage-rung w worker
8Optimal steady state unemployed search effort s0(a) solves ζ′(s0(a) − s) = λ(a) ∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[ξ10(x|a) −
ξ00(a)]dF (x|a).
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increases the household utility flow by worker-felicity ψ(c(a), s1(w|a)), which leaves net-
of-tax revenue in the amount of w−T (w)−c(a) to be distributed within the household. The
household values this additional revenue at the marginal utility of consumption, u′(c(a)).
Job destruction, job reallocation, and job finding events are associated with capital gains
from the worker transitioning into unemployment, being reallocated to a randomly drawn
new job, or being matched with a new potential employer through on-the-job search.
In Appendix A.1.3 we derive a similar expression for the steady state value of an
unemployed worker, ξ00(a), which reads
ρξ00(a) = u(c(a))− ζ(s0(a)) + u′(c(a))[b− T (b)− c(a)]
+ λ(a)[µ+ s0(a)]
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (2.11)
Substituting (2.10) and (2.11) into the reservation wage definition (2.8) shows that
φ(a) = b. (2.12)
This result stems from the assumption that unemployed and employed job search is equally
efficient, and involves equal disutility. In this case, there are no opportunity cost of taking
up a job. We impose φ(a) = b in the remainder of the paper. Given (2.12), it is evident that
optimal off-the-job search equals optimal on-the-job search in a firm offering w = b, that
is, s0(a) = s1(b|a).9 This result allow us to simplify notation by dropping the superscript
“0” and “1” that has distinguished unemployed and employed search up until now. In the
remainder of the paper we let s(w|a) denote optimal search effort at wage w, with s(b|a)
being optimal unemployed search.
Taking the derivative of (2.10) with respect to w, applying the Envelope Theorem,
and substituting the resulting expression for ∂ξ10(w|a)/∂w into (2.9) yields the following
expression for the complete markets optimal job search effort as a function of the current
wage w,
ζ ′(s(w|a)− s) = λ(a)
∫ w(a)
w
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (2.13)
The optimal search effort balances the marginal cost with the marginal gains from on-the-
job search. In general, workers of different ability differ in their chose job search effort,
due to differences in the return to job search stemming from differences in the distribution
of job offers F (x|a) across workers of different abilities. Lemma 1 summarizes some useful
properties of the optimal search effort.
9For details, consult Appendix A.1.3.
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Lemma 1. Optimal search effort s(w|a) has the following properties (i) s(w|a) ≥ s, (ii)
s(w(a)|a) = s, and (iii) ∂s(w|a)/∂w < 0 for every w ∈ [b, w(a)).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
Lemma 1 states that job search effort is bounded from below by s > 0. This is a
useful feature of the model as it rules out degenerate equilibrium wage offer distributions,
see Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983), and Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The
return to job search effort diminishes at higher wages because there are only limited
possibilities to climb further up the wage ladder. Indeed, at the highest paying job, the
returns to on-the-job search is zero, and no job search effort is forthcoming. The model
implies that unemployed workers exert more job search effort than employed workers,
despite facing the same disutility of effort and the same search efficiency. The impact
of income taxation on job search is discussed further below when we consider partial
equilibrium substitution and income effects in the provision of job search effort. We note,
however, that (2.13) implies that search effort is distorted by income taxation, and it
is the average tax (i.e. the integrated marginal tax rate) that matters for distortions.10
Furthermore, income taxation may have different quantitative implications for the job
search behavior of workers of different abilities. These effects of income taxation will all
be born out in the empirical analysis to come.
2.2.2.1 The complete markets steady state labor allocation
Normalizing the steady state household population Nt(a) ≡ 1 allow us to interpret n0(a)
as the steady state unemployment rate among type-a workers, and to define the steady
state PDF of employed workers across wage rates as g(w|a) ≡ n1(w|a)/[1 − n0(a)], with
associated CDF G(w|a) = ∫ wb g(w|a)dw. Together, n0(a) and G(w|a) characterizes the
steady state allocation of type-a labor.
Using the steady state version of (2.6) with Nt(a) ≡ 1 implies that
n0(a) =
δ(a)
δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(b|a) , (2.14)
where s(b|a) is given by (2.13). Furthermore, the steady state version of (2.6) with φ(a) = b
10Integration by parts of (2.13) results in a differential equation for s(w|a) that does not depend on the
marginal tax function T ′(·), but only the average tax function T (·).
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and Nt(a) ≡ 1 yields the following balanced flow equation defining G(w|a),
[λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s0(a)]F (w|a) n
0(a)
1− n0(a) + λ(a)µF (w|a)G(w|a)
= δ(a)G(w|a) + F (w|a)
∫ w
b
λ(a)s(x|a)g(x|a)dx. (2.15)
The left-hand side of reflects the inflow into the stock of workers earning a wage w or less,
and the right-hand side reflects the outflow. In steady state, in- and outflow balance. We
show in Appendix A.1.2 that (2.15) implies the following closed-form expression for the
allocation of labor,
G(w|a) = 1− exp
〈
−
∫ w
b
[
δ(a) + λ(a)µ
δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(x|a)F (x|a)
]
f(x|a)
F (x|a)dx
〉
. (2.16)
Since all type-a households are identical, G(w|a) represents both the allocation of labor
within a type-a household, as well as the economy-wide allocation of type-a workers.
2.2.2.2 Tax reforms and partial equilibrium substitution and income effects
The analysis to follow is based on a comparative statics analysis of steady state partial
equilibrium predictions of the impact of income taxation on job search effort. That is,
we compare the steady state job search policies under two different tax regimes, with no
account of the out-of-steady state adjustment process.
Consider a tax reform that changes the income tax function from T (·) to Tˆ (·). Let
s(w|a) be the pre-reform job search effort of a type-a worker employed with wage w given
by (2.13), and let sˆ(w|a) be the post-reform search effort defined by the post-reform version
of (2.13),
ζ ′(sˆ(w|a)) = λ(a)
∫ w(a)
w
u′(cˆ(a))[1− Tˆ ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)sˆ(x|a)F (x|a)dx, (2.17)
where cˆ(a) is post-reform consumption, computed according to the steady state version of
(2.4) imposing the post-reform tax system and the post-reform labor allocation. Finally,
let s˜(w|a) be the job search intensity of a type-a worker employed with wage w under
the new tax regime Tˆ (·), but holding the marginal utility of consumption constant at the
pre-reform level, i.e. at u(c(a)). This counterfactual object is defined by the functional
ζ ′(s˜(w|a)) = λ(a)
∫ w(a)
w
u′(c(a))[1− Tˆ ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s˜(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (2.18)
The full partial equilibrium on-the-job search effort response of a type-a worker em-
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ployed with wage w, sˆ(w|a)− s(w|a) can be decomposed into a substitution effect and an
income effect according to
sˆ(w|a)− s(w|a) = s˜(w|a)− s(w|a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Substitution effect
+ sˆ(w|a)− s˜(w|a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income effect
. (2.19)
To fix ideas, suppose the tax reform increases the net-of-tax rate for wages in the interval
[wˆ, wˆ+∆] ∈ [b, w(a)] for some ∆ > 0, while leaving the rest of the tax function unchanged.
Suppose w < wˆ. Then, inspection of (2.13) and (2.18) reveals that, in response to the
higher net-of-tax rates in [wˆ, wˆ+ ∆], on-the-job search effort at wage w < wˆ increases, i.e
the substitution effect s˜(w|a)−s(w|a) is positive. The magnitude of the substitution effect
is inversely related to the convexity of the disutility from search effort, i.e. ζ ′′(·). The
intuition is straightforward: An increase in the net-of-tax rate at some interval [wˆ, wˆ+∆] ∈
(w,w(a)] increases the gains from reallocating to this wage interval, mandating an increase
in search effort at wage w to rebalance marginal costs and benefits. If the disutility from
search is highly convex, only small adjustments in search effort are needed to equalize
marginal costs and benefits. If w > wˆ + ∆, the reform affect only wages below the
worker’s current position, leaving job search incentives unchanged, and the substitution
effect is zero.11
The increased net-of-tax wages in the interval [wˆ, wˆ + ∆] also increases workers’ per-
manent income, and thus consumption. That is, c(a) < cˆ(a), and by the convexity of the
utility of consumption, u′(c(a)) ≥ u′(cˆ(a)). Inspection of (2.17) and (2.18) reveals that
the magnitude of the income effect is driven by the curvature of the utility of consump-
tion, u(·). Again, the intuition is straightforward: An increase in the net-of-tax rate at
some interval [wˆ, wˆ + ∆] increases the worker’s permanent net-of-tax income, reducing
the marginal utility of consumption and thus mandating a decrease in search effort at all
wage levels. Since the income effect operates through the workers’ permanent income, it
is present even when [wˆ, wˆ + ∆] ∈ [b, w].
2.2.3 Firm behavior
Firm behavior is modeled in a one-shot game. Conditional on entry, a firm sets a wage
policy and a hiring intensity policy in order to maximize its expected flow of net-of-tax
profit in steady state. In doing so, each firm takes the income and profit tax regimes,
workers’ search strategies, and the hiring and wage policies of other firms as given. Each
11In the case where w ∈ [wˆ, wˆ + ∆] a positive substitution effect arises from the incentives to reallocate
to wages in the interval (w, wˆ + ∆].
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firm conditions its policies on worker ability.12 Specifically, a wage policy for a generic
type-p ∈ [p0, 1] firm is w(a|p) : [0, 1] 7→ R+, and a hiring intensity policy is v(a|p) : [0, 1] 7→
R+. Recall that the productivity distribution among the entering firms is Γ0(·). There
is an underlying exogenous distribution of potential productivities Γ(p) with p ∈ [0, 1].
There is free entry of firms with entry decisions based on expected steady state net-of-tax
profit flow. The entry game pins down the measure of entering firms, M0, the minimum
productivity p0, as well as Γ0(·).
2.2.3.1 Profit maximization
Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999);
Bontemps et al. (2000), firms that have entered the labor market seek to maximize the
expected steady state flow profit.13 Let `(a|w, v) be the the steady state measure of type-a
workers that a generic (type-p) firm can expect to employ when it offers this type of work-
ers a wage w while searching for them at intensity v. The notation makes it clear that firm
productivity p plays no direct role in shaping `(a|w, v), but, of course, the optimal wage
and hiring policies will depend on p, because output per worker depends on p. Indeed,
profit per type-a worker in a type-p firm, paying a wage w is y(a, p)−w. Let pi(p) be the
steady state net-of-tax profit flow resulting from a type-p firms’ optimal wage and hiring
intensity policy. Recall that profit flows are taxed at a flat rate τ . It follows that
pi(p) = max
w(·|p),v(·|p)
(1− τ)
∫ 1
0
〈
[y(a, p)− w(a|p)]`(a|w(a|p), v(a|p))− d(v(a|p))
〉
da, (2.20)
where d : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) is the twice continuously differentiable hiring intensity cost
function. We impose d′(·) > 0 and d′′(·) > 0. Equation (2.20) embeds a number of
assumptions stated above. First, firm-level output exhibits constant returns to scale in
matches. Second, hiring cost is a monetary cost that is fully deductible in relation to
profit taxation (say, the cost of running a human resource department). In the current
formulation of the model, the hiring costs vanishes from the economy, i.e. it does not
accrue to any of the agents in the economy.14 We are currently working on a version
of the model where firms assign employees to either production or recruitment activities,
similar to the formulation in Shimer (2010). Production workers produce output according
to a production function as above, whereas recruitment workers enable the firm to attract
12This setup involves a degree of directedness in firms’ search processes, eliminating cross-ability con-
gestion externalities in wage policies.
13Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Mortensen (2005) point out that steady-state profit is the appro-
priate criterion only if firms do not discount the future, namely ρ = 0.
14A contrived and empirically nonsatisfactory narrative underlying such a formulation could involve
firms outsourcing their hiring operation to foreign owned recruitment agencies.
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more workers. In such a setup, hiring cost can be regarded literally as wage costs in
a human resource department, and are clearly accruing to the (recruitment) workers.
Finally, a third assumption embedded in (2.20) is that hiring intensity can be directed
towards workers of a particular ability, with a firms’ total hiring cost being the integrated
worker-type specific hiring costs.
In order for a firm to be able to hire any type-a workers at all, its wage offer must
exceed the type-a worker reservation wage and the firm must exert strictly positive hiring
effort. That is, `(a|w, v) = 0 if and only if w < b or v = 0. Consider a generic type-p firm
with type-a worker wage and hiring policies represented by w(a|p) > b and v(a|p) > 0.
Then, `(a|w(a|p), v(a|p)) is pinned down by the following balanced flow equation,
`(a|w(a|p), v(a|p))
[
δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(w(a|p)|a)F (w(a|p)|a)
]
=
v(a|p)
V (a)
〈
h(a)n0(a)[λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(b|a)]
+ h(a)[1− n0(a)]
[
λµ+ λ(a)
∫ w(a|p)
b
s(x|a)dG(x|a)
]〉
, (2.21)
where s(w|a) is given by (2.13), n0(a) is the steady state type-a worker unemployment rate
(2.14), G(w|a) is given by (2.16), and where V (a) = M0
∫ 1
p0
v(a|p)dΓ0(p) is the integrated
type-a worker hiring intensity. The left-hand side of (2.21) is the measure of type-a workers
that leave a type-p firm with type-a worker wage and hiring policies w(a|p) and v(a|p).
These workers leave either because they are laid off, reallocated or because they find a
higher paying job. The right-hand side of (2.21) is the measure of type-a workers that are
hired into the type-p firm. The expression in angle brackets is the number of meetings
between firms and type-a workers willing to accept a job offer w(a|p). These workers are
either coming from unemployment, reallocated from other firms, or are currently working
in firms paying a wage less than w(a|p). The pool of willing workers are distributed across
hiring firms in proportion to the firms’ hiring intensity, i.e. according to the density
v(a|p)/V (a).
Since (2.21) implies that `(a|w(a|p), v(a|p)) = v(a|p)V (a) ˜`(a|w(a|p))h(a), where
˜`(a|w(a|p)) = n
0(a)[λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(b|a)] + [1− n0(a)][λ(a)µ+ λ(a) ∫ w(a|p)b s(x|a)dG(x|a)]
δ(a) + λ(a)µ+ λ(a)s(w(a|p)|a)F (w(a|p)|a) ,
(2.22)
we can analyze a firm’s wage policy w(a|p) independently of its hiring intensity pol-
icy v(a|p). Lemma 2 states a useful and intuitive property shared by `(a|w(a|p)) and
˜`(a|w(a|p)).
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Lemma 2. `(a|w) and ˜`(a|w) are strictly increasing in w for w ∈ [b, w(a)].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.5.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is straightforward. By offering a higher wage, a firm
simultaneously increases its ability to poach workers from other (lower paying) firms, and
reduces the likelihood of its own workers being poached by other (higher paying) firms.
Both effects tend to increase the steady state measure of type-a workers employed in the
firm.
Using (2.21) and (2.22) allow us to restate the firms profit maximization problem (2.20)
as a two-step problem. Indeed,
pi(p) = max
v(·|p)
(1− τ)
∫ 1
0
〈
v(a|p)
V (a)
p˜i(a|p)h(a)− d(v(a|p))
〉
da, (2.23)
where
p˜i(a|p) = max
w
〈
[y(a, p)− w]˜`(a|w)
〉
, (2.24)
with ˜`(a|w) given by (2.22). Equation (2.24) pins down the optimal wage policy w(·|p),
independently of the hiring policy v(·|p). Equation (2.23) then pins down the optimal
hiring policy v(·|p), given the optimal wage policy.
The fact that hiring costs are fully deductable ensures that profit taxation has no
direct distortionary effects on hiring intensity, nor on wage policies. In equilibrium, profit
taxation will, however, have distortionary effects through its impact on firm entry and
exit, and the derived effects of this on firms’ wage policies. As established above, see
(2.13), income taxation has distortionary effects on workers’ search effort and thus on the
allocation of labor, see (2.14) and (2.16). It is evident from (2.22), (2.23) and (2.24) that
income taxation therefore induce further equilibrium distortions of firms’ wage and hiring
policies.
2.2.3.2 Optimal wage and hiring policies
We restrict attention to a pure strategy equilibrium in which the solution to (2.23) and
(2.24) are two functions w : [0, 1]× [p0, 1] 7→ R and v : [0, 1]× [p0, 1] 7→ R mapping worker-
types and firm-types into wage offers and hiring intensities. In a similar, but simpler,
model where search effort and hiring intensity are exogenously fixed at constant levels,
Bontemps et al. (2000) show that, provided that the underlying productivity distribution
Γ0(·) is continuous, the pure strategy equilibrium is in fact the only equilibrium. We
conjecture that this result carries over to our slightly more complicated setup.
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The optimal wage and hiring intensity policies, w(a|p) and v(a|p), have a couple of
useful and intuitive properties that are formally stated below.
Proposition 1. w(a|p) is strictly increasing in p for all a ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.6.
Proposition 2. v(a|p) is unique and is strictly increasing in p for all a ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.7.
Proposition 3. pi(p) is strictly increasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.8.
2.2.3.3 Firm entry and exit
Firm entry and exit is as in Melitz (2003). Firms enter the market by paying a sunk entry
cost C. Our current model formulation assumes the presence of a third class of economic
agent in the economy besides workers and firms, namely entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur
is a risk neutral agent who therefore do not participate in the risk sharing arrangement
in the large households. An entering firm is an entrepreneur who pays the sunk cost to
develop a business idea. One might for example think of C as a money-metric disutility
cost of an entrepreneurs foregone leisure. Indeed, we treat C as non-deductible in relation
to profit taxation. Immediately upon entry, the firm observes its productivity p, and
decides whether to hire workers and start producing, or exit. A firm’s productivity p is
drawn from the exogenous productivity distribution Γ(·) with support [0, 1]. A firm with
productivity p exits if the steady profit at that productivity is negative, i.e. if pi(p) < 0.
Proposition 3 established that pi(p) is strictly increasing in p. Hence, there is a threshold
productivity p0 such that firms with p < p0 exit the market. The threshold productivity
p0 solves pi(p0) = 0 and the endogenous distribution of productivities across operating
firms, Γ0(·), is given by
Γ0(p) =
Γ(p)− Γ(p0)
Γ(p0)
, p ∈ [p0, 1]. (2.25)
Free entry ensures that, in equilibrium, the measure of active firms in the economy,
M0, adjust such that the expected steady state profit flow from entry is offset by the
opportunity (flow) cost of entry, given by the annuitized entry cost ρC. That is,∫ 1
p0
pi(p)dΓ(p) = ρC. (2.26)
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Substituting (2.23) for pi(p) in (2.26), and using that V (a) = M0
∫ p
p0
v(a|x)dΓ0(x), implies
that
M0 =
[
ρC
1− τ +
∫ 1
p0
∫ 1
0
d(v(a|p))dadΓ(p)
]−1[ ∫ 1
p0
∫ 1
0
v(a|p)p˜i(a|p)h(a)∫ 1
p0
v(a|x)dΓ0(x)
dadΓ(p)
]
. (2.27)
Equation (2.27) shows that profit taxation distorts firms’ entry and exit decisions, and
thus impact the measure of active firms. These distortion arise because entry costs are
sunk, and therefore not deductable. Profit taxation effectively increases the cost of entry,
or reduces the value of entry, thereby depressing the number of firms in the economy.
Ownership structure of firms. Firms are owned by the risk neutral entrepreneurs
who simply consumes the net-of-tax profit flow, on average ρC. As mentioned above,
the entrepreneurs do not participate in the risk sharing arrangement of the risk averse
workers. Indeed, the household budget constraint (2.4) does not include any net-of-tax
profits. We stress that the entrepreneurs are within the jurisdiction of the tax authorities
as the revenue from profit tax enters the government’s budget (2.1).
An alternative model formulation assumes that the households are the ultimate owners
of the firms, perhaps through a mutual fund. In such a formulation, net-of-tax profit
flows accrue to households and enters the household budget constraint (2.4), and will
have implications for workers’ search behavior via income effects. While such a model
formulation is perhaps more conventional in the macro literature, we note that the vast
majority of individuals in our data in fact have negative capital income, see Figure 2.1.15
Hence, from a purely empirical standpoint, it is not clear that capital income generates
significant income effects in workers search behavior. Nonetheless, to explore these issues
further we are currently working on a model formulation where household own the firms
through mutual funds.
2.2.3.4 Aggregation
Since firms optimal worker-type a conditional wage offers w(a|p) are strictly increasing in
firm-type p, see Proposition 1, and firms meet potential employees at a rate proportional
to hiring intensity v(a|p), the wage offer distribution faced by workers is simply the hiring
intensity weighted productivity distribution given by
F (w|a) ≡ F (w(a|p)|a) =
∫ p
p0
v(a|x)dΓ0(x)∫ 1
p0
v(a|x)dΓ0(x)
. (2.28)
15This result arise because the measured capital income include interest on mortgage debt. Taking out
mortgage interest, we believe most individuals in our data have little or not capital income.
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Let θ(a) be the worker-type a specific labor market tightness, measured as the ratio
of aggregate hiring intensity V (a) = M0
∫ 1
p0
v(p)dΓ0(p) to aggregate search effort S(a) in
the worker-type a labor market. Aggregate worker-type a search effort S(a) is given by
S(a) = n0(a)[µ+ s(b|a)] + [1− n0(a)]
∫ w(a)
b
[µ+ s(w|a)]dG(w|a), (2.29)
where s(w|a) is given by (2.13), n0(a) is given by (2.14), and G(w|a) is given by (2.16),
and where, by Proposition 1, w(a) = w(a|1), the optimal wage offer in the most productive
firm with p = 1.
The model structure implies that the flow of contacts between type-a workers and
firms in the economy is λS(a). With a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching
function with elasticity of matches with respect to unemployed search being η, we have
that λ(a) = θ(a)1−η. This closes the model, and we can state the equilibrium conditions
in the next subsection.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
Our equilibrium definition follows Mortensen (2005).
Definition 1. A steady-state labor market equilibrium is composed of the following com-
ponents:
• The optimal reservation strategy: An employed worker accepts any job offer that
offers a wage strictly greater than the current wage. An unemployed type-a worker
accepts any job offer greater than or equal to φ(a) = b, see (2.12).
• Workers’ optimal search effort solves (2.13).
• Firms’ worker-type specific optimal wage and hiring intensity policies w(a|p) and
v(a|p) solve (2.24) and (2.23).
• The worker-type specific unemployment rate n0(a) satisfies (2.14) and the distribu-
tion of wages across employed workers G(w|a) satisfies (2.16).
• The conditional gross wage offer distribution F (w|a) that satisfies (2.28).
• The threshold productivity for entry p0 solves pi(p0) = 0 with pi(p) given by (2.20).
• The measure of firms operating in the market M0 given by (2.27).
• The worker-type specific matching efficiency parameters λ(a) are given by λ(a) =
θ(a)1−η where θ(a) = S(a)/V (a), V (a) = M0
∫ 1
p0
v(p)dΓ0(p) and S(a) given by
(2.29).
72
Given the rich structure of the model, we have not been able to prove existence of the
equilibrium. However, our solution algorithm finds a numerical solution under reasonable
parameter values. The numerical model solution is detailed in Appendix A.4.
2.3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses a matched employer-employee panel covering the entire Danish
population during 1990-2005. The data is constructed from administrative records. Esti-
mation of the structural parameters of the model is carried out using a subset of this data
pertaining to the period 1999-2003. Evaluation of a series of tax reforms implemented in
1994, 1998, and 2004 requires the use of the entire 1990-2005 data period.
2.3.1 Data sources
We build our matched employer-employee panel from three sources, (i) labor market spell
data, including hourly wage information, (ii) information from IDA (Integreret Database
for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning), a Danish register-based matched employer-employee database
maintained by Statistics Denmark containing socioeconomic information on workers and
some background information on firms, and (iii) information on firms’ sales and purchases
from firm-level value added tax (VAT) accounts administered by the Danish tax authori-
ties.
Labor market spell data. The labor market spell data contains individual job and
non-employment spells. Information on job spells is available for the period 1985-2013
for all legal Danish residents aged 15-74, and is obtained by combining a number of
administrative registers.16 We restrict attention to the period 1990-2005. A job spell
is defined as a continuous period of primary employment at a given firm, with duration
measured in days.17 Job spells, and therefore labor market transitions, are recorded at
the firm-level. A firm may consist of multiple workplaces, but the labor market spell data
is constructed such that continuous employment at different workplaces within a firm is
considered as a single job spell. Nonemployment spells are periods where no job spells are
recorded. We are not able to distinguish between nonemployed who actively search for a
job and nonparticipants.
16Henning Bunzel at Aarhus University has been instrumental in developing the job spell data described
here.
17Primary attachment is evaluated calendar month by calendar month. For each individual in each
month, the primary employer is defined as the firm at which the individual works the highest number of
hours in the current and next two calendar months.
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The unit of observation in the labor market spell data is a person-spell-year. Hence, a
spell that starts on Jan. 5th, 2000 and ends on March 12th, 2002 is represented by three
observations relating to the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. The job spell data includes worker
and firm identifiers, start- and end-dates of the job, the annual earnings pertaining to the
job, as well as an estimate of the annual number of hours worked in the job.18 Hence, we
can compute (an estimate of) the average annual wage rate in each job. In cases where a
worker transitions from one firm to another with up to 14 days of nonemployment between
the two employment spells, we overwrite the the nonemployment spell and thus record a
job-to-job transition. In cases where a worker ends an employment spell at a firm, but
transitions back to the same firm with at most 12 weeks of non-employment between the
two employment spells, we overwrite the nonemployment spell and instead record a single
employment spell.
IDA data. IDA consists of several sub-panels. We use the sub-panels IDA-P and IDA-S
from the period 1990-2005. IDA-P contains annual background information from public
registers on all individuals aged 15-74 residing legally in Denmark on the 31st of December.
IDA-P information includes highest completed education including date of completion, and
information on any ongoing education subsequent to the highest completed education. We
use date of completion of the highest completed education is used to define labor market
entry. The unit of observation in IDA-P is a person-year. IDA-S contains background
information from public records on all physical workplaces in Denmark. We retain a
public sector indicator from IDA-S, defining a firm’s public sector status to be the public
sector status of its largest workplace. The unit of observation in the (aggregated) IDA-S
panel is a firm-year.
VAT data. Data on firms’ (not workplaces) sales and purchases are obtains from the
panels MOMS and MOMM, constructed from firm’s value added tax (VAT) accounts
maintained by the Danish tax authorities. Danish firms settle VAT accounts monthly,
quarterly or annually depending on the size of their revenue. MOMS covers the period
1995-2000 and contains annual sales and purchases. MOMM is a monthly panel starting
in January, 2001. We use MOMM data up until December, 2005, aggregating the monthly
information to an annual frequency.19 Putting MOMS and MOMM together, we obtain an
18Annual hours are estimated using information on mandatory pension contributions. Lund and Vejlin
(2015) develop and implement a procedure for computing annual hours in a job in the IDA data for
the period 1980-2007, primarily using information on mandatory pension contributions. We adapt this
procedure for the spell data with some minor simplifications.
19For firms that settle VAT accounts on quarterly or annual frequencies, the monthly information in
MOMM are imputed by Statistics Denmark. As all firms settle VAT accounts at least annually, the annual
aggregate data is not affected by the imputation.
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annual panel of firms’ sales and purchases for the period 1995-2005. We compute annual
firm-level value added as annual sale less annual purchases. The unit of observation in the
VAT panel data is a firm-year.
Merging the data sources. Merging the data sources is relatively straightforward
using the available person and firm identifiers, and Appendix A.2 provide a detailed de-
scription of the merging procedure. Here we simply note that the resulting 1990-2005
matched employer-employee panel contains 84,474,045 spell observations on 4,447,401 in-
dividuals, 428,448 firms, 57,568,393 job spells and 26,905,652 non-employment spells prior
to selection of the analysis data.
2.3.2 Selecting the analysis data
We start by discarding all observations on individuals never observed with either age or
education information.20 We also discard individuals with implausible education infor-
mation, defined as age minus years of schooling being less than 5. We then define labor
market entry to occur at the observed date of graduation from highest completed educa-
tion (as observed in the window of observation, 1990-2005), or at January, 1st of the year
an individual turns 19, whichever occur at the latest date. All pre-entry observations are
discarded. We define labor market exit to occur at the last year an individual is observed
residing legally in Denmark (i.e. present in IDA-P) or at December, 31st of the year an
individual turns 55, whichever occur first. All post-exit observations are discarded. We
right censor observations at age 55 to avoid labor market behavior driven by retirement
considerations.
A series tax reforms were implemented in Denmark on January 1st in 1990, 1994, 1999
and 2004. As we document further below, between these reform dates, the tax system is
relatively stable, and we therefore extract four short matched employer-employee panels
pertaining to the periods 1990-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003, and 2004-2005. We employ
a rudimentary, but consistent, set of selection criteria to each of the four panels. These
criteria are imposed independently for each panel. Hence, an individual or firm discarded
from, say, the 1999-2003 panel due to violation of the selection criteria to be outlined
below, will be included in the other three analysis datasets if the same selection criteria
are not violated during in the 1990-1993, 1994-1998 or 2004-2005 panels.
Effectively, we select individuals who primarily work full time in the private sector
(when they work). Specifically, for each of the four panels covering 1990-1993, 1994-1998,
1999-2003, and 2004-2005, we discard workers who, (i) in any year worked less than 25
20The primary cause of missing education data is foreign educational credentials. Hence, we are likely
to discard predominantly immigrants and refugees in this step.
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Table 2.1: November 28th cross-sections in the 1999-2003 estimation panel
Nonemploy-
Year # Persons # Firms ment rate
1999 932,868 75,310 28.9%
2000 895,223 71,710 28.8%
2001 861,383 71,890 28.6%
2002 831,835 70,423 28.7%
2003 813,555 70,902 30.3%
hours a week on average, when working, (ii) at any point in time work in the public sector,
or (iii) leave the panel prematurely (likely caused by periods of living abroad, or death).
Finally, for the estimation period 1999-2003, we trend value added and wages to 2003
prices using the internal wage deflator.
The selection process leaves us with four short matched employer-employee panels for
the periods 1990-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003, and 2004-2005. Table 2.1 provides basic
summary statistics for the estimation period 1999-2003. We note that the number of
workers and firms, as well as the non-employment rates is relatively stable. Table 2.2
report some further basic descriptive statistics on the estimation dataset. On average, a
worker is observed for slightly more than 4 years, during which she works at 1.84 firms.
The descriptive statistics on age and education is in line with aggregate statistics for the
Danish labor force.
2.4 The empirical tax function
The income tax function is a key component in our analysis. This section provides a brief
overview of the Danish income tax system, discusses the 1994, 1999, and 2004 tax reforms,
and describe how we estimate marginal and average tax functions using the micro-level
analysis panels described above.
2.4.1 The Danish income tax system 1990-2005
An overview. Income taxes in Denmark are divided into regional and national taxes.
Regional taxes include municipality tax, county tax, and a minuscule church tax paid
only by members of the Church of Denmark. Regional tax rates differ by municipality
and county, although the variation in tax rates is small. National taxes have a progressive
structure with three brackets (bottom, middle and top) with tax rates cumulated across
brackets. Regional and national taxes differ not only in tax rates, but also in terms of the
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Table 2.2: Summery Statistics for the 1999-2003 estimation panel
Mean Std. Dev. Percent
Number of years in sample 4.34 1.29
Number of workers per firm 8.53 93.16
Number of firms per worker 1.84 1.24
Age 41.30 8.93
Highest completed education
Primary 36.75
High school 6.06
Vocational education 44.38
Short tertiary education 3.20
Medium tertiary education 5.86
Bachelor 0.57
Master degree or longer 3.17
Note: Numbers of years in the sample is computed as the number
of years (maximum five) a given worker is observed in the sample.
Number of workers per firm is the number of workers a given firm
employs at a given November cross section. Number of firms per
worker is the number of firms a given worker is observed with during
the panel.
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Table 2.3: Income concepts in the Danish income tax system
Income concept Main items included
Labor income (LI) Salary, wages, honoraria, fees, bonuses, fringe benefits,
business earnings
Personal income (PI) LI+ transfers, grants, awards, gifts, received alimony −
labor market contribution, certain pension contributions
Capital income (CI) Interest income, rental income, business capital income −
interest on debt (mortgages, bank loans, credit card debt,
student loans)
Deductions (D) Commuting, union fees, UI contributions, other work
expenditures, charity, paid alimony
Note: Reproduction of Table 1 in Kleven and Schultz (2014b).
base on which they are levied. Furthermore, during the period we consider, various social
security and labor market contributions (SSC and LMC), as well as earned income tax
credits (EITCs) have been introduced (and in some cases abolished again).21 Finally, a
marginal tax ceiling is in place. If the sum of all tax rates, excluding the church tax, and
any social and labor market contributions, exceeds this ceiling, the top tax rate is adjusted
to equal the ceiling. The Danish tax code is based on individual filing for married couples,
but some components of deductions or allowances can be transferred across spouses. We
take the spousal income into account when we simulate marginal tax rates.
The tax base of regional and national income taxes consists of a combination of income
concepts, including personal income, capital income, and deductions. Table 2.3 details the
main items in each of the taxable income components relevant for the taxation of labor
income during 1990-2005, and Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics on the distribution
of each of these components in the 1999-2003 estimation data.22 We note that, on average,
labor income dwarfs the other income types, as well as the deductions, but also that
there are considerable variation in each of the taxable income components, highlighting
the benefit of having comprehensive micro data at our disposal. Finally, capital income is
negative for the majority of Danish taxpayers as a result of interest payments on mortgages
and loans.
21Social security contributions are compulsory payments that confer entitlement to future social benefit,
including unemployment benefits. For example, a labor market contribution introduced in 1994, was at
the onset effectively a social security contribution. Earmarking of the labor market contributions ceased
in 2008, after which it is best described as a regular (flat) income tax.
22Since 1987, the taxation of wealth including income from stock holdings is completely separate from
the taxation of labor income. Consistent with the theoretical model our empirical analysis ignores the role
of wealth in shaping labor market behavior. See Jakobsen, Jakobsen, Kleven, and Zucman (2018) for a
comprehensive analysis of wealth taxation in Denmark.
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Table 2.4: The summary statistics on the distribution of 1999-2003 taxable income com-
ponents
Average Std. dev. P25 P50 P75
Labor income 333,763 184,862 245,640 301,755 381,665
Personal income net of labor income 4,485 590,762 −3, 752 1 2,001
Capital income −25, 158 99,442 −41, 549 −22, 281 −4, 288
Deductions 16,691 13,579 9,489 13,461 19,719
Note: All amounts denominated in 2003 Danish Kroner. P25, P50 and P75 refers to the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles in the distribution of each of the variables (pooled across the years 1999-2003)
To get a sense of the correlation structure between the different income concepts, Figure
2.1 plots the average personal income net of labor income, capital income and deductions
against the percentiles in the distribution of labor income for the 1999-2003 panel used
in our estimation. From panel A, we see that, naturally, personal income net of labor
income is, on average, higher for individual with low labor income, reflecting primarily
transfers and benefits related to periods of nonemployment. However, once labor income
reaches about 250,000 Danish Kroner—around the 25th percentile in the labor income
distribution—the personal income net of labor income component is, on average, close
to zero, and remains smal as we move through the labor income distribution. In fact,
personal income net of labor income becomes, on average, negative for high labor incomes,
most likely reflecting certain pension contributions. Panel B in Figure 2.1 confirms that
capital income is, on average, negative for all labor incomes, and that capital income is
negatively related to the labor income component. This relationship reflects that, for
most individuals, capital income consists almost exclusively of interest on mortgage debts,
and that individuals with higher labor income tend to have larger mortgages. Still, the
ratio of capital income to labor income remains small throughout the distribution of labor
incomes. Finally, Panel C in 2.1 shows that deductions are a hump-shaped function of
labor income, and that the amounts deducted are small relative to labor income throughout
the distribution of labor incomes.
Overall, the descriptive evidence in Table 2.4 and in Figure 2.1 clearly indicate that
labor income is the primary source of income for almost all individuals in our data, and
that, for most individuals, capital income and deductions will have not greatly affect
their available permanent income. We will account for the presence of non-labor income
components in the estimation of the tax function detailed below, but our model ignores
any consumption enjoyed out of non-labor income. The evidence in Table 2.4 and in
Figure 2.1 suggest that the bias induced by this omission is likely to be small.
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Income tax reforms. There were three major reforms of the income tax system in
Denmark during 1990-2005, namely in 1994, 1999, and 2004.23 Although some of the
reforms were part of a larger fiscal reform packages, all three reforms were intended to
increase the return to work. The reforms implemented changes to the tax bases of regional
and national taxes, as well as the tax rates, and as we shall see, induced significant shifts
in the marginal income tax function faced by individuals. Table 2.5 describes the tax
bases and rates in place during the periods 1990-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003, and 2004-
2005. We note that the three reforms were characterized by (i) changes in tax bases in all
national tax brackets, (ii) differential changes in progressive tax rates across brackets, (iii)
abolition of social security contributions and introduction of labor market contributions
and EITCs, and (iv) rising regional tax rates and declining marginal tax ceilings. We show
further below that the the income levels defining bottom, middle and top tax brackets also
change during the period (over and above indexation to inflation).
The 1994 tax reform. The 1994 reform was legislated in 1993 with implementation
starting January 1st, 1994, but not completed until 1998. Following recommendation from
a commission of appointed experts published in 1992, the purpose of the 1994 tax reform
was to improve incentives to work, and to reduce opportunities for tax avoidance. While
the 1994 reform largely followed the 1992 expert recommendations, it was considered key
element in the the newly formed centre-left government attempts to stimulate the Danish
economy. Besides the changes to the income tax bases and rates described in Table 2.5,
the reform made social pensions and cash benefits tax liable to facilitate comparison to
earned income. Finally, the 1994 reform involved a reduction in property taxes, and an
increase in the use of levies and fees in environmental regulation.
The 1999 tax reform. The 1999 income tax reform was an integral part of wider set
of economic reforms known as the “Pentecost reforms” (in Danish: “Pinsepakken”) due
to the date it was proposed. The reform was legislated in June 1998, with the income tax
reforms implemented January 1st, 1999. The reformation of the tax system was motivated
by a political desire within the centre-left government to lower tax rates on low incomes,
and to increase the marginal tax ceiling. Besides the changes to the income tax bases and
rates described in Table 2.5, the “Pentecost reforms” made changes to property taxation,
and further promoted the use of levies and fees in environmental regulation as a source of
public revenue.
23The description of the reforms to come is based on material available on the
website of the Danish Ministry of Taxation, see http://www.skm.dk/aktuelt/temaer/
skattereformer-og-skatteomlaegninger-siden-1987 (in Danish).
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The 2004 tax reform. The 2004 income tax reform was designed by a centre-right
government that had come to power in November 2001. The reform was motivated by
desire to incentivize labor market participation and work by lowering the tax on labor
income. Compared to the 1994 and 1999 reforms, the changes to the marginal tax rates
on labor income was not offset by increases in other fees or levies due to the centre-right
government having committed to not increase any taxes, levies or fees upon taking office.
Besides the changes to the income tax bases and rates described in Table 2.5, the 2004
tax reform made small changes to vehicle excise duties, and committed public funds to
social care and health care, particularly focused on the elderly.
2.4.2 Estimating the marginal tax functions
Simulating individual marginal labor income tax rates. Table 2.5 describes how
an individual’s marginal tax rate depend on several factors, including the distribution of
income across the income concepts listed in Table 2.3, region of residence, marital status,
and, if cohabiting or married, partner income. Fortunately, our data contains all the
information necessary to simulate the marginal tax rates faced by individuals in our data.
The simulations are carried out using a simulator of the Danish tax system constructed
by le Maire and Schjerring (2013) and Kleven and Schultz (2014b).24
The tax simulator allow us to compute the total tax liability for each individual, for
each year that we consider (i.e. 1990-2005). For the purpose of this paper, where we focus
on labor income taxation, it is useful to represent individual i’s tax liability in year t as
Tt(LIit, zit), where Tt(·) is the tax function in year t according to the tax simulator, LIit
is individual labor income, and zit is a vector of other income concepts relevant for the
tax liabilities in year t, see Table 2.3. Following Kleven and Schultz (2014b) we compute
individual marginal tax rates as
T ′t(LIit, zit) =
Tt(LIit + 100, zit)− Tt(LIit, zit)
100
.
That is, we add 100 Danish Kroner (approximately 15 US Dollars in 2003) to annual labor
income LI, and record the share of this marginal increase that is appropriated by taxes.
We stress that marginal tax rates are computed individual by individual, year by year,
and reflects individual circumstances such as the composition of income across the income
concepts Table 2.3, region of residence, and relevant household characteristics. Hence,
24We are grateful to Henrik Kleven and Esben Schultz for making the tax simulator available. The
tax simulator consists of a set of SAS-programs which we downloaded from the website of the American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics. We collected data on regional taxes in Denmark for the period
1985-2005 to use as an input in the tax simulations. This data is available in online supplementary material
to this paper.
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the simulated marginal tax rates represent the actual marginal tax rate faced by each
individual in our data.
Estimating the marginal labor income tax function. We use the annual individual
marginal tax rates as data points for estimation of a marginal labor income tax function
for each tax regime, i.e. for each of the periods 1990-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003, and
2004-2005. As mentioned above, the 1994 tax reform was implemented gradually over the
period 1994-1998. For that particular tax regime, we therefore estimate a marginal labor
income tax function for each year. For the remaining three tax regimes, including our
estimation period 1999-2003, we pool the annual marginal tax rates and estimate a single
marginal labor income tax function. To facilitate the pooling, we deflate labor income to
2003 levels using the internal deflator from spell data wages described above.
Our structural model of worker search requires a marginal taxes as a function of hourly
wages, not annual labor income. We transform the observed labor income into hourly
wages by dividing by a measure of annual full-time working hours, as constructed by
Lund and Vejlin (2015).25
As individual tax liabilities Tt(LIit, zit) are not solely functions of labor income LI,
but also depend on other income components, e.g. capital income, and household char-
acteristics, the mapping from hourly wages to marginal tax rates is not one-to-one. To
proceed with estimation of the marginal labor income tax functions, we split hourly wages
into 100 bins representing the percentiles in the empirical distribution of hourly wages
for a given year in a given tax regime. We next compute the median marginal tax rates
for each hourly wage bin in each year, pool the annual median marginal tax rates and
fit a flexible parametric function (of hourly wages) to these median median marginal tax
rates.26 Figure 2.2 shows the resulting marginal tax function (Panel A) and tax function
(Panel B) for the estimation period 1999-2003. The marginal tax function in Panel A is
superimposed on the annual within-wage-percentile median tax rate, and the average tax
function in Panel B is obtained by integrating the marginal tax function. Similar plots
of the marginal tax functions and tax functions for the periods 1990-1993, 1994-1998,
and 2004-2005 are presented and discussed further below in relation to our tax reform
evaluation exercise.
25According to this measure, annual hours range between 1,665 and 1,695 for the estimation period
1999-2003.
26Appendix A.3 provides further details on this procedure.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal tax function and tax function for Denmark 1999-2003
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Note: Panel A plots the marginal tax function T ′(w) and Panel B plots the average tax function T (w). The
gray circles in Panel A represent the annual within-wage-percentile median tax rates as described
in the text. The gray circles in Panel B represent the annual within-wage-percentile median hourly
tax liabilities.
2.5 Model estimation
Armed with the empirical tax function, we proceed to estimation of the model’s structural
parameters by way of Indirect Inference, see Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993).
The estimation procedure finds the set of structural parameters which best fit a set of
chosen auxiliary statistics. The model is identified if there is one and only one set of
structural parameters which generates the auxiliary statistics of the estimation. This
section describes how we parameterize the model, discusses issues related to identification
of the model parameters, reports and discusses the estimated parameters as well as the
model’s ability to fit the chosen auxiliary statistics.
2.5.1 Parameterization
The presentation of the model in section 2.2 left some key objects, such as the exoge-
nous heterogeneity distributions, match output and workers’ felicity function, not fully
parametrically specified. For the purpose of estimation, specific parametric forms are
required.
Match output y(a, p) is specified as a flexible second order polynomial. Indeed,
y(a, p) = %0 + %1a+ %2p+ %3a
2 + %4p
2 + %5ap. (2.30)
where % = (%0, ..., %5) are unknown parameters. Consistent with the theoretical model,
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estimation is carried out under the restriction ya(a, p) > 0 and yp(a, p) > 0.
27 The match
output function (2.30) is sufficiently flexible to warrant a normalization of the exogenous
worker and firm heterogeneity distributions to be uniform. That is, H(·) = U [0, 1] and
Γ(·) = U [0, 1].
Worker felicity (2.2) has two components, namely utility from consumption, repre-
sented by u(·), and disutility from job search effort, represented by ζ(·). The utility
function u(·) is taken to be logarithmic, i.e.
u(c) = log(c), (2.31)
which correspondes to a moderate elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The search
effort disutility component is specified as an isoelastic function ζ(s),
ζ(s− s) = ζ0(s− s)
1+1/ζ1
1 + 1/ζ1
(2.32)
which accounts for free search s, and where ζ0 > 0 and ζ1 > 0 are parameters to be
estimated. Recall that the curvature of ζ(·), determined by the parameter ζ1, is a key
determinant of the substitution effect in job search effort.
A brief comment on the restrictive logarithmic specification of the utility function is
warranted here. The theoretical analysis made it clear that the curvature of the utility
function is a key driver of workers’ responses to changes in the tax regimes. We do,
however, currently not attempt to estimate this curvature. We are working on adding
survey data on consumption expenditures to our data which we conjecture will allow
allow us to identify a more general utility function. We are also currently working on
establishing whether identification of the curvature in the utility function can be obtained
from the already available mobility and wage data. For now, however, the utility function
is restricted to be logarithmic, as per (2.31).
The hiring intensity cost function χ(·) is specified in an analogous fashion, i.e.
χ(v) =
χ0v
1+1/χ1
1 + 1/χ1
, (2.33)
where χ0 > 0 and χ1 > 0 are parameters to be estimated. The isoelastic search effort
disutility and hiring cost functions are standard in the literature, see e.g. Christensen et al.
(2005), Kreiner et al. (2015), and Bagger and Lentz (2015).
For empirical realism we enrich the model to incorporate ability-dependent job de-
27In addition, we are currently imposing the restriction y(0, 0) = %0 = b in the estimation. Since job
search off- and on-the-job are equally efficient, the latter restriction ensures that a match between the least
able worker (a = 0) and the least productive firm (p = 0) is viable, and that all workers accept all jobs.
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struction rates. Specifically, we let
δ(a) = exp(δ0 + δ1a), (2.34)
and estimate the parameters δ0 and δ1. This completes the parameterization of the model.
The fully parameterized model features the following structural parameters (ρ, b,%, ζ0, ζ1, s,
χ0, χ1, δ0, δ1, µ, C, η). We remind the reader that ρ is the discount rate, b is the unemploy-
ment flow income, µ is the reallocation rate, C is the entry cost, and η is the elasticity of the
aggregate matching function with respect to job search effort. We fixed a few of the struc-
tural parameters prior to estimation. Specifically, we set ρ = 0.05 per year, and we also fix
the unemployment flow income b = %0 = 107 Danish Kroner (DKK) per hour. In addition,
ζ0 and χ0 are not separately identified as they both scale the baseline job finding rate λ. We
therefore impose the normalization χ0 = 1,
28 which leaves fifteen structural parameters
to be estimated. Collect these in the vector ω = (%1, ..., %5, ζ0, ζ1, s, χ0, χ1, δ0, δ1, µ, C, η).
Let ω0 be the true value of ω. The indirect inference estimator is given by
ωˆ = arg min
ω
[
a(ω0)− aS(ω)
]′
Ω
[
a(ω0)− aS(ω)
]
, (2.35)
where Ω is a symmetric and positive definite weighting matrix, and a(ω0) is a vector of
auxiliary statistics computed using the data described in section 2.3, i.e. at the unknown
true value of the structural parameter vector ω0. The vector a
S(ω) = S−1
∑S
s=1 as(ω)
contains the same auxiliary statistics, but computed using N s labor market histories sim-
ulated from the structural model for some value ω of the structural parameter value.
Effectively, the Indirect Inference estimator finds the structural parameter vector that
minimizes the distance between the real data and data simulated from the structural
model, as measured by the included auxiliary statistics, and the weight matrix Ω.29 Ap-
pendix A.4 contains a detailed description of the numerical computation of the model
equilibrium, as well as a description of the simulation procedure we apply.
Implementation of (2.35) requires first of all a set of auxiliary statistics, and we discuss
the ones we include below. In addition, however, implementation requires us to set S, the
number of simulation repetitions, N s, the number workers (i.e. the number of simulated
labor market histories per simulation repetition s), as well as the weight-matrix Ω for
28The same argument applies to any multiplicative constants in the aggregate matching function, which
is also implicitly normalized to unity.
29Under mild regularity conditions, see Gourieroux et al. (1993), we have
√
N(ωˆS − ω0) d→ N (0, (1 +
S−1)V0), where V0 = [J′0Σ0J0]
−1J′0Σ0Ω0Σ0J0[J
′
0Σ0J0]
−1, J0 = ∂a(ω)/∂ω at ω = ω0, Σ0 is the
variance-covariance matrix of a(ω0). We report standard errors based on the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix N−1(1 +S−1)Vˆ, where Vˆ is V0 with true values replaces by estimates. Σ0 is estimated
by block-bootstrapping a(ωˆ), with workers’ labor market histories constituting the blocks. We take N to
be the number of workers in our estimation data.
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computing the distance between empirical and simulated auxiliary statistics, see (2.35).
In our implementation, we take S = 1, N s = 100, 000, and take Ω to be a diagonal matrix.
With a few exceptions reported further below, the diagonal entries in Ω are set to 1.30
2.5.2 The government budget
In steady state, a type-a worker’s contribution to the government budget is
B(a) = n0(a)T (b) + [1− n0(a)]
∫ 1
0
T (w(a|p))dG(w(a|p)|a)− n0(a)b− b, (2.36)
where b is a lump-sum transfer, see (2.1). The government budget is therefore B =∫ 1
0 B(a)dH(a).
Ideally, estimation of the model’s structural parameters should be conducted under
a balanced budget restriction, i.e. B = 0, achieved through the lump-sum transfers b.
However, these transfers transfers are not straightforward to implement in our model be-
cause a) we would need to take a stance on who who receives the lump-sum transfers,
which in the absence of a government welfare function is somewhat arbitrary, and, more
importantly, b) because recipients of government transfers will adjust their search effort
as the income effects kick in. This, in turn, sets in motion a sequence equilibrium ad-
justments, which feeds back into the government budget. We are currently augmenting
our equilibrium computation algorithm to allow for lump-sum transfers that balance the
government budget. In doing so, we distribute any government surplus or deficit equally
across workers, independently of ability. The current estimates, however, does not allow
for lump-sum transfers, and hence, does not balance the government budget. That is, the
current estimates impose b = 0. To nonetheless facilitate interpretation, we always report
changes in the government budget associated with various actual or counterfactual income
tax reforms.
2.5.3 Auxiliary statistics
The estimation panel contains primarily information on wages and labor market transi-
tions, and both these features of the data are needed to identify the model. In addition,
the data has information on value added, which we also make use of. The description of the
auxiliary statistics provided here is nontechnical and focuses on the intuition underlying
the identification arguments for each of the structural parameters.
30Asymptotic efficiency of the Indirect Inference estimator requires Ω = Σˆ−1, i.e. using the inverse
variance-covariance matrix of the vector of auxiliary statistics as weight-matrix. Altonji and Segal (1996)
illustrates how an asymptotically efficient GMM estimator may be marred by small sample biases in
applications.
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Given our focus on a labor market with two-sided heterogeneity, it is useful to rep-
resent wages in a way that captures this feature of the data.31 For this reason, let
i index individuals, j index firms, and let n index annual November 28th cross sec-
tions. In addition, let J(i, n) = j if worker i in cross section n is employed by firm j,
and consider the following auxiliary two-way fixed effect log-wage regression based on
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
lnwin = φi + ψJ(i,n) + εin, (2.37)
where, here, φi is a person effect, ψj is a firm effect, and εin represent residual log-wage
variation. As indicated by the notation, we estimate this auxiliary model of wages using
repeated annual November 28th cross sections. Estimation of the worker and firm fixed
effects is done by ordinary least squares imposing the assumption E[εin|i, J(i, n)] = 0, and
we ensure that the design matrix of regressors, containing only worker and firm dummies,
has full rank by estimating (2.37) only on the largest set of connected workers and firms,
see Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) for details.32
The auxiliary wage regression (2.37) allows a decomposition of log wages into a worker-
component φˆi, a firm-component ψˆj , and a residual component εˆin ≡ lnwin− φˆi− ψˆJ(i,n).
Indeed, lnwin = φˆi + ψˆJ(i,n) + εˆin. These components form the basis of many of the
auxiliary wage statistics we include in the estimation. We stress that, even though (2.37)
is not derived from the structural model and therefore likely is misspecified, the resulting
decomposition of wages is useful because it yields measurements related to the underlying
heterogeneity worker- and firm types, a and p.33 We normalize the grand mean of the
estimated firm effects to zero.
Identification of the match-level output function y(a, p). The model-predicted
wage offers w(a|p) are complicated equilibrium objects that depends on all parameters
of the model, including the match-level output function y(a, p). However, holding search
effort and hiring intensity fixed—and we argue below that search and hiring behavior is
identified from data sources unrelated to wages—the distribution of wage offers is largely
determined by the characteristics of the output function y(a, p). Hence, statistics describ-
ing the distribution of wages contains identifying information regarding the parameters %
31Unlike wages, value added is available only at the firm-level, not at the match-level. Given the focus
on two-sided heterogeneity, this limits the identifying power from value added data.
32In our data, as well as in our model simulations, almost all workers and firms are connected.
33Indeed, our structural model implies that wages are increasing in firm-types (see Lemma 1), and
simulations confirm that the model delivers wages that are also increasing in worker-types. Simulation
studies in Bagger and Lentz (2015) indicate that the estimated “wage-types” from regressions like (2.37)
captures “productivity-types” well provided wages are monotone in productivity-types.
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in the polynomial specification for y(a, p), see (2.30). In addition to wage data, we make
(at the moment, limited) use of information on value added per worker for the firms in
our data to help identify y(a, p).
Specifically, we include the average cross sectional wage, the 20th and 80th percentiles
in the distribution of estimated worker effects from (2.37), and the same percentiles in
the distribution of estimated firm effects. The average log wage in our data is 5.2273, and
the 20th and 80th percentiles from the distribution of worker and firm fixed effects are
−0.2754 and 0.2418 for the worker effects, and −0.0317 and 0.1631 for the firm effects.
Hence, the wage data exhibits economically meaningful heterogeneity in both the worker
and the firm dimension. Recall that the grand mean of the firm effects are normalized
to zero, and that the reported percentiles therefore suggests the distribution of firm fixed
effects has a rather long right tail.
We also include the so-called co-worker correlation. This latter statistics is the cor-
relation between a individual’s worker fixed effect and the average worker fixed effects of
all his co-workers, see Lopes de Melo (2018). In our data, the co-worker correlation turns
out to be 0.4421, suggesting a relatively strong tendency for high (low) worker fixed effect
individuals to work with other high (low) worker fixed effect individuals. In our model,
such sorting patterns are primarily determined by differences in search behavior across
worker-types, and these difference arise because the wage gains from reallocating from
low- to high-type firms vary across the ability distribution, i.e. because of the modularity
of the wage function w(a|p). Since the wage offer distribution is endogenous, modularity
of w(a|p) reflect, in part, the modularity of the match-level output function.34
Regarding value added data, we include the average firm-level labor-share, i.e. the
ratio of a firm’s annual wage bill to it’s annual value added, as well as the employment-
weighted correlation between value added per worker-hour and the average wage paid by
the firm. As detailed in the description of our in section 2.3, we observe total annual
value added from a firm’s VAT account with the Danish tax authorities, and the number
of hours per year per firm is then computed using the hours information in the spell data
before the sample selection described in section 2.3 takes place. The average labor share is
0.8028 in our data, and the employment-weighted correlation between average value added
per worker and the average wage paid by the firm is 0.1360. We note that the correlation
between observed firm productivity, i.e. value added per hour, and the average wage paid
is positive, but not particularly strong.
34Simulations confirm this to be the case, although we note that the Burdett-Mortensen wage setting
game we apply here seems unable to deliver a submodular wage function, even when the output function
is (strongly) submodular.
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Identification of the level of free search effort s. The free search parameter s
ensures all workers provide at least search effort s, which first of all implies that the
Diamond paradox is moot in the model. However, it also ensures that job search persists
all the way to the top of the job ladder, which sustains an element of competition for
workers at the higher rungs of the wage ladders. The competition manifest itself in the
wage policies of firms, specifically in the variability of the firm fixed effects estimated from
(2.37). The auxiliary statistics listed in the previous paragraphs relating to identification
of y(a, p) are numerous enough to over-identify y(a, p), and we use these degrees of freedom
to argue that the difference between the 20th and 80th percentile in the firm fixed effect
distribution identifies s. Simulation studies and our estimation procedure confirms this
logic.
Identification of the disutility of job search effort function ζ0 and ζ1. The
disutility from job search effort function ζ(·) is central to our analysis and has two param-
eters, ζ0 and ζ1. ζ0 determines the level of disutility, whereas ζ1 governs the curvature,
and therefore the substitution effect. If job search effort yields higher disutility at all
effort-levels, job search effort will fall, both off- and on-the-job. Hence, higher disutility
from job search, i.e. higher ζ0, reduces the outflow from nonemployment. For a given job
destruction rate, this increases the steady state nonemployment rate, see (2.14). Hence,
we take identification of ζ0 from the inclusion of the average nonemployment rate in our
five-year panel, which is 0.1180.35
Since ζ1 governs the curvature of ζ(·), it impacts differences in search effort between
workers with different circumstances. Suppose the disutility function ζ(·) is extremely
convex. In that case, workers with very different returns to search will choose, essentially,
the same job search effort—because the the disutility function is effectively “kinked”.
Hence, all else equal, an extremely convex disutility of search effort function, minimizes the
variance of job durations, with all variation driven by variation in acceptance probabilities
arising from wage dispersion. With less convex disutility, workers with different returns
to search due to differences in ability and wages will make different choices regarding the
search effort they provide. This increases the variance of job search effort, and therefore,
all else equal, the variance of observed job durations. Based on that logic, we include
the variance of the duration of the first job spell after non-employment in the vector of
auxiliary statistics in order to identify ζ1. In our estimation panel, where job durations
are necessarily censored after five years of duration at the latest, we measure this variance
35The nonemployment rate is computed among workers who, at some point during our estimation
period, are observed working. Our data contains individuals who are never working, so the unconditional
nonemployment rate exceeds 0.1180. Our model interprets workers who are never, or rarely, working as
being of types with very little return to job search.
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to be 1.5107, including both censored and non-censored jobs durations.36
Identification of the hiring intensity cost function χ1. Recall that the hiring cost
function χ(·) is normalized such that χ(1) = 1, which leaves one parameter to be identified,
namely χ1, determining the curvature of the hiring cost function. This parameter is
identified from the employment-weighted variance of firms’ hiring rates. The logic is
analogous to that applied above to argue identification of the curvature of the disutility
of job search effort. We measure a firm’s year t hiring rate as the ratio of new hires from
November 28th, year t to November 27th, year t + 1 to the number of employees in the
firm on November 28th in year t, which allow us to compute firm-level hiring rates for
1999-2002.37 The empirical employment-weighted variance of the hiring rate is 0.0827.
Identification of the sunk entry cost C. A high entry cost deters firm entry, which
implies that the firms that do enter grow large. Hence, there is a positive relationship
between the sunk entry cost parameter C and the average firm size in the economy. We
consequently include the average firm size as an auxiliary statistic that we require our
structural model to fit. A firm’s size in year t is measured as the number of employees
observed in the estimation data on November 28th in year t. The average firm size refers
to the average taken across all firms and the five cross sections in our estimation panel
(t = 1999, 2000, ..., 2003). We find an average firm size of 8.8414.
Identification of the job destruction process δ(a). Recall from (2.34) that we allow
the job destruction process to be a function of worker ability. High-ability workers are over-
represented high-wage workers, and we therefore use the empirical job destruction hazard
conditional on workers’ wages being below or above the median wage in the cross section.
Specifically, consider all ongoing jobs at each annual cross section dates (November 28th),
and compute the median wage in these jobs. Next, split the cross section sampled job
spells according to whether the individual wage is above or below the median wage just
computed. Finally, record the share of these jobs that end within a year because the
worker transits to unemployment, for both below- and above median wage jobs. We find
that the job destruction rate among jobs where workers are paid below the median wage
is 0.2137 per year, whereas it drops to 0.0938 for jobs where workers are paid above the
median wage. The model interprets the difference in job destruction rates as stemming
from differences in the job destruction rate by worker ability.
36It is important to keep in mind that we replicate the data structure, and therefore this sampling of
job durations, in the simulated data.
37We cannot compute the hiring rate for 2003, the final year in our estimation panel, because the
1999-2003 tax regime ends in December 31st, 2003.
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Identification of the job reallocation rate µ. It is straightforward to show that,
in a “standard” model of on-the-job search where job offers arrive at exogenous rates
to nonemployed and employed workers, such as e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the
share of jobs in a cross section of workers that end with the worker making a transition
to nonemployment, is bounded from below by 1/2. With reallocation shocks this share
may go below 1/2 because reallocations increases the prevalence of job-to-job transitions
without increasing to the steady state mass of high-wage workers with high reservation
wages. Hence, in this case, the reallocation rate is identified from the share of cross section
jobs that end in a job-to-nonemployment transition—at least insofar as the empirical share
falls below 1/2.
We have not established a lower bound for the steady state share of jobs that end in
a job-to-nonemployment transition in our more complicated model with worker and firm
heterogeneity, and endogenous search effort choices on both sides of the market, but our
simulation studies suggest that the model cannot easily deliver a share below 1/2 without
the additional job-to-job transition from reallocation shocks. Empirically, the share is
0.4745, i.e. close to, but below 1/2, thus providing identification of the reallocation rate
µ.
2.5.4 Model fit
Having established identification of the model’s structural parameters, we turn to es-
timation. Before reporting the structural parameter values, we describe the estimated
model’s fit to the auxiliary statistics just described. Table 2.6 reports the empirical and
the simulated values for the auxiliary statistics used for estimation. In addition, Table 2.6
reports the diagonal elements in the Indirect Inference estimator’s weight-matrix Ω. All
off-diagonal elements in Ω are set to zero. We put relatively high weight on average log
wages and on the average firm size, and relatively little weight on the covariance between
wages and hourly value added.
Overall, the fit reported in Table 2.6 is good. The over-weighting of average log wages
ensures that the model accurately reproduces the level of wages. This is important as we
applying the empirical tax function T (·) to the simulated wages. The fit to the 20th and
80th percentile in the distribution of worker fixed effects is spot on as well. However, while
the model accurately reproduces the 20th percentile in the distribution of firm fixed effects,
it does not generate the long right tail observed in the distribution of firm fixed effects
estimated using the real data. The estimated structural model therefore underestimates
the variability in log wages that can be attributed to firm fixed effects.
Furthermore, the model simultaneously underestimates the correlation between an
individual’s own worker fixed effect and her co-workers average worker fixed effect, and
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overestimates the correlation between the average wage paid by firms, and their value
added. Bagger and Lentz (2015), employing a random search model bearing similarities to
the the present model, also underestimated the “worker, co-worker” fixed effect correlation
to the same extent, and attributes this to workers sorting on other dimensions than wages
(or productivity). We believe the overestimation of the correlation between wages and
value added largely stem from the absence of measurement errors in the simulated wage
and output measurements. For this reason, we put relatively little weight on the “firm
wage, value added”-correlation in the estimation.
With respect to the fit of the auxiliary statistics that are particularly informative about
the disutility of job search effort function ζ(·), namely the nonemployment rate and the
variance of durations of jobs initiated by a nonemployment-to-job transition, we see that
the estimated model does an excellent job in reproducing the empirical magnitudes. This is
reassuring given that the curvature of the disutility job search effort is the key determinant
of the substitution effect in job search effort in response to income tax reforms. The fit to
the employment-weighted variance of the hiring rate, on the other hand, leaves room for
improvement. The estimated model under-predicts the variance of hiring rates by more
than 40 percent.
The average firm size carries relatively high weight in the estimation, and as a conse-
quence, the fit is excellent, as is the fit to the wage conditional job destruction hazards,
even though these latter two moments carries normal weight in the estimation. Finally, the
share of jobs ending in job-to-nonemployment transition, an auxiliary statistic included to
identify the reallocation rate µ, is fitted reasonably well, although the estimated model’s
prediction exceeds 1/2, while the data, as noted above, has a share slightly below 1/2.
2.5.5 Structural parameter estimates
A subset of the structural parameter estimates are reported in Table 2.7, along with their
asymptotic standard errors (see footnote 29). We do not report the parameter estimates
of δ0 and δ1 that shape the job destruction process δ(a), nor of %, the parameters of the
match output function y(a, p), both which we instead render graphically in Figure 2.3.
Turning attention first on the estimates reported in Table 2.7, we note that, with an
estimate of ζ1 of 1.5257, the elasticity of job search effort disutility with respect to job
search effort is 1.66, i.e. with slightly less curvature than a quadratic disutility function.
This is consistent with the empirical results in Christensen et al. (2005), Kreiner et al.
(2015), and Bagger and Lentz (2015), who all utilizes Danish data, and who all report
approximately quadratic job search cost functions. We also note that ζ0 is precisely
estimated at 0.1011, that free search s is estimated to be only 0.0212, and that the job
reallocation rates µ is estimated to be 0.1489. The latter three parameters, however, can
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Table 2.6: Model fit
Simulated Data Weight
Average log wage 5.2254 5.2273 100.00
Workers’ share of value added 0.8407 0.8028 1.00
20th percentile, worker fixed effects −0.2795 −0.2754 1.00
80th percentile, worker fixed effects 0.2405 0.2418 1.00
20th percentile, firm fixed effects −0.0339 −0.0317 1.00
80th percentile, firm fixed effects 0.0606 0.1631 1.00
Corr(worker fixed effect, average co-worker fixed effects) 0.2681 0.4421 1.00
Corr(average firm wage, hourly value added) 0.2447 0.1360 0.10
Nonemployment rate 0.1289 0.1180 1.00
Variance, duration of the 1st job out of nonemployment 1.6097 1.5107 1.00
Variance, hiring rate (employment weighted) 0.0471 0.0827 1.00
Average firm size 8.9939 8.8414 10.00
Job destruction hazard if wage < median wage 0.1799 0.2137 1.00
Job destruction hazard if wage ≥ median wage 0.0918 0.0938 1.00
Share of jobs ending in job-to-nonemployment transition 0.5517 0.4745 1.00
Note: The column labeled “weight” reports the diagonal elements in the weight-matrix Ω, see (2.35).
Off-diagonal entries in Ω are set to zero.
Table 2.7: Structural parameter estimates
Parameter Estimate
Disutility of job search effort ζ(s− s) = ζ01+1/ζ1 s1+1/ζ1
Level, ζ0 0.1011
(0.0191)
Curvature, ζ1 1.5257
(0.2205)
Free search, s 0.0212
(0.0010)
Reallocation rate (annual), µ 0.1489
(0.0339)
Hiring intensity cost χ(v) = 11+1/χ1 s
1+1/χ1
Curvature, χ1 0.7244
(0.0390)
Sunk entry cost, C 5, 082
(10.4026)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 2.3: Job destructions and match output
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Panel A: Annual job destruction rate δ(a) Panel B: Match output function y(a, p)
Note: Match output is denominated in Danish Kroner per hour.
be interpreted only in proportion to the baseline job offer arrival rate λ(a), an equilibrium
object that we return to below. The final two parameter estimates reported in Table 2.7
refer to the firm-side of the model. Hiring cost is convex with the elasticity with respect to
hiring effort being 2.38 and the sunk entry cost is estimated to be 5, 082 Danish Kroner.
Panel A in Figure 2.3 plots the estimated annual job destruction process as a function
of worker ability a. The job destruction rate exhibits a strong negative relationship with
worker ability a. Indeed, a worker at the 25th percentile in the ability distribution has
her job destroyed, on average, every fifth year, whereas a worker at the 75th percentile
waits, on average, 10 years between job destruction events. Panel B in Figure 2.3 is a
contour plot of the estimated match output function y(a, p). By assumption, y(a, p) is
increasing in both arguments, but it is evident that the estimated match output function
is supermodular: The increase in output from reallocating a high-ability worker from
a low- to a high-productive employer is greater than the increase realized by the same
reallocation of a low-ability worker. Likewise, the increase in output from replacing a
low-ability worker with a high-ability worker is greater for firms with higher productivity.
This completes the description of the model’s exogenous components.
The estimated model favors high-type workers in two important ways. First, high-
type workers face lower job destruction rates than low-type workers. All else equal, this
ensures that, on average, high-type workers are matched with better firm-types than low-
type workers. It also increases the return to job search for high-type workers vis-a-vis
low-type workers. Second, the match output function is increasing in a by construction,
and in addition, is estimated to be supermodular. Insofar as the supermodularity is carried
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Figure 2.4: Key equilibrium objects
Panel A: Wage offers w(a|p) Panel B: Vacancy intensity v(a|p)
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Note: Wages are denominated in Danish Kroner per hour.
over to the equilibrium wage function, and provided income effects, and any countervailing
equilibrium effects running through firms hiring intensity choices v(a|p) or the equilibrium
baseline job offer arrival rate λ(a) are relatively small, this will tend to further widen the
gap in returns to job search effort between high- and low-type workers.
Figure 2.4 depicts a set of key equilibrium objects relevant for understanding the
implications of the estimated model for the equilibrium allocation of labor. Panel A plot
the contours of the estimated equilibrium wage function w(a|p). Of course, as established
in Lemma 1, wages are strictly increasing in p, but, in addition, higher-type workers almost
always reap greater wage gains by moving from a low- to a high-productive firm than do
workers of lower ability. Unlike the estimated match output function, the wage function is,
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however, not globally supermodular.38 Panel B plots a contour plot of firms’ equilibrium
hiring intensity as a function of worker- and firm-types. Consistent with Lemma 2, hiring
intensity v(a|p) is always increasing in p for a given a, but we see that hiring intensity
v(a|p) need not be increasing in a for a given p, although there is a very strong tendency
for this to be the case.
Turning to the key decision margin of workers—job search effort—Panel C in Figure
2.4 contains a contour plot of workers’ optimal job search effort as a function of worker-
and firm-types. As stipulated by Lemma 1, job search effort is strictly decreasing in p for
each a with optimal search effort in the most productive firm being s for all a. Moreover,
we see that, at any firm-type p, higher-type workers exert more job search effort than
lower-type workers. Hence, the equilibrium implies higher return to search for high-type
workers.
As noted further above, the magnitude of job search effort, free search, reallocation
shocks must be interpreted in proportion to the relevant baseline job offer arrival rate
λ(a). Panel D in Figure 2.4 plots λ(a) as a function of a. We see that λ(a) is strictly
increasing and concave function in a. The labor market for the least able workers receive
job offers at an annual rate of 0.2 per unit of search, whereas, at the other end of the
ability spectrum, high-ability workers receive offers at annual rate 0.55 per unit of search,
emphasizing again the estimated equilibrium is such that return to job search effort is
higher for high ability workers.
Finally, Figure 2.5 puts Panels C and D from Figure 2.4 together and plots the annual
job offer arrival rates resulting from on-the-job search effort implied by the estimated
model. Panel A plots the job offer arrival rate as a function of firm-type, λ(a)s(p|a) by way
of a contour plot. Because both s(p|a) and λ(a) are increasing functions of a, conditional
on the type of the employing firm, workers of higher ability will, in equilibrium, receive
more job offers than workers of lower ability. Panel B in Figure 2.5 plot the job offer
arrival rate for workers of type a = 0.25, a = 0.50 and a = 0.75, respectively, as a function
of the wage, i.e. λ(a)s(w|a) where w = w(a|p). We see that, at any wage rate, more able
workers receive more job offers. Indeed, at the lowest wage, equilibrium behavior implies
that a type a = 0.75 worker is four times more likely to receive a job offer than a type
a = 0.25 worker. We stress that these differences arise endogenously, and that they have
implications for the equilibrium allocation of labor, a subject we turn to next.
38We are not entirely sure what causes this feature of the equilibrium wage function, and cannot at
the time of writing rule out that it is caused by numerical problem in computing the equilibrium wage
function.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated annual job offer arrival rates by worker- and firm-type
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Note: Panel A plots the estimated job offer arrival rates as a function of firm-type p ∈ [p0, 1] and the
Panel B plots the estimated job offer arrival rates as a function of wage w = w(a|p) ∈ [b, w(a)].
2.5.6 The equilibrium allocation of labor
The allocation of labor is represented by the worker-ability specific nonemployment rates,
n0(a) given by (2.14), and the worker-ability specific distributions of workers across wage
rates w, G(w|p) given by (2.16). Note that, since w = w(a|p) is a one-to-one function of p,
the distribution of worker-types across firm types is simply given as G(p|a) = G(w(a|p)|a).
We have already seen from Table 2.6 that the estimated model implies an empirically
reasonable aggregate nonemployment rate n0 =
∫ 1
0 n
0(a)dH(a) around 0.13 among those
workers ever observed in employment over the 5 years of simulated data. However, the ag-
gregate nonemployment rate masks heterogeneity across worker-types. Panel A in Figure
2.6 plots the estimated steady state nonemployment rates as a function of worker ability
a. We note that the estimated model implies that the workers in the lowest quintile of
the ability distribution face very high nonemployment rates, in excess of 20 percent, while
workers in the top quintile of the ability distribution has nonemployment rates around 2
percent.39
Panel B in Figure 2.6 illustrates the conditional densities g(p|a) as a function of a. We
see a clear pattern whereby high-type workers tend to cluster in high-type firms to a much
higher extent than low-type workers. In that sense, the equilibrium allocation exhibits
traits of positive assortative matching, a finding that is consistent with Bagger and Lentz
39Workers at the very bottom of the ability distribution are effectively estimated to be nonparticipants.
Many of these workers will not be observed in employment during a 5-years simulation window, and will
therefore not contribute to the nonemployment rate of 0.13 reported in Table 2.6. Our data, of course,
also contains nonparticipants.
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Figure 2.6: The equilibrium allocation of labor
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(2015). This equilibrium sorting results come about because high ability workers have
higher returns to job search effort, due to their lower unemployment risk, see Panel A in
Figure 2.3, and the super-modularity of the match output function, see Panel B in Figure
2.3. The endogenous response to the higher returns to job search effort result in higher
job offer arrival rates, see Panel C in Figure 2.5, which implies that high-ability workers
climb the wage (or firm productivity) distribution faster than low-ability workers. The
remainder of the paper analyzes and quantifies the impact of the income tax schedule on
the equilibrium allocation of labor.
2.6 Equilibrium tax reform evaluations
We initiate our analysis of the impact of labor income taxation on the allocation of labor by
employing the estimated structural model to conduct equilibrium evaluations of a series of
Danish income tax reforms during 1990-2005. The reforms under consideration took place
in 1990, 1994, and 2004 and the context in which they were devised and implemented
is described in section 2.4.1. Figure 2.7 shows the marginal tax functions (Panel A)
and the average tax functions (Panel B) for the four tax regimes we consider, including
the 1999-2003 regime used for estimation. Inspection of Figure 2.7 reveals that each of
the implemented changes in the income tax system during 1990-2005 (almost) uniformly
flattened the tax function, i.e. lowered the marginal rate at all wage rates. At the same
time, the average tax rate was increased at the bottom of the wage distribution, and
lowered everywhere else.
The equilibrium evaluations are conducted as comparative statics between the steady
state equilibria associated with each of the income tax regimes. The structural parame-
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Figure 2.7: Danish tax regimes 1990-2005: Marginal and average tax functions
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Note: Panel A plots the marginal tax function T ′(w) and Panel B plots the average tax function T (w).
ters are held fixed throughout. Our interest centers on aggregate and worker-type specific
steady state, i.e. long run, nonemployment rates and expected labor income. The worker-
type specific nonemployment rate n0(a) is given by (2.14), with the aggregate nonemploy-
ment rate given by
∫ 1
0 n
0(a)dH(a). The worker-type a specific expected labor income is
given by
LI(a) = [1− n0(a)]
∫ 1
0
w(a|p)dG(w(a|p)|a), (2.38)
where G(w|a) is given by (2.16), and aggregate labor income is LI = ∫ 10 LI(a)dH(a).
The tax reforms also impact the government budget. As mentioned above, our current
equilibrium computation algorithm does not feature lump-sum transfers to balanc the
government budget. Instead, to at least provide context for the reported effects on the
equilibrium labor allocation, we also report the change in government budget associated
with each of the tax regime comparisons.
Table 2.8 reports the percentage change in nonemployment n0, labor income LI, and
the government budget B between each of the 1990, 1994, and 2004 Danish income tax
regimes, and the baseline 1999 regime. Hence, in Table 2.8, the 1999 tax regime is always
the baseline. This means that the numbers reported in the 1990-1993 panel evaluates the
effect of changing the 1999-2003 regime (back) to the 1990-1993 regime, while the numbers
in the 2004-2005 panel evaluates the effect of the actual reform 2004 reform, i.e. changing
the 1999-2003 regime to the 2004-2005 regime. Perhaps confusingly, a negative number
for, say, labor income in the 1990-1993 panel therefore means that the allocation improved
between the 1990-1993 regime and the 1999-2003 regime, while a negative number for labor
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income in the 2004-2005 panel means that the allocation of labor deteriorated between
the 1999-2003 regime and the 2004-2005 regime.
We consider the aggregate response (rows labeled “All” in Table 2.8), as well as the
responses at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the ability distribution (rows labeled
0.25, 0.50, and 0.75, respectively). For each variable, we consider the total effect, compris-
ing both the substitution effect and the income effect, as well as the substitution effect in
isolation. Hence, the difference between pairs of columns labeled “Total” and “Subst” in
Table 2.8 is the income effect.40 Finally, we consider both the partial equilibrium effect
(labeled “PE”) and full equilibrium effect (labeled “FE”). The partial equilibrium effect
holds firm behavior and equilibrium variables constant, allowing only workers to respond
to changes in the income tax code.
Long run nonemployment. Relative to the 1999-2003 tax regime, the 1990-1993 tax
regime involves a 4.9 percent higher steady state nonemployment rate when accounting
for equilibrium effects. The corresponding partial equilibrium effect is much larger at 7.4
percent. Income effects are modest at the aggregate level. In partial equilibrium, nonem-
ployment increases 7.9 percent due to the substitution effect. This causes an increase in
the marginal value of consumption, and the resulting income effect in workers’ job search
effort reduces the total effect effect slightly to 7.4 percent. The full equilibrium adjustment
is such that the income effect in the aggregate, albeit small, works in the same direction
as the substitution effect. If we look at the effect within the ability distribution, we see
that workers at the bottom of the ability distribution experience the largest increase in
nonemployment. The differences across ability levels is especially pronounced in full equi-
librium. We also note that the positive aggregate income effect in full equilibrium is driven
by equilibrium adjustments at the bottom of the ability distribution—towards the top of
the ability distribution, the income effect is negative, dampening the substitution effect.
Similar results, although with smaller magnitudes are found when comparing the 1994-
1998 regime to the baseline 1999-2003 regime. Although full equilibrium income effects are
still positive towards the bottom of the ability distribution, the aggregate income effect
is negative, but still small. In full equilibrium, aggregate nonemployment is 1.1 percent
higher in the 1994-1998 regime than in the 1999-2003 regime. The distinction between
partial and full equilibrium adjustments continues to be quantitatively important. In
comparison to the 1999-2003, the 2004-2005 regime involves 1.4 percent lower nonemply-
ment in full equilibrium, with the full equilibrium substitution effect being a 2.6 percent
lower nonemployment rate. In the case of the 2004-2005 regime, income effects become
economically significant, often reducing the substitution effect by up the 50 percent.
40The substitution effect holds the marginal utility of consumption constant, see section 2.2.2.2.
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Overall, each of the 1990, 1994, and 2004 Danish income tax reforms lead to a re-
duction in nonemployment. The effect reported in Table 2.8 implies that the tax reforms
implemented during 1990-2005 in Denmark reduced steady state nonemployment by ap-
proximately 6 percent. However, towards the bottom of the ability distribution, the
reduction was larger, around 13 percent at the 25th percentile in the ability distribution,
while the effect is smaller for workers with higher ability, around 3% among workers at the
75th percentile in the ability distribution. The income effect reduces the effect for high
ability workers in particular.
Long run labor income. Consider first the evaluation of the 1990-1993 tax regime rel-
ative to the baseline 1999-2003 regime in the first panel of Table 2.8. Table 2.8 shows that
the overall effect amounts to a 1.8 percent drop in labor income, accounting for equilibrium
adjustments. The partial equilibrium response is a 1 percent drop in labor income, again
highlighting the importance of modeling the equilibrium response to tax reforms. On the
aggregate, the income effects are small. However, we again find heterogenous effects across
the ability distribution with low ability workers experiencing a much larger reduction in
their labor income than workers of higher ability.
Turning now to the comparison between the 1994-1998 regime relative to the baseline
1999-2003 regime, we obtain a smaller increase in aggregate labor income of 0.5 percent
accounting for equilibrium adjustment. The partial equilibrium response indicates a 0.3
percent decrease in labor income. Accounting for the income effects in the comparison
between the 1994-1998 regime and the 1999-2003 regime is quantitatively important. The
substitution effect indicate a 0.5 increase in labor income, implying that the income effect
reverses the sign of the predicted labor income response. The labor income response again
exhibits heterogeneity across the ability distribution.
Finally, consider the comparison of labor incomes between the 2004-2005 tax regime
and the baseline 1999-2003 regime, i.e. the third panel in Table 2.8. Going from the 1999-
2003 tax regime to the 2004-2005 regime involves a 0.3 percent long run gain in aggregate
labor income, when equilibrium adjustments on the labor market are taken into account.
These equilibrium adjustments are, however, small, with the partial equilibrium effect
being a 0.2 percent increase. The relatively small total effect masks a large substitution
effect increasing steady state labor income by 0.7 percent. Again, we see evidence of
heterogenous responses throughout the ability distribution.
The overall long run effect on labor income of the tax reforms implemented in Denmark
between 1990 and 2005 is an approximate 2 percent increase, with larger effects (an ap-
proximate 4.5 percent long run increase) at the 25th percentile of the ability distribution,
whereas for the more able workers at the top of the ability distribution, smaller effects
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materialize (an approximate 1 percent increase).
Long run government budget. The third set of columns in Table 2.8 present the
percentage change in the government budget, comparing the 1990-1993, the 1994-1998,
and the 2004-2005 tax regimes to the baseline 1999-2003 regime. The reported figures
imply that, in full equilibrium and accounting for income effects, the government budget
increased 2.7 percent when going from the 1990-1993 regime to the 1999-2003 regime. If
we consider the effect of going from the 1990-1993 to the 1999-2003 regime on the ability-
specific contributions to the government budget, we see a large increase in tax revenue at
the bottom of the ability distribution, with the effect tapering off as we move up through
the distribution.
The budgetary implications of going from the 1994-1998 regime to the 1999-2003 regime
are quite small, and we shall not comment further on them here, except to note that,
accounting for equilibrium effects, the government budget increased 0.6 percent as a result
of going from the 1994-1998 regime to the 1999-2003 regime. Keeping in mind that the
average tax rate was reduced everywhere, except at quite low wage levels, it is interesting
to note that government budget nonetheless increased as a result, perhaps suggesting the
Danish labor market operated to the right of the peak of the Laffer-curve prior to 1999.41
Finally, consider the budgetary implications of going from the 1999-2003 regime to the
2004-2005 regime. From Table 2.8, we see that this reform leads to a rather large declines
in government revenue, of 5 percent in full equilibrium, with the partial equilibrium effect,
and the pure substitution effects being of the same magnitude. Considering Panel B in
Figure 2.7, we note that the going from the 1999-2003 regime to the 2004-2005 regime in-
volves uniformly reducing the average tax rates at all wage levels. The improved allocation
is simply not enough to compensate for the associated mechanical loss. Given the sizeable
budgetary implications involved in the 2004 income tax reform, one might speculate that
allowing for lump sum transfers to balance the budget may impact the conclusions we
reached for this reform regarding nonemployment and labor income.
Summing up. A series of income tax reforms in Denmark implemented in 1994, 1999,
and 2004 improved the equilibrium allocation of labor, reducing unemployment by about 6
percent, and increasing labor income by about 2 percent, with workers of low ability gain-
ing the most. Our analysis does not balance the government budget, and overall, the tax
reforms during 1990-2005, lead to a 2 percent drop in government revenue. Our analysis
41In our model, the “Laffer effect” is operates through labor allocation adjustments. By lowering taxes,
the government sustains a mechanical loss in revenue, but the behavioral effects on workers’ job search
behavior improves the allocation of labor, leading to increases in government revenue. The behavioral gain
may dominate the mechanical loss.
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has shown that the key ingredients in our model—two-sided heterogeneity, taking account
of possible income effects, and equilibrium adjustments—are quantitatively important for
understanding the long run labor market adjustments to the implemented income tax re-
forms. Appendix A.5 provides a complementing analysis of counterfactual linear income
tax functions to assess the impact of progressivity on the equilibrium allocation of labor.
2.7 The long run elasticity of taxable labor income
The evaluation exercises in the previous section demonstrated that, when analyzed through
the lens of our structural model, the long run allocation of labor respond in economically
meaningful ways to the incentives provided by the income tax system. The measured
response operates through the job search effort choices of workers, and the hiring intensity
choices and wage polices of firms, or put succinctly, through labor mobility.
Following Feldstein (1995, 1999), the broader public economics literature typically
summarizes economic responses to taxation in the elasticity of taxable income, or more
recently the elasticity of taxable labor income. The shift in focus towards taxable labor
income reflects that labor income is less prone to evasion and avoidance, which means that
behavioral responses can be understood within standard models of the labor market, see
e.g. Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011a). From a theoretical point of view,
the elasticity of taxable labor income comprises all behavioral responses to changes in the
tax system of relevance for labor income, including hours responses, and effort provision
in various dimensions. Empirically, Kleven and Schultz (2014b) report estimates of the
taxable labor income elasticity in Denmark ranging between 0.05 and 0.12.42
Estimates of the taxable labor income elasticity, such as the ones reported in Kleven and Schultz
(2014b), are often obtained using variation in marginal tax rates induced by tax reforms
as a sources of exogenous variation in incentives across individuals. As discussed in
Kreiner et al. (2015), such an approach is, however, unlikely to capture the search in-
duced labor allocation effects. Indeed, Kreiner et al. (2015) uses a partial equilibrium job
search model to estimate the long run elasticity of taxable labor income for Denmark,
accounting for steady state labor allocation responses, at 0.30. The model used for esti-
mation in Kreiner et al. (2015) does not feature equilibrium responses, does not explicitly
account for worker heterogeneity, and does not allow for income effect in the job search
effort responses of workers. Our model incorporates all these features. It is therefore of
interest to revisit the elasticity of taxable labor income within the context of our richer
model
42For the US, the elasticity of taxable income is typically estimated to be around 0.25, see
Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012a).
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Table 2.9: Long run taxable labor income elasticities
Total Subst
Ability PE FE PE FE
All 0.069 0.123 0.091 0.169
0.25 0.217 0.289 0.241 0.297
0.50 0.068 0.110 0.093 0.156
0.75 0.031 0.081 0.060 0.142
To proceed, recall that, within our model, taxable labor income LI =
∫ 1
0 L(a)dH(a),
where LI(a) is given by (2.38). LI(a) depends on the equilibrium allocation of labor
across wage levels G(w|a), see (2.16). The labor allocation, in turn, depends on workers’
search effort which may be distorted by income taxation. Following Kreiner et al. (2015),
we compute the elasticity of taxable labor income for type-a workers, by recording the
percentage change in their labor income LI(a) following a uniform 1 percent increase in
the marginal net-of-tax rate 1 − T ′(w), keeping b − T (b) constant.43 Let (a) denote the
computed elasticity of taxable labor income for type-a workers. The aggregate elasticity
of taxable labor income is then  =
∫ 1
0 (a)dH(a).
Table 2.9 reports the partial and full equilibrium elasticities implied by the estimated
structural model, both aggregate, and for workers at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile
in the ability distribution. Table 2.9 reports both the total effect, comprising both a
substitution and an income effect, as well as elasticity estimates based purely on the
substitution effect.
The results in Table 2.9 echoes a common theme running through this paper, namely
that the distinctions between partial and full equilibrium, income and substitution effects,
as well as worker heterogeneity are quantitatively important. We estimate the full equilib-
rium mobility-based elasticity of taxable labor income, comprising both substitution and
income effects, to be 0.123, a substantially lower elasticity estimate than that reported by
Kreiner et al. (2015). When we shut down equilibrium adjustments and consider only the
substitution effect to facilitate closer correspondence to the modeling framework employed
in Kreiner et al. (2015), we obtain an elasticity of 0.091.44 In full equilibrium, the uncom-
pensated elasticity of taxable labor income is larger, at 0.169. Finally, from Table 2.9, we
note a clear pattern, whereby workers of lower ability have higher taxable labor income
43That is, we change the net-of-tax rate faced by workers from 1− T ′(·) to 1.01× [1− T ′(·)].
44It is at present not clear to us why the difference between the two estimates arises. We have estimated
the Kreiner et al. (2015) model on our data and obtained results similar to those they report, ruling out
differences in the data we use. Kreiner et al. (2015) do, however, use a different tax function than we do,
but we have yet to ascertain that differences in the tax function are responsible for the different estimates.
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elasticities. Indeed, workers at the 25th percentile in the ability distribution have taxable
labor elasticities close to the 0.30 reported in Kreiner et al. (2015), whereas workers at
the 75th percentile have three times lower elasticities, at 0.081.
2.7.1 Decomposing the long run elasticity of taxable labor income
Our rich structural model allow us to further decompose the elasticity of taxable income to
gain further insights into the behavioral (mobility) responses to income taxation. For this
purpose, let LI(a) and LˆI(a) be expected taxable incomes of a type-a worker under two
different income tax regimes, T (·) and Tˆ (·). Also, let n0(a) and nˆ0(a), G(p|a) and Gˆ(p|a),
and w(a|p) and wˆ(a|p) be the nonemployment rates, wage distribution, and wage policies
under the T (·) and Tˆ (·) regimes, respectively. Given the expression for the expected
taxable income of a type-a worker, (2.38), the following decomposition of the change in
taxable labor income between the two tax regimes T (·) and Tˆ (·) is of interest:
LI(a)− LˆI(a) = [n0(a)− nˆ0(a)]
∫ 1
0
wˆ(a|p) dGˆ(p|a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive margin allocation
+ [1− n0(a)]
∫ 1
0
wˆ(a|p) [gˆ(p|a)− g(p|a)]dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive margin allocation
+ [1− n0(a)]
∫ 1
0
[wˆ(a|p)− w(a|p)] dG(p|a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage policy margin
. (2.39)
Equation (2.39) states that the change in taxable labor income between the two tax
regimes T (·) and Tˆ (·) can be decomposed into responses along three different margins.
First, a change in income taxation brings about a change in the equilibrium nonemploy-
ment rate, an extensive margin allocation effect. Second, a change in income taxation also
shifts the equilibrium distribution of workers across firms, denoted the intensive margin
allocation effect. Third, a change in income taxation induces changes in the equilibrium
wages offered by firms, an effect we denote the wage policy margin.45
With (2.39) in hand, we can decompose the elasticity of taxable labor income estimates
provided in Table 2.9. We focus here exclusively on the decomposition of the elasticity
accounting for equilibrium adjustments, which was found to be 0.123 at the aggregate in
45The labor income decomposition (2.39) is carried out such that the extensive margin allocation is
evaluated at the intensive allocation and the wage policy under Tˆ (·), and the intensive allocation margin is
evaluated at the extensive margin allocation under T (·), and the wage policy under Tˆ (·). The wage policy
margin is evaluated at the allocation under T (·). The decomposition is robust to the order in which we
evaluate the three terms.
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Table 2.10: Decomposing the full equilibrium elasticity of taxable labor income
All a = 0.25 a = 0.50 a = 0.75
Elasticity of taxable labor income 0.123 0.289 0.110 0.081
Extensive margin allocation 46% 73% 32% 15%
Intensive margin allocation 12% 2% 15% 21%
Wage policy margin 42% 24% 53% 64%
Table 2.9.46 The decomposition is reported in Table 2.10, where we see that 46 percent
of the aggregate taxable labor income elasticity can be ascribed to reallocations on the
extensive margin, whereas 12 percent can be ascribed to reallocations on the intensive
margin. Adjustments on the wage policy margin account for the remaining 42 percent of
the estimated elasticity of taxable labor income.
When we apply the decomposition (2.39) to taxable labor income elasticities across
the ability distribution an interesting pattern emerge. Adjustments along the extensive
margin are responsible for the bulk of the measured taxable labor income elasticity at the
bottom of the ability distribution. In Table 2.10, extensive margin adjustments account
for 73 percent of measured elasticity among workers at the 25th percentile of the ability
distribution. This share declines monotonically to 15 percent once we consider workers
at the 75th percentile of the ability distribution. By implication, the opposite pattern
emerges when we consider adjustments along the intensive margin, i.e. changes in G(p|a)
and wage policies, i.e. changes in w(a|p). The relative importance of both of these two
margins of adjustment increases monotonically in the ability of workers.
2.8 A Pareto optimal tax reform
We have throughout the paper refrained from discussing normative issues, i.e. optimal
income taxation. Our model has an exclusively positive focus and is designed to capture
the enormous amount heterogeneity present in labor market data, and to deliver empir-
ically realistic behavior, including wage distributions. As result, the model describes an
economy that is likely rife with inefficiencies arising from congestion and thick market
externalities. Such a model does not lend itself well to the analysis of optimal, i.e. welfare
maximizing, policies for the simple reason that it is not possible to disentangle the extent
to which a particular tax schedule is “optimal” because it happens to correct inefficiencies
particular to the Danish 1999-2003 labor market under consideration here, or because it
46Decompositions of the partial equilibrium elasticities yield qualitatively similar results and are available
upon request.
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optimally trades efficiency off with equity.47
In this last section of the paper, we do, however, take a step towards analyzing a no-
tion of optimal taxation. Specifically, inspired by Werning (2007), Blundell and Shephard
(2012) and Hosseini and Shourideh (2017), we use the estimated structural model to con-
struct a Pareto optimal income tax reform. That is, we consider whether—taking the
status quo in terms of the actual tax system and any inefficiencies that may be present in
the baseline economy as given—it is possible to reform the income tax system in such a
way that the government tax revenue increases while all workers are made (weakly) better
off in terms of steady state expected utility.
To state the problem we solve formally, let W (a) be the expected steady state utility
of a type-a worker under the current tax system. We then solve
max
T (·)
∫ 1
0
〈
n0(a)[T (b)− b] + [1− n0(a)]
∫ w(a)
b
T (w)dG(w|a)
〉
dH(a) (2.40)
subject to
n0(a)ψ(c(a), s(b|a)) + [1− n0(a)]
∫ w(a)
b
ψ(c(a), s(w|a))dG(w|a) ≥W (a) (2.41)
for all a ∈ [0, 1]. At present, when searching for a Pareto optimal tax regime T (·) that
solves (2.40) subject to (2.41), we retain the functional form of the actual tax system, but
allow for different parameter values.48
The resulting Pareto improving tax system is superimposed on the actual 1999-2003
Danish income tax system in Figure 2.8. The reform increases government revenue by
0.68 percent while leaving no workers worse off. In fact, workers’ steady state utility,
on average, increases slightly by 0.07 percent. From Figure 2.8 we see that the Pareto
optimal income tax regime reduces the marginal tax rate at low wage levels, and increases
it slightly at all higher wage levels. At the same time, however, the average tax rate is
increased at low wages, and reduced at higher wage levels.
It is interesting to observe that the Pareto optimal tax schedule captures some quali-
tative features of the actual tax reforms implemented in Denmark during 1990-2005, and
analyzed in section 2.6. In particular, tax rates at the very bottom of the wage distribution
are increased, while they are lowered elsewhere. The Pareto optimal tax reform, however,
combines these shifts in the tax function with a steeper marginal tax function, reducing
marginal taxes for low wages and increasing it slightly elsewhere except at the very top.
47Bagger, Moen, and Vejlin (2017) provides a normative income taxation analysis in the context of a
frictional labor market with two-sided heterogeneity.
48An obvious alternative would be to look for a flexible, say, piece-wise linear tax system as in
Blundell and Shephard (2012).
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Figure 2.8: A Pareto optimal tax reform
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Table 2.11: Percentage changes between 1999-2003 regime and optimally reformed
regime—Partial Equilibrium
Ability S0 S1 V θ n
0 N2J J2J wF
All 0.95 -0.17 0.00 0.00 -1.37 1.96 -0.12 0.00
0.25 2.53 5.04 0.00 0.00 -5.44 7.47 0.91 0.00
0.5 0.12 -0.96 0.00 0.00 -0.79 0.87 -0.42 0.00
0.75 0.01 -0.25 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.13 -0.12 0.00
The actual reforms tended to uniformly reduce the marginal tax rates.
To get a sense of how the social planner achieves this welfare gain Tables 2.11 and
2.12 calculate the percentage change in a number of key variables between the 1999-2003
regime and the optimally reformed regime, considering both the aggregate effects across
the ability distribution, as well as showing effects for specific ability-types (the 25th, 50th
and 75th percentiles in the ability distribution). The variables we consider are aggregate
unemployed search S0, aggregate employed search S1, aggregate hiring intensity V , market
tightness θ, the nonemployment rate n0, the aggregate non-employment to employment
rate N2J , the aggregate job-to-job transition rate (J2J), and the average percentage
change in the wages offered by firmswF . Table 2.11 shows the partial equilibrium effects,
whereas Table 2.12 show the full equilibrium effects.
From Table 2.11 we see that in partial equilibrium, where firm behavior is fixed, the
optimally reformed tax system increases unemployed search and therefore reduces the
unemployment rate. This reduces the planner’s expenditures on unemployment benefits.
This effect of the optimally reformed income tax regime is especially pronounced at the
bottom of the ability distribution—a group of workers that also faces high unemployment
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Table 2.12: Percentage changes between 1999-2003 regime and optimally reformed
regime—Full Equilibrium
Ability S0 S1 V θ n
0 N2J J2J wF
All 2.20 -1.14 0.75 -0.29 -3.11 4.62 -0.89 0.10
0.25 3.54 4.09 -0.20 -2.61 -6.67 9.41 0.35 0.47
0.5 -0.05 -3.31 0.87 1.85 -0.75 0.37 -1.74 0.01
0.75 0.00 -0.24 0.57 0.66 -0.10 -0.18 -0.41 0.03
rates, and are likely to be located at the bottom of the wage distribution when in work.
Table 2.11 also shows that, in partial equilibrium, employed job search and hence the job-
to-job transition rate are reduced. This comes from the fact that the optimally reformed
marginal income tax rates in the middle and towards the top of the wage distribution
are increased, reducing the incentives to search for those jobs. Workers in the bottom
quartile of the ability distribution actually increases their employed job search, because
the reduced tax rates at the lower wages impact most of the wage ladder that these workers
face.
Turning now to the full equilibrium responses tabulated in Table 2.12 we note that
there is a qualitatively similar full equilibrium impact on S0, S1, n0, N2J and J2J .
However, firm responses to the optimally reformed tax system involves an increase in
hiring intensity, and an increase in the offered wages. This equilibrium response tend to
magnify the partial equilibrium responses described above. Hence, the intuition underlying
the optimally reformed income tax schedule remains that it moves especially low ability
workers out of nonemployment, and higher up on the wage ladder.
Conditioning taxes on ability. Finally, we discuss the possibility of conditioning the
tax schedule on individual ability. In the model, ability a is observable to both workers
and firms, as well as the planner designing the Pareto optimal tax reform. It is therefore
natural to consider the case where the planner can condition taxes on worker ability. This
gives additional degrees of freedom to the social planner, and we discuss here the potential
for further welfare gains through the introduction of an ability-conditional tax function,
T (w; a).
From the above discussion of the optimally refomed tax system we noticed that the
social planner achieved the welfare gains primarily by targeting the behavior of low ability
workers with high propensity for nonemployment. However, without being able to condi-
tion tax rates on worker-ability the targeting is less than perfect. Indeed, the optimally
reformed tax system does not change the behavior of workers of median or higher ability.
112
We conjecture therefore that an ability-specific tax function would be able to substantially
improve welfare relative to the one depicted in Figure 2.8. Most of these additional gains
are likely to come through induced behavioral changes among workers above the 25th
percentile of the ability distribution. We are currently working on a-specific tax functions
T (w; a) in this Pareto-optimal tax reform exercise.
2.9 Conclusion
Income taxation reduces the return to job search effort, thus distorting workers’ job search
effort, and therefore the equilibrium allocation of heterogenous workers across heteroge-
nous firms. Using a rich equilibrium frictional labor market model of search on-the-job,
we have documented economically significant effects of income taxation on the allocation
of labor. Specifically, we found that 1994, 1999, and 2004 Danish income tax reforms im-
proved the equilibrium allocation of labor, reducing the steady state unemployment rate
by about 6 percent, and increasing steady state labor income by about 2 percent, with
workers of low ability gaining the most in terms of lower unemployment rates and higher
labor incomes.
We also computed a mobility-based long-run elasticity of taxable labor income to be
0.12, with the labor income of lower ability workers being more responsive to income
taxation than that of high ability workers. A decomposition of the elasticity reveals that
the larger response of low ability workers is mostly along the extensive margin, whereas
the smaller adjustments towards the top of the ability distribution are along the intensive
margin and the wage policy margin. Finally, we have identified a Pareto improving labor
income taxation reform that increases government revenue by 0.7 percent while leaving all
workers weakly better off. Throughout the paper we have emphasized that the distinctions
between partial and full equilibrium, income and substitution effects, as well as worker
heterogeneity are quantitatively important.
This paper has dealt exclusively with positive aspects of labor income taxation in a
framework with labor market frictions and two-sided heterogeneity where the allocation
of labor is endogenous with respect to the tax system. The model set up here does not
lend itself easily to normative analysis, but in a related paper Bagger et al. (2017) studies
optimal taxation in a similar environment, within a model better suited for normative
analysis.
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Appendices
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A.1 Proofs and derivations
A.1.1 Law of motions for n0t (a) and n
1
t (w|a)
Recall from the main text that n0t (a) is the time-t measure of unemployed workers in the
household, while n1t (w|a) is the measure of workers employed with wage w. Define
Nt(a) ≡ n0t (a) +
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
n1t (w|a)dw (A.1)
as the time-t measure of the household population.
Now, consider a small interval of time of length dt from t to t+ dt. The change in the
type-a household-specific unemployment rate from t to t+ dt is given by the difference in
gross worker flows in and out of unemployment. Indeed,
n0t+dt(a)− n0t (a) = δ(a)dt[Nt(a)− n0t (a)]− λdt [µ+ s0t (a)]F (φ(a)|a)n0t (a). (A.2)
There are Nt(a) − n0t (a) employed workers at time t, and within a small interval of time
of length dt, a share δ(a)dt of them have their job destroyed, generating a gross flow
δ(a)dt[Nt(a) − n0t (a)] into unemployment. There are n0t (a) unemployed workers in the
type-a household at time t, and between t and t+ dt, a share λdt [µ+ s0t (a)]F (φ(a)|a) of
them obtain an acceptable job offer, generating a gross flow λdt [µ+ s0t (a)]F (φ(a)|a)n0t (a)
out of unemployment.
In equilibrium, F (φ(a)|a) = 1 as no firm would optimally set the offered type-a worker
wage below the type-a household’s reservation wage. Imposing F (φ(a)|a) = 1 and dividing
through by dt > 0 and taking the limit as dt→ 0 yields the law of motion (2.6) stated in
the main text.
The law of motion for n1t (w|a) derives from a similar logic. Consider the change in the
measure of workers employed at a job paying w or less during a small interval of time of
length d from t to t+ dt. That is, let N1t (w|a) =
∫ w
φ(a) n
1
t (w|a)dw, and consider
N1t+dt(w|a)−N1t (w|a) =
λdt[µ+s0t (a)][F (w|a)−F (φ(a)|a)]n0t (a)+λdtµ[F (w|a)−F (φ(a)|a)][Nt(a)−n0t (a)−N1t (w|a)]
−[δ(a)+λµF (φ(a)|a)]dtN1t (w|a)−λdtµF (w|a)N1t (w|a)−F (w|a)
∫ w
φ(a)
λdts1t (x|a)n1t (x|a)dx.
(A.3)
The first term stems from the gross inflow of unemployed workers who find an acceptable
job paying w or less. The second term stems from the inflow of workers currently employed
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at a wage greater than w (there are Nt(a) − n0t (a) − N1t (w|a) such workers in a type-a
household), but who are reallocated to an acceptable job paying w or less. The sum of
the first two terms constitutes total inflow into the group of employed type-a household
members earning a wage w or below. The third term reflects the gross worker outflow made
up of employed workers earning a wage w or below who move into unemployment. They
may do so due to a job destruction shock, or a reallocation shock involving an unacceptable
job offer, an event that occurs with probability λµF (φ(a)|a)dt in a short interval of length
dt. The fourth term comprises gross worker outflow from workers earning a wage w or
less who are reallocated to jobs paying in excess of w. Finally, the fifth term reflects gross
outflow of workers who, through on-the-job search, located a job paying in excess of w.
The sum of the last three terms constitutes total outflow from the group of employed
type-a household members earning a wage w or below.
Rearranging and collecting terms in (A.3), imposing the equilibrium restriction F (φ(a)|a) =
0, dividing through by dt > 0 and taking the limit as dt→ 0 yields
N˙1t (w|a) = [λµ+ λs0t (a)]F (w|a)n0t (a) + λµF (w|a)[Nt(a)− n0t (a)−N1t (w|a)]
− δ(a)N1t (w|a)− λµF (w|a)N1t (w|a)− F (w|a)
∫ w
φ(a)
λs1t (x|a)n1t (x|a)dx. (A.4)
Finally, taking the derivative with respect to w and a bit of algebra yields the law of
motion (2.7) stated in the main text.
A.1.2 Steady state labor allocation
The size of a household is Nt(a) = n
0
t (a) +
∫ w
ψ(a) n
1
t (w|a). Hence, n0t (a)/Nt(a) is the
type-a household time-t unemployment rate. The PDF of employed workers across wage
rates is gt(w|a) = n1t (w|a)/[1− n0t (a)], with associated CDF Gt(w|a) =
∫ w
φ(a) gt(w|a)dw =
N1t (w|a)/[1 − n0t (a)]. The law of motions for n0t (a) and n1t (w|a) are discussed above.
Gt(w|a) is the steady state employment-weighted wage distribution, which reflects the
allocation of labor across firms. The law of motion for Gt(w|a) is straightforward to
obtain from (A.4). Indeed,
G˙t(w|a) = [λµ+ λs0t (a)]F (w|a)
n0t (a)
1− n0t (a)
+ λµF (w|a)Gt(w|a)
− δ(a)Gt(w|a)− λµF (w|a)Gt(w|a)− F (w|a)
∫ w
φ(a)
λs1t (x|a)gt(x|a)dx. (A.5)
In steady state n˙0t (a) = 0, and s
0
t (a) = s
0(a), and n˙1t (w|a) = 0 and s1t (w|a) = s1(w|a)
for all w ∈ [ψ(a), w(a)], in which case (A.2) implies that the worker-type conditional
116
steady state unemployment rate, n0(a), is
n0(a) =
δ(a)
δ(a) + λµ+ λs0(a)
. (A.6)
Furthermore, in steady state, G˙t(w|a) = 0, in which case (A.5) simplifies as∫ w
φ(a)
λs1(x|a)g(x|a)dx = [δ(a) + λµ]F (w|a)−G(w|a)
F (w|a) , (A.7)
where we have used that, according to (A.6), n0(a)/[1−n0(a)] = δ(a)/[λµ+λs0(a)]. Next,
take the derivative of (A.7) with respect to w to obtain
λs1(w|a)g(w|a) = [δ(a) + λµ]f(w|a)G(w|a)− g(w|a)F (w|a)
F (w|a)2 , (A.8)
which, upon multiplying through by F (w|a)/G(w|a), yields
λs1(w|a)F (w|a) g(w|a)
G(w|a) = [δ(a) + λµ]
f(w|a)
F (w|a) − [δ(a) + λµ]
g(w|a)
G(w|a) . (A.9)
Rearrange to get an expression for the hazard function of G(w|a),
g(w|a)
G(w|a) =
[
δ(a) + λµ
δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(w|a)F (w|a)
]
f(w|a)
F (w|a) . (A.10)
It follows that the steady state labor allocation, G(w|a), is given by
G(w|a) = 1− exp
〈
−
∫ w
φ(a)
[
δ(a) + λµ
δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(x|a)F (x|a)
]
f(x|a)
F (x|a)dx
〉
. (A.11)
As mentioned in the main text, this expression is useful for the numerical solution of
the model because it allow us to compute the allocation of labor from any search effort
function s1(w|a) and wage offer distribution F (x|a) without having to (numerically) solve
a system of balanced flow equations.
The special case of wage-independent search effort, s1(w|a) = s1. While use-
ful, the derivation of, and the resulting expression for, the employment-weighted wage
distributionG(w|a) is somewhat unconventional. Consider the special case where on-the-
job search effort is independent of the wage. This exogenous search effort specification
is common in the job search literature. Under the restriction that s1(w|a) = s1(a), the
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integrated hazard function of the employment-weighted wage distribution is given by∫ w
φ(a)
g(x|a)
G(x|a)dx =
∫ w
φ(a)
[
δ(a) + λµ
δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(a)F (x|a)
]
f(x|a)
F (x|a)dx
=
∫ w
φ(a)
[1 + κ1(a)F (x|a)]−1 f(x|a)
F (x|a)dx
=
∫ 1
F (w|a)
[1 + κ1(a)z]−1
1
z
dz
=
∫ 1
F (w|a)
[
1
z
− κ
1(a)
1 + κ1(a)z
]−1
dz. (A.12)
where κ1(a) ≡ λs1(a)δ(a)+λµ . Integrating (A.12) yields∫ w
φ(a)
g(x|a)
G(x|a)dx =
∣∣∣∣1
F (w|a)
ln
(
z
1 + κ1(a)z
)
= ln
(
1
1 + κ1(a)
)
− ln
(
F (w|a)
1 + κ1(a)F (w|a)
)
= ln
(
1 + κ1(a)F (w|a)
[1 + κ1(a)]F (w|a)
)
, (A.13)
Hence, using (A.11) on (A.13), we obtain
G(w|a) = 1−exp
〈
−ln
(
1 + κ1(a)F (w|a)
[1 + κ1(a)]F (w|a)
)〉
= 1− [1 + κ
1(a)]F (w|a)
1 + κ1(a)F (w|a) =
F (w|a)
1 + κ1(a)F (w|a) .
(A.14)
We note that (A.14) is the “standard” expression for the employment-weighted distribution
of wages that appears in e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps et al. (2000).
A.1.3 Applying the Maximum Principle
The current value Hamiltonian associated with the household problem is given as
Ht(a) = ψ(ct(a), s0t (a))n0t (a) +
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
ψ(ct(a), s
1
t (w|a))n1t (w|a)dw
+ eρtξ0t (a)
〈
δ(a)Nt(a)− [δ(a) + λµ+ λs0t (a)]n0t (a)
〉
+
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
eρtξ1t (x|a)
〈[
λµNt(a) + λs
0
t (a)n
0
t (a) +
∫ x
φ(a)
λs1t (z|a)n1t (z|a)dz
]
f(x|a)
−
[
δ(a) + λµ+ λs1t (x|a)F (x|a)
]
n1t (x|a)
〉
dx, (A.15)
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with ct(a) given by (2.4), restated here for later reference,
ct(a) =
1
Nt(a)
(
[b− T (b)]n0t (a) +
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[w − T (w)]n1t (w|a)dw
)
+ b (A.16)
and Nt(a) given by (A.1).
By the Maximum Principle (Acemoglu, 2009, Theorem 7.13, p. 254), the optimal
controls satisfies the following necessary conditions. First, with respect to employed job
search effort s1t (w|a) at any wage level w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], optimality requires
∂Ht(a)
∂s1t (w|a)
= 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞) and for all w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], (A.17)
∂Ht(a)
∂n1t (w|a)
= −eρtξ˙1t (w|a) for all t ∈ [0,∞) and for all w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], (A.18)
where Ht(a) is given by (A.15) and ξ˙1t (w|a) ≡ ∂ξ1t (w|a)/∂t. Of course, there is set of
analogous necessary optimality conditions pertaining to unemployed search effort s0t (a).
Indeed,
∂Ht(a)
∂s0t (a)
= 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞), (A.19)
∂Ht(a)
∂n0t (a)
= −eρtξ˙0t (a) for all t ∈ [0,∞). (A.20)
We next solve the system of equation made up (A.19), (A.20), (A.17), and (A.18), with
Ht(a) given by (A.15).
Optimal steady state job search effort, s1t (w|a) and s0t (a). Consider first employed
job search effort, s1t (w|a). Using (A.15), equating the derivative of Ht(a) with respect to
s1t (w|a), for some w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], to zero, and rearranging, yields
e−ρtζ ′(s1t (w|a)) = λ
∫ w(a)
w
[ξ1t (x|a)− ξ1t (w|a)]f(x|a)dx, (A.21)
for any w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], and where ζ ′(·) represents the marginal disutility of job search
effort, see (2.2). The necessary optimality conditions (A.21) has a straightforward inter-
pretation that is spelled out in the main text. For future reference, notice that integrating
(A.21) by parts implies
e−ρtζ ′(s1t (w|a)) = λ
∫ w(a)
w
∂
∂x
ξ1t (x|a)F (x|a)dx. (A.22)
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Next, consider unemployed job search effort s0t (a). Derivations analogous to those that
lead to (A.21) implies that
e−ρtζ ′(s0t (a)) = λ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[ξ1t (x|a)− ξ0t (a)]f(x|a)dx, (A.23)
and integration by parts yields
e−ρtζ ′(s0t (a)) = λ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
∂
∂x
ξ1t (x|a)F (x|a)dx. (A.24)
The steady state costate ξ1t (x|a). Consider first the costate variable ξ1t (x|a), the
multiplier on the law of motion for the control n1t (w|a), the time-t measure of workers
employed at wage w in the type-a household. Utilizing (A.18) and equating the derivative
of Ht(a) with respect to the control n1t (w|a) to −eρtξ˙1t (w|a) yields
− ξ˙1t (w|a) = e−ρt
[
u(ct(a))− ζ(s1t (w|a)) + u′(ct(a))[w − T (w)− ct(a)]
]
+ δ(a)[ξ0t (a)− ξ1t (w|a)] + λµ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[ξ1t (x|a)− ξ1t (w|a)]f(x|a)dx
+ λs1t (w|a)
∫ w(a)
w
[ξ1t (x|a)− ξ1t (w|a)]f(x|a)dx, (A.25)
for any w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)]. In deriving (A.25) we have used that ∂Nt(a)/∂n1t (w|a) = 1, and
that, by (A.16),
∂ct(a)
∂n1t (w|a)
=
w − T (w)− ct(a)
Nt(a)
. (A.26)
The first term on the right-hand side of (A.25) is the change in the household’s flow-
payoff if a worker earning a wage w is added to the household at time t. Such an additional
worker increases the time-t utility flow in the household by u(ct(a)) − ζ(s1t (w|a)) and, in
addition, contributes net-of-tax revenue in the amount of w−T (w)−ct(a) to be distributed
within the household. The household values this additional revenue at the marginal utility
of consumption, u′(ct(a)). The two last terms on the right-hand side of (A.25) represent
the change in the value of the stock of workers earning a wage w, denominated in present
values, stemming from the additional worker. This change is given by the expected cap-
ital gains from job destruction, reallocation and job search at the dictated search effort,
λs1t (w|a) that the additional worker is subject to. At the optimal search policy, the change
in the current flow-payoff plus the change to the value of the household’s stock of workers
employed at wage w, n1t (w|a), balance the depreciation of the stock, i.e. −ξ˙1t (w|a).
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Substituting (A.21) into (A.25) and rearranging allow us to write
−ξ˙1t (w|a) = e−ρtΦ1t (w|a)− [δ(a) + λµ]ξ1t (w|a), (A.27)
where Φ1t (w|a) is defined as
Φ1t (w|a) ≡ u(ct(a))− ζ(s1t (w|a)) + u′(ct(a))[w − T (w)− ct(a)]
+ δ(a)eρtξ0t (a) + λµ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
eρtξ1t (x|a)f(x|a)dx+ ζ ′(s1t (w|a))s1t (w|a). (A.28)
Solving the non-homogenous first-order linear ordinary differential equation (ODE)
(A.27) for ξ1t (w|a) yields
ξ1t (w|a) = e[δ(a)+λµ]tξ10(w|a)− e[δ(a)+λµ]t
∫ t
0
e−[ρ+δ(a)+λµ]xΦ1x(w|a)dx. (A.29)
Consider now an economy in steady state, i.e. consider the situation where n˙1t (w|a) = 0
for all w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], as well as n˙0t (a) = 0, such that n1t (w|a) = n1t′(w|a) = n1(w|a) for
all w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)], n0t (a) = n0t′(a) = n0(a), and where s1t (w|a) = s1t′(w|a) = s1(w|a)
and s0t (a) = s
0
t′(a) = s
0(a) for any two dates t and t′. The steady state version (A.28)
implies that Φ1t (w|a) = Φ1t′(w|a) = Φ1(w|a) for any two dates t and t′. Moreover, in steady
state, the current value costate variables are equalized, i.e. ξ10(w|a) = eρtξ1t (w|a) for all
w ∈ [φ(a), w(a)]. Put differently, the present value costate variables differ only across time
due to discounting.1 The steady state version of (A.29) therefore implies that
ξ0t (w|a) =
e[δ(a)+λµ)]t
1− e[ρ+δ(a)+λµ)]t
[
1− e−[ρ+δ(a)+λµ]t
]
Φ1(w|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ
. (A.30)
The transversality condition for the costate ξ1t (w|a) holds. Indeed, since
lim
t→∞
e[δ(a)+λµ]t
1− e[ρ+δ(a)+λµ]t = −
δ(a) + λµ
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt = 0, (A.31)
we have
lim
t→∞ ξ
1
t (w|a) = 0. (A.32)
We note that the steady state identity ξ10(w|a) = eρtξ1t (w|a) and (A.30) implies that the
household’s steady state shadow valuation of an additional worker employed with wage
1Recall from the main text that ξ1t (w|a) is the present value shadow value of adding an additional
employed worker earning a wage w to the household at time t. In steady state, this differs from the present
value shadow value of adding an additional employed worker at wage rate w to the household at time 0,
ξ10(w|a), only by discounting. Hence, ξ10(w|a) = eρtξ1t (w|a).
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rate w is
[ρ+ δ(a) + λµ]ξ10(w|a) = Φ1(w|a), (A.33)
which, upon substituting the steady state version of (A.28) into (A.33), implies that
ρξ10(w|a) = u(c(a))− ζ(s1(w|a)) + u′(c(a))[w − T (w)− c(a)]
+ δ(a)[ξ00(a)− ξ10(w|a)] + λµ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[ξ10(x|a)− ξ10(w|a)]f(x|a)dx+ ζ ′(s1(w|a))s1(w|a),
(A.34)
where c(a) is steady state household consumption, see (A.16). Substituting (A.22) back
into (A.34), using again the steady state identity ξ10(w|a) = eρtξ1t (w|a), and integrating
the remaining integral by parts yield
ρξ10(w|a) = u(c(a))− ζ(s1(w|a)) + u′(c(a))[w − T (w)− c(a)]
+δ(a)[ξ00(a)−ξ10(w|a)]+λµ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx+λs1(w|a)
∫ w(a)
w
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx.
(A.35)
By the Envelope Theorem, the derivative of (A.35) with respect to w implies that
∂
∂w
ξ10(w|a) =
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(w)]
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(w|a)F (w|a) . (A.36)
From (A.36), we note that ∂∂wξ
1
0(w|a) > 0, and hence, that ξ10(w|a) is strictly increasing in
w. This implies that the household dictates that employed workers accept an alternative
job offer if and only if it pays a higher wage than the current job.
Substituting (A.36) back into (A.35), allow us to express the steady state costate
ξ10(w|a) as
ρξ10(w|a) = u(c(a))− ζ(s1(w|a)) + u′(c(a))[w − T (w)− c(a)]
+ δ(a)[ξ00(a)− ξ10(w|a)] + λµ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(x|a)F (x|a)dx
+ λs1(w|a)
∫ w(a)
w
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (A.37)
The interpretation of (A.37) is described in the main text.
Finally, substituting (A.36) into (A.22) yields a useful characterization of the optimal
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steady state search effort among employed workers,
ζ ′(s1(w|a)) = λ
∫ w(a)
w
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (A.38)
The steady state costate ξ0t (a). The characterization of the costate ξ
0
t (a) is analogous
to that of ξ1t (w|a) detailed above, but is nonetheless included here for completeness. First,
equate the derivative of Ht(a) with respect to n0t (a) to −eρtξ˙0t (a), to obtain
− ξ˙0t (a) = e−ρt
[
u(ct(a))− ζ(s0t (a)) + u′(ct(a))[b− T (b)− ct(a)]
]
+ [λµ+ λs0t (a)]
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[ξ1t (x|a)− ξ0t (a)]f(x|a)dx. (A.39)
Equation (A.39) has the same interpretation as (A.25).
Substituting (A.23) into (A.39) and rearranging yields
−ξ˙0t (a) = e−ρtΦ0t (a)− λµξ0t (a), (A.40)
where Φ0t (a) is defined as
Φ0t (a) ≡ u(ct(a))−ζ(s0t (a))+u′(ct(a))[b−T (b)−ct(a)]+
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
eρtξ1t (x|a)f(x|a)dx+ζ ′(s0t (a))s0t (a).
(A.41)
The solution to the non-homogenous first-order linear ODE (A.40) can be expressed as
ξ0t (a) = e
λµtξ00(a)− eλµt
∫ t
0
e−[ρ+λµ]xΦ0x(a)dx. (A.42)
Imposing steady state, where Φ0t (a) = Φ
0(a) and ξ00(a) = e
ρtξ0t (a), on (A.42) implies
ξ0t (a) =
eλµt
1− e[ρ+λµ]t
[
1− e−[ρ+λµ]t
]
Φ0(a)
ρ+ λµ
. (A.43)
It is straightforward to verify that the transversality condition limt→∞ ξ0t (a) = 0 holds,
and that the household’s steady state shadow valuation of an additional unemployed
worker, ξ0t (a) is
[ρ+ λµ]ξ00(a) = Φ
0(a). (A.44)
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Substituting the steady state version of (A.41) into (A.44) yields
ρξ00(a) = u(c(a))−ζ(s0(a))+u′(c(a))[b−T (b)−c(a)]+λµ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
[ξ10(x|a)−ξ00(a)]f(x|a)dx+ζ ′(s0(a))s0(a),
(A.45)
where c(a) is steady state household consumption, see (A.16). Substitute (A.24) into
(A.45) and integrate the integral by parts to obtain
ρξ00(a) = u(c(a))−ζ(s0(a))+u′(c(a))[b−T (b)−c(a)]+λ[µ+s0(a)]
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
∂
∂x
ξ10(x|a)F (x|a)dx.
(A.46)
The derivative ∂∂xξ
1
0(x|a) is given by (A.36), and hence, we may write
ρξ00(a) = u(c(a))− ζ(s0(a)) + u′(c(a))[b− T (b)− c(a)]
+ λ[µ+ s0(a)]
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (A.47)
Finally, substituting (A.36) into (A.24) yields,
ζ ′(s0(a)) = λ
∫ w(a)
φ(a)
u′(c(a))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+ δ(a) + λµ+ λs1(x|a)F (x|a)dx. (A.48)
The steady state reservation wage, φ(a). The steady state reservation wage φ(a)
solves
ξ10(φ(a)|a) = ξ00(a). (A.49)
In other words, it is the wage rate φ(a) at which the household’s shadow valuation of
employment coincides with the shadow valuation of unemployment. From (A.37), (A.47),
(A.38) and (A.48) it is evident that
φ(a) = b. (A.50)
and that unemployed steady state search effort is identical to employed steady state search
effort in the lowest paying firm with w = b,
s0(a) = s1(b|a). (A.51)
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A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider property (i) in lemma 1. From (2.13), s(w|a) = [ζ ′]−1
(
λ
∫ w(a)
w
u′(c(a))[1−T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+δ(a)+λµ+λs(x|a)F (x|a)dx
)
+
s. Since ζ ′ : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) we have [ζ ′]−1 : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞). Hence, [ζ ′]−1(·) ≥ 0,
and therefore, s(w|a) ≥ s. Consider now property (ii) in lemma 1. The derivative of
[ζ ′]−1(·) is 1/ζ ′′([ζ ′]−1(·)). Since ζ ′′(·) > 0, [ζ ′]−1 : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) is a strictly increas-
ing function. It follows that [ζ ′]−1(0) = 0, and hence, s(w(a)|a) = 0. Finally, consider
property (iii) in lemma 1. [ζ ′]−1(·) is a strictly increasing function. Take w′ < w′′.
Then,
∫ w(a)
w′
u′(c(a))[1−T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+δ(a)+λµ+λs(x|a)F (x|a)dx >
∫ w(a)
w′′
u′(c(a))[1−T ′(x)]F (x|a)
ρ+δ(a)+λµ+λs(x|a)F (x|a)dx. It follows that
s(w′|a) > s(w′′|a).2
A.1.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Take w′ < w′′ both in [b, w(a)]. Lemma 1 established that s(w′|a) > s(w′′|a), from
which it follows that s(w′|a)F (w′|a) > s(w′′|a)F (w′′|a). Finally, ∫ w′b s(x|a)dG(x|a) <∫ w′′
b s(x|a)dG(x|a). Lemma 2 now follows from (2.21) and (2.22).
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let p′ < p′′ such that y(a, p′) < y(a, p′′), and let w′ = w(a|p′) and w′′ = w(a|p′′).
Then, p˜i(p′′|w′′, a) = [y(a, p′′)−w′′]˜`(a|w′′) > [y(a, p′′)−w′]˜`(a|w′) > [y(a, p′)−w′]˜`(a|w′) =
p˜i(p′|w′, a) > [y(a, p′)−w′′]˜`(a|w′′). This implies that [y(a, p′′)−y(a, p′)]˜`(a|w′′) > [y(a, p′′)−
y(a, p′)]˜`(a|w′), which implies ˜`(a|w′′) > ˜`(a|w′). Lemma 2 established that ˜`(a|w) is
strictly increasing in w, which implies that w′ < w′′.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Fix a ∈ [0, 1]. The first order condition (FOC) for a type-p firm’s hiring intensity
problem (2.23) is p˜i(a|p)h(a)/V (a) = d′(v). The left-hand side of the FOC is independent
of v. Strict convexity of d(·) implies that the right-hand sider of the FOC is strictly
increasing in v. Hence, the FOC has a unique solution v = v(a|p). Strict convexity of d(·)
also ensures the second order condition is satisfied. The proof of Proposition 1 established
that p˜i(p|a) is strictly increasing in p. Strict convexity of d(·) implies that v(a|p) is strictly
increasing in p.
2Alternatively, since F (w|a) is differentiable, direct differentiation of (2.13) yields the desired result.
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A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Taking the derivative of (2.23), applying the Envelope Theorem, yields
∂pi(p)
∂p
= (1− τ)
∫ 1
0
[
v(a|p)
V (a)
]
∂p˜i(p|a)
∂p
dH(a).
The proof of Proposition 1 established that p˜i(p|a) is strictly increasing in p for every
a ∈ [0, 1]. Proposition 2 established that v(a|p) is strictly increasing in p for every a ∈ [0, 1].
The product of strictly increasing strictly positive functions yields a strictly increasing
function. Integrating a set of strictly increasing functions yields a strictly increasing
function. Proposition 3 follows.
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A.2 Details on the data
A.2.1 The merging procedure
Merging data sources by person ID is straightforward. However, a few complications arise
when merging data sources by firm IDs because different public registers using different
firm identifiers. Data clean-up, manipulation, merging and selection is carried out in a
series of SAS-programs. Before we move on to describing the merging procedure, we
provide a brief description of the person and firm IDs that enters the procedure.
Person and firm IDs. Persons are identified by their CPR-number. All individuals
residing legally in Denmark are registered in the CPR register (Centrale Person Register)
with a unique CPR number. The CPR-number is the sole identifier of an individual in
relation to the state. Person data is recorded under a anonymized CPR-number labeled
pnr.
There are two main ways of identifying business entities. The Central Business Register
(CVR), established in October 1999, contains primary data on all businesses with economic
activity in Denmark, regardless of economic and organizational structure. CVR covers
both public and private businesses.The SE-number identifies a business in Stamregistret
for Erhvervsdrivende (the SE-register), a register established in 1985. The main function of
SE-register is to identify businesses vis-a-vis the tax authorities when settling value added
tax (VAT), income tax payments, or tax payments for self-employed persons, and pension
contributions. CVR- and SE-numbers are recorded under the variable names cvrnr and
senr, respectively. Although the relationship between CVR-numbers and SE-numbers
is somewhat complicated by fact that a business entity may split up into multiple legal
business entities, an SE-numbers associated with one and only one CVR-number at a given
point in time. We are able to map CVR-numbers and SE-numbers using a correspondence
table provided by Statistics Denmark.
As it turns out, employing firms in the labor market spell data are identified by the
firm ID spell firm id, a hybrid firm identifier specific to the labor market spell data,
which corresponds very closely to the CVR-number. As we describe below, we are able to
map spell firm id to cvrnr using IDA-N data.
The labor market spell data. The unit of observation in the labor market spell data
is a person-spell-year, where a spell is a job with a particular employer, and the employing
firm is identified by spell firm id as described above. That is, a labor market spell that
stretches across three calendar years (i.e. stretches across three January 1st) is represented
by three observations in the labor market spell data.
127
Merging IDA-P onto the labor market spell data. We first merge the employment
spell data and IDA-P. IDA-P contains annual background information from public registers
on all individuals aged 15-74 residing legally in Denmark on the 31st of December. The
unit of observation in IDA-P is a person-year. We merge on person identifier (variable
pnr) and year (variable aar). 98.64% of the employment spell observations are matched to
an IDA-P observation. We retain only person-years that are found in both data sources.
Merging IDA-S onto the labor market spell data. IDA-S contains background
information from public records on all physical workplaces in Denmark, excluding the
so-called fictitious workplaces briefly described in the main text. The unit of observation
in the raw IDA-S panel is a workplace-year. Our analysis is conducted at the firm-level,
and a firm may consist of several workplaces. Because IDA-S contains both workplace
and firm identifiers, we can aggregate IDA-S to firm-years, letting a firm inherit industry
affiliation and public sector status from its largest workplace.3
We start by mapping the firm identifier of employment spell data (variable spell firm id)
into the firm identifier of the IDA database (cvrnr). The mapping between spell firm id
and cvrnr is established using IDA-N, yet another IDA dataset. IDA-N contains data on
all primary employment relationships ongoing on November 28th in a given year. The unit
of observation in IDA-N is a person-workplace-year, but it also contains information on
both the IDA-S firm identifier cvrnr and the spell data firm identifier (spell firm id),
allowing us to construct a correspondence table with spell firm id, cvrnr, and aar. We
use this table to map spell firm id into cvrnr in the labor market data,4 and then we
subsequently merge IDA-S onto the employment spells on firm identifier cvrnr and year
aar. 96.10% of the employment spell observations are matched with an IDAS observation.
We retain all employment spell data, whether matched to IDA-S or not.
Merging VAT data onto the labor market spell data. As described in the main
text, value added data comes from two data sources, MOMS and MOMM. MOMS cov-
ers 1995-1999 and contains annual data on firms’ sales and purchases, whereas MOMM
starts in January, 2000, and provides the same information, but recorded on a monthly
frequency.5
3The size of the workplace is the number of workers with primary employment at the workplace on the
28th of November, as measured in IDA-S
4There is a few occurrences where the mapping between spell firm id and cvrnr is 1-to-many, in
which case we arbitrarily pick cvrnr as max(cvrnr).
5The VAT declaration frequency depends on the firm’s annual turnover. Firms register VAT information
at the tax authorities monthly if their turnover exceeds DKK 15 mill., quarterly if their turnover is between
DKK 1 mill. and DKK 15 mill., and every six months if turnover is below DKK 1 mill. The reporting
frequency for a given firm is also provided in the MOMM data.
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The MOMS data is recorded under the senr-firm ID, whereas the labor market spell
data (and MOMM) is recorded under the firm ID cvrnr. As a first step in the merging
of VAT data to the labor market spell data, we map senr in MOMS to cvrnr. This done
using a correspondence table provided by Statistics Denmark. Then, using MOMM data
up until December, 2005, we aggregate the monthly data to annual frequencies. Stacking
the MOMS and MOMM data now yields a value added panel covering the period 1995-
2005, containing essentially all firms with economic activity in Denmark over the period.
The unit of observation in this combined MOMS and MOMM data is a firm-year, with
the firm ID given by cvrnr.
Merging the annual value added panel onto the labor market spell data, we match
90.37% of the employment panel firm-months to value added data.6 We retain all employ-
ment spell data, whether matched to the VAT-data or not. This completes the merging
procedure. As mentioned in the main text, the resulting 1990-2005 matched employer-
employee panel contains 84,474,045 spell observations on 4,447,401 individuals, 428,448
firms, 57,568,393 job spells and 26,905,652 non-employment spells.
6The share of observations in the value added panel matched to the employment panel is much lower
due to many firms in the value added data being small firms with no employees.
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A.3 Estimating T ′(·) and T (·)
Consider the 1999 - 2003 regime. Given that this regime has a progressive structure with
three brackets (see Table 2.5), we impose the following flexible parametric function for
marginal tax rates T ′(·),
T ′(w) =
α1
1 + exp(−α2(w − α3)) +
α4
1 + exp(−α5(w − α6)) + α7. (A.52)
The marginal tax function T ′(·) is composed of two logistic functions “splined” together.
The data points we use the compute the parameters α1, α2, ..., α7 consist of 100
hourly wage distribution percentiles and 100 median marginal tax rates for each of the
5 years. Let (w
(50)
tk , [T
′](50)tk ) for t = 1999, 2000, ..., 2003 and k = 1, 2, ..., 100 denote these
data points. The parameters α1, α2, ..., α7 are estimated by fitting T
′(wi) to ti, where
T ′(·) is given by (A.52). That is,
min
α1,α2,...,α7
2003∑
t=1999
100∑
k=1
[
α1
1 + exp(−α2(w(50)tk − α3))
+
a4
1 + exp(−α5(w(50)tk − α6))
+α7−[T ′](50)tk
]2
.
(A.53)
Let αˆ1, αˆ2, ..., αˆ7 be the solution to the minimization problem (A.53).
Integrating (A.52) produces the following expression for the average tax function T (·),
T (w) =
α1
α2
log(eα2α3 + eα2w) +
α4
α5
log(eα5α6 + eα5w) + α7w + α0, (A.54)
where α0 is the constant of integration. Parameter estimates for α1, α2, ..., α7 are available,
and we estimate α0 in the same way we estimated α1, α2, ..., α7. That is, we calculate
median tax liability T
(50)
tk , measured in the same unit as wtk, for each of the 100 wage
percentiles and for each of the years 1999 - 2003, and fit (A.54) with α1 = αˆ1, α2 = αˆ2,
..., α7 = αˆ7 to (wtk, T
(50)
tk ) with t = 1999, 2000, ..., 2003 and k = 1, 2, ..., 100:
min
α0
2003∑
t=1999
100∑
k=1
[
αˆ1
αˆ2
log(eαˆ2αˆ3+eαˆ2wtk)+
αˆ4
αˆ5
log(eαˆ5αˆ6+eαˆ5wtk)+αˆ7wtk+α0−T (50)tk
]2
. (A.55)
The marginal and average tax functions pertaining to the other tax regimes under
consideration in this paper, i.e. the 1990-1993, the 1994-1998, and the 2004-2005 tax
regimes, are estimated by analogous procedures, sometimes adapted to account for specific
features of a tax regime. For example, for the 1990-1993 tax regime, and for the years
1994 and 1995, we build the marginal tax functions from three, rather than two, logistic
functions.
130
A.4 Numerical implementation
A.4.1 Solving the model
A.4.1.1 Discretization of H(a) and Γ0(p)
Our algorithm is based on discrete values of worker ability a and firm productivity p,
whereas the theoretical model takes the distributions H(a) and Γ0(p) to be continuously
differentiable. We apply Proposition B of Kennan (2006) to discretize the support of
H(·). Let Na and Np be the numbers of discrete points in the support of worker ability
a and firm productivity p, respectively.7 For i = 1, ..., Na, ai = H
−1([2i− 1]/2Na), where
H(·) is the (continuous) population distribution of a.8 We then calculate a probability
mass function (PMF) hˆ(ai) and a corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF)
Hˆ(ai) as hˆ(ai) = 1/Na and Hˆ(ai) = i/Na, introducing the “ˆ”-notation to distinguish
the continuous population distributions and their discrete approximations. The same
procedure applies for p, where we compute γˆ0(pi) = 1/Np and Γˆ0(pi) = i/Np.
A.4.1.2 Finding λ(a), v(a|p), and w(a|p)
This is the main part of numerical implementation. Given Hˆ(a) and Γˆ0(p), the structure
of the algorithm is as follows.
0. Guess λ0(a), s(w|a), v0(a|p), and w0(a|p)
1. Calculate s1(w|a), w1(a|p), v1(a|p), and λ1(a)
2. If s1(w|a), w1(a|p), v1(a|p), and λ1(a) differ from s0(w|a), w0(a|p), v0(a|p), and
λ0(a), take s0(w|a) = s1(w|a), w0(a|p) = w1(a|p), v0(a|p) = v1(a|p), and λ0(a) =
λ1(a) and go to 1. If not, take s(w|a) = s1(w|a), w(a|p) = w1(a|p), v(a|p) = v1(a|p),
and λ(a) = λ1(a) and terminate the algorithm.
We explain calculations of step 1 in detail below.
Calculation of F (w(a|p)|a). The first step is to calculate F (w(a|p)|a). For the current
guesses of λ(a), v(a|p), and w(a|p), from (2.28), the discrete approximation of F (w(ai|pj)|ai)
is given by
Fˆ (w(ai|pj)|ai) =
∑pj
z=p0
v(ai|z)γˆ0(z)∑1
z=p0
v(ai|z)γˆ0(z)
.
The associated PMF fˆ(w(ai|pj)|ai) is calculated as Fˆ (w(ai|pj)|ai)− Fˆ (w(ai|pj−1)|ai).
7In the empirical implementation we take Na = 100 and Np = 1, 000.
8Recall that H(·) = U [0, 1] in our empirical implementation.
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Calculation of s(w|a). For the current guesses of λ(a), v(a|p), and w(a|p), we employ
the following algorithm to compute s(w|a).
0. Guess s(wj |ai) = s0.
1. Calculate n0(ai) from (2.14) and Gˆ(wj |ai) from (2.16).
2. Calculate s1 as the RHS of (2.13), replacing F (w|a) with Fˆ (wj |ai), and approximat-
ing the integral as detailed further below.
3. If s1 6= s0, take s0 = s1 and go to 1. If s1 = s0, take s(wj |ai) = s1 and terminate
the algorithm.
Step 2 involves solving for s(wj |ai) as the fixed point of (2.13). We approximate the
integral in (2.13) as follows:∫ w(ai)
wij
u′(c(ai))[1− T ′(x)]F (x|ai)
ρ+ δ(ai) + λµ+ λs(x|ai)F (x|ai)
dx =
∫ wiNp
wij
φi(x)dx
=
∫ wiNp
wij
φi(x)
1
f(x|ai)dF (x|ai)
=
Np∑
k=j
φi(wik)
1
f(wik|ai) fˆ(wik|ai)
=
Np−1∑
k=j
φi(wik)
1
f(wik|ai) fˆ(wik|ai)
≈
Np−1∑
k=j
φi(wik)
fˆ(wik|ai)
fˆ(wi,k+1|ai)
(wi,k+1 − wik),
where φi(x)
.
= u
′(c(ai))[1−T ′(x)]F (x|ai)
ρ+δ(ai)+λµ+λs(x|ai)F (x|ai) . For the second equality above, we use the defini-
tion of a PDF, i.e., dF (x|ai) = f(x|ai)dx, while the third equality comes from the definition
of expectation in discrete w. The fourth equality is from the fact that φi(wiNp) = 0 for all i.
We finally use numerical differentiation to approximate f(wik|ai) ≈ F (wi,k+1|ai)−F (wik|ai)wi,k+1−wik =
fˆ(wi,k+1|ai)
wi,k+1−wik for k ≤ Np − 1. Note that s(wiNp |ai) = s(w(ai)|ai) = 0 for all i.9
9We compared s(wij |ai) calculated from the method explained here with the one calculated from value
function iteration, and confirmed that two methods gave the same results with negligible approximation
errors. Due to computational time, our method is preferred to value function iteration.
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A.4.1.3 Calculate w(a|p)
From (2.24), w(ai|pj) is calculated as
w(ai|pj) = y(ai, pj)− p˜i(ai|pj)˜`(ai|wi·j)
.
˜`(ai|wi·j) is calculated from (2.22). We approximate p˜i(ai|pj) by the second order Taylor
series sequentially:
p˜i(ai|pj+1) ≈ p˜i(ai|pj) + ∂p˜i(ai|pj)
∂p
(pj+1 − pj) + 1
2
· ∂
2p˜i(ai|pj)
∂p2
(pj+1 − pj)2. (A.56)
By the Envelope Theorem,
∂p˜i(ai|pj)
∂p
=
∂y(ai, pj)
∂p
˜`(ai|wi·j).
By taking the second derivative and applying numerical differentiation,
∂2p˜i(ai|pj)
∂p2
=
∂2y(ai, pj)
∂p2
˜`(ai|wij) + ∂y(ai, pj)
∂p
· ∂
˜`(ai|wij)
∂w
· ∂wij
∂p
≈ ∂
2y(ai, pj)
∂p2
˜`(ai|wij) + ∂y(ai, pj)
∂p
·
˜`(ai|wi,j+1)− ˜`(ai|wij)
wi,j+1 − wij ·
wi,j+1 − wij
pj+1 − pj .
Thus, by substituting these partial derivatives, we can calculate (A.56) as
p˜i(ai|pj+1) ≈ p˜i(ai|pj)+∂y(ai, pj)
∂p
·
˜`(ai|wij) + ˜`(ai|wi,j+1)
2
(pj+1−pj)+∂
2y(ai, pj)
∂p2
·
˜`(ai|wij)
2
(pj+1−pj)2.
The initial condition is given by p˜i(ai|p0) = 0 for all ai from pi(p0) = 0.
A.4.1.4 Calculate v(a|p)
M0 is given by (2.27), which gives V (a) = M0
∫ 1
p0
v(p)dΓ0(p). We calculate v(a|p) from
(2.23).
A.4.1.5 Calculate λ(a)
S(a) is given by (2.29), which gives λ(a) = (V (a)/S(a))1−η.
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Figure E.1: Counterfactual linear tax systems
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A.5 Allocative distortions and tax progressivity
Our evaluations of the 1990, 1994, 1999, and 2004 Danish tax reforms as well as the anal-
ysis of the elasticity of taxable income suggest that income taxations induce quantitative
relevant distortions in the equilibrium allocation of labor. The Danish income tax sched-
ule is characterized by a high degree of progressivity, see Figures 2.7, and in this section
we consider a number of counter-factual reforms to quantify the impact of income tax
progressivity on the allocation of labor.
Specifically, we consider three counterfactual linear tax regimes, with T ′(w) = 0.54,
T ′(w) = 0.30, and T ′(w) = 0. The T ′(w) = 0.54 is the mechanically revenue neutral
linear tax regime, that is, in the absence of any behavioral changes, replacing the actual
1999-2003 income tax system with a the linear tax function T ′(w) = 0.54 would leave
the government budget unchanged. The T ′(w) = 0.30 tax regime is intended as a brute
approximation of the US income tax system, and the extreme counterfactual T ′(w) = 0 tax
system is included primarily for illustration. When we impose each of the counterfactual
tax systems, we always impose that b − T (b) stays constant. The counterfactual tax
regimes are rendered graphically in Figure E.1 along with the actual 1999-2003 income
tax system.
Table E.1 present the percentage changes in nonemployment, labor income and the
government budget for each of the three counterfactual tax regimes. As usual, we report
both partial and full equilibrium responses, and also report the compensated responses
where we keep the marginal utility of consumption constant. We stress again, the we
do not balance the government budget in these cases, an issue that may be particularly
egregious in the context of large counterfactual reforms where the direct effect on the
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government budget may be rather large, and one might suspect that income effects arising
from lump sum transfers balancing the budget may be quantitatively important.10
The mechanically revenue neutral linear tax T ′(w) = 0.54 increases nonemployment,
and reduced expected labor income in both full and partial equilibrium almost everywhere
in the ability distribution, except at the very top. In the aggregate, the T ′(w) = 0.54
regime therefore induces an increase in the nonemployment rate, a decrease in aggregate
labor income, as well as a small reduction in the government budget stemming from
changes in the behavior of workers and firm.
Moving on to the T ′(w) = 0.30 regime, we see relatively large reduction in the nonem-
ployment rate, especially in partial equilibrium, and fairly large increases in labor income,
across the ability distribution. This implies that the aggregate nonemployment rate is re-
duced by almost 10 percent in full equilibrium, while aggregate labor income increases by
5 percent. The impact on the government budget is very large, with the full equilibrium
effect being a 24 percent drop in government revenue. We caution that if we were to make
workers absorb this reduction in the budget through lump-sum taxation, it would likely
induce rather large income effects in job search behavior. These could alter the conclusion
drawn regarding the effect of going to a T ′(w) = 0.30 regime on nonemployment and labor
income. The same caveats apply to the interpretation of the last counterfactual exercise
presented in Table E.1, where we impose the extreme tax regime T ′(w) = 0, while keeping
b − T (b) constant. This reform has the same qualitative predictions as discussed above
for the case of T ′(w) = 0.30 regime, but quantitatively, the impact is of course large, and
that includes a very large and negative impact on the government budget.
10As mentioned above, we are currently working on amending our computation algorithms to impose
balanced government budgets, but are at present unable to present empirical results for this case.
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